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This thesis brings together a collection of essays on parity 
c:x::n:iitions in international econanics: covered interest parity: 
\lIlCOVered interest par i ty: purchasing power par i ty and real interest 
parity. While each essay is an independent study of a particular 
problem area, there exists a ccmnan theme in that the set of parity 
cxn:iitions chosen for analysis is thought to be important in determining 
the short ani long-nm behaviour of exchange rates. The justification 
for the study arises fran two related issues. Firstly, as it is often 
assumed that exchange rates are determined in efficient markets, an 
analysis of international parity cxn:iitions may help us comment on the 
efficient markets hypothesis. We define efficiency according to Fama 
(1970), Where the market is said to be efficient if prices 'fully 
reflect' all currently available information. Secondly, ncdels of 
exchange rate determination, within which the above parity conditions 
play a fundamental role, have exhibited a poor empirical performance in 
the recent past. An examination of the foundations of such models may 
therefore be helpful in allocating 'blame'. of the four problem areas 
analysed ally covered interest parity was unconditionally accepted as a 
plausible assumption. Fran a possible 6330 potential arbi trage 
cpportuni ties observed dur ing the roc>nths of August and September 1987, 
only eight would have been profitable. Agents were efficient in terms 
of ensuring the forward exchange premiwn equalled the relevant interest 
rate differentials, subject to transaction costs. Some evidence 
however was found for the existence of a risk premiwn in the forward 
exchange rate during the 1920s, but attempts to model the premia as both 
a func:ticn of past forecast errors an::i as a latent variable, had limited 
success. We were therefore unable to verify the existence of risk-
averse speculative agents in foreign exchange markets. Purchasing 
power parity, analysed in terms of a theory of arbitrage for the period 
1975 to 1980, using a recently developed econanetric teclmique -
cointegration - was rejected. This would imply that COImlOdity 
arbitrage may be inefficient. A direct test of real interest parity 
using the bivariate vector autoregression approach, was also decisively 
rejected for the period 1979 to 1986. The observation that real 
interest rates do not fully reflect all currently held informaticn 
suggests that the long nm credibi I i ty of the European Monetary System 
may be suspect and that governments can influence national 
investment/saving decisions by intervention in domestic financial 
markets. 
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I~ICN 
I As for foreign exchange, it is allOC)St as romantic as young love, and 
qui te as resistant to formulae I • 
Mencken, H.L., 1924, Prejudices Vol. IV 
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1 Introduct icn 
'!his thesis consists of a collection of essays which test 
international parity conditions: covered interest parity; unc:overed 
interest parity: purchasing power parity and real interest parity. The 
preoccupation with internat ional par i ty condi tions ar ises from the 
consideration that they are a reflection of equilibrium conditions in 
the current and capital accounts of the balance of payments, and may be 
viewed as underpirming international monetary order by anchoring 
exchange rate m:wements within a floating exchange rate regime. The 
justification for this study stems from the puzzling behaviour of 
exchange rates during the recent float and the poor empirical 
performance of asset-type models of exchange rate determination which 
were developed to explain such behaviour. As the processes underlying 
international parity conditions also drive exchange rates, then a 
clearer understanding of certain parity conditions will help increase 
our understanding of how exchange rates are determined. 
International parity conditions are often used as building blocks 
in m::xiels of exchange rate determination, often regarded as 'self-
evident truths' from which a model is constructed. An examination of 
such 'truths' is therefore warranted to ensure that asset type models of 
exchange rate determinat ion rest on solid fOllIldat ions. M::>reover, it is 
often assumed that foreign exchange markets are efficient and if we 
define market efficiency acx:.'Ording to Fama (1970), as being a market 
which 'fully reflects' all current and past infonnation, then 
international parity relationshix:s. market efficiency and exchange rate 
behaviour becane inextricably linked. We should, however, identify 
what is meant by the term 'fully reflect' in our definition of 
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efficiency. FollC»ling Levich (1979), to make sense of the term, sane 
view of equilibrium prices or expecte:i returns is require:i. If, for 
example, the excess market return on asset j is given by 
Zjt - Xjt - E(Xjtl~-1) 
where Xjt is the one period percentage return, S2t-1 is the information 
set, a bar denotes an equilibrium value and Zjt is the excess market 
return, then if the market for asset j is efficient, Zjt should be 
orthoganal to the information set, ie, E(Zj t l2t-1) - 0 and serially 
uncorre1 ate:i. Agents are therefore rational in that they do not make 
systematic forecasting errors and they know the market equilibrium 
process. Hence an analysis of international parity conditions will 
allC»l us to consider the efficiency of markets within which the exchange 
rate is determine:! and also the validity of using certain parity 
condi t ions as axians when bui lding models of exchange rate 
determinaticn. 
The processes underlying exchange rate behaviour are therefore the 
central concern of this thesis. Behaviour halever cannot be analyse:! 
in isolation but must be given a frame of reference by which we can 
judge performance and attempt to ident i ty cause and effect. Hence 
recent exchange rate behaviour should be put into context by considering 
the conditions and circumstances of events prior to the general floating 
of exchange rates in the early 1970s. By such an exercise we may be 
able to understand the nature of the ol::serve:i series of puzzles which 
IlOtivate:i the developnent of asset type models of exchange determination 
with their reliance on international parity conditions. 
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'I1le remainder of this chapter is set out as follows: sect ion 2 
discusses the behaviour of exchange rates both with the 1920s experience 
of floating exchange rates and during the most recent period of floating 
exchange rates. Section 3 considers the view that emerged in the early 
1970s of the exchange rate as an asset price; sections 4 and 5 discuss 
the role of parity conditions in asset-type models of exchange rate 
determination, summarizing the empirical performance of such models, and 
section 6 ccn::ludes the introduction by overviewing the collection of 
essays on parity conditions that comprise the major interest of the 
thesis. 
13 
~ Floating Exchange Rates: ~ Historical Perspective 
The IOC'St recent experience with floating exchange rates for the OK 
officially came into being on 23rd June 1972, when the OK Treasury 
announced that efforts to maintain sterling at a fixed value were at an 
end. By March 1973 the Bretton Woods system of fixed but adjustable 
exchange rates, devised in 1944 as a blueprint for creating a new post-
war monetary order, had colla~ completely. 'Ihe major trading 
econanies had been forced by international events to folloo the p:>licy 
prescriptial advocated by IOC'St international monetarists of the time who 
saw flexible exchange rates as a panacea for the economic ills of the 
post-war world (eg see beloo Friedman 1953, Johnson 1970, Malchup,1972). , , 
Bretton Woods had failed to deal with fW1darnental current account 
imbalances of 1960s and 1970s and eventually collapsed under the 
pressure of an explosion of international liquidi ty and speculat i ve 
ITOVements in capital. The source of the increase in international 
liquidity of this period can be argued as being a consequence of US 
p:>licy to finance the escalating Vietnam War and to deal with a domestic 
recessial. Both problems were financed by expansionary monetary and 
fiscal policies, resulting in a large and grooing US current account 
deficit. The international monetary mechanism was such that the US 
current ac:co\Dlt deficit was reflected in large and growing current 
ao:::ount surpluses of the major trading partners of the US, particularly 
West Germany and Japan. Such surpluses led to increased dollar 
holdings by European and Japanese central banks, increasing money 
supplies, hence inflationary pressure in both the national economies and 
the world ec:a1CX11Y. Further, persistent large overseas dollar holdings 
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together with controls on US noney markets (Regulation Q), led to the 
steady expansion of the Eurcx:lollar market from the late 1950s. This 
developnent also contributed to the increase in capital mobility of the 
period, the main attraction being the immunity from exchange controls. 
When in 1970 the Nixon administration lowered domest ic interest rates at 
a time when European countries, especially West Germany, were pursuing 
tight nonetary policies, the ensuing speculatative capital outflow of 
cbllars from the US, along with the on-going belief that the US dollar 
was overvalued, led to the collapse of Bretton Wcxx:ls and to a system of 
floating exchange rates ( ,). Thus fundamental disequilibrium as 
reflected in long-run par i ty misalignment, and the sul::st i tut ion of 
dollars for other currencies, set within the relative rigidity of 
Bretton Woods, led to the demise of the international monetary system. 
International monetarists (Triffin, 1960, Friedman, 1953, Johnsan, 
1970) had long argued that such a crisis was inevitable. They 
suggested that the experience of the 19205 had shown that long-run 
parity misalignments can have devastating effects on national and world 
econanies. The return to the Gold standard in 1925 had resulted in 
parity misalignrnents in Europe that were quite sul::stantial. Sterling 
had been fixed at its pre-war parity of $4.86, arguably overvalued by 
aroun:i 10% (Keynes, 1931, Friedman and Schwartz, 1982), and the 
misalignment had been further aggravated by the return of France and 
Belgium to Gold standard parities which undervalued their currencies. 
------------------------------------------------------------------------
(, ) Taylor (1986), notes that by the time Bretton Woods had collapsed 
the Bundesbank would often have to a.l:sorb over $1 bi 11 ion in an hour if 
the market expected a parity change. 
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'!hus 
'The successful return to gold at a pre-war parity required a 
further 10t deflation of danestic prices: the attempt to achieve 
such further deflation pro:iuc::ed instead stagnation and 
unemployment, fran which Britain was unable to recover until it 
finally devalued the pound in 1931'. 
Friedman and Schwartz, 1982, p 4. 
The core problem of adjustment in the late 1920s had been the 
cbmward inflexibi li ty of wages. While prices, other than wages, had 
been relatively flexible during this period, any reduction in the price 
level led to higher real incanes at hcme rather than greater 
canpetitiveness abroad. Britain in the late 1920s was forced to 
implement a policy of historically high interest rates to attract 
foreign exchange with which to support sterling at its abnormally high 
fixed parity level. 
'!hus internat ional econanists argued. that in a changing econanic 
environment, such as that in evidence in the 1950s and 1960s, where 
slJccessful reconstruction and expansicn in Europe had resulted in 
changing trade relationships, particularly between the tE and Europe, 
reliance en expenditure reducing policies would be ill-advised for 
deficit countries. Cc:nversely, expenditure increasing policies with 
full employment would be inflationary for surplus countries. under 
Bretton Wc:x:ds the only other course of actien was the expenditure 
swi tching pol icies of devaluation or revaluatien. Such actien would 
increase uncertainty and threaten stability if the sharp discrete 
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changes in exchange rates were implemented too frequently - as would be 
the case in a changing econanic envirooment. 'Ihus as early as 1953 
Friedman had put forward a ~rful case for floating exchange rates: 
'If a country has an incipient surplus of receipts over payments ••• 
the exchange rate will tend to rise, if it has an incipient 
deficit, the exchange rate will tend to fall. If the conditions 
responsible for the rise and fall of the exchange rate are 
generall y rejected as temporary, actual or potential holders of a 
country's currency will tend to change their holdings in such a way 
as to moderate the movement in the exchange rate'. 
Friedman, 1953, p 161. 
Embryonic deviations from parity would therefore be detected and 
adjusted immediately. 
Friedman's case was based on the ol:servation that prices, 
especially wages, were sticky in a damwards direction. He argued that 
it would be less painful in terns of unemployed resources to let the 
exchange rate maintain balance of payments equilibrium. Purchasing 
~r parity and the current account of the balance of payments was 
therefore at the heart of his argument: the exchange rate was expected 
to adjust immedi ate I y under a free float to take account of changes in 
relative prices. 
Machlup (1972) followed Friedman by arguing that serious 
misalignments under flexible exchange rates 
'would hardly ever arise, and expectations of change would be 
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confined to minuscule adjustments. Profits from sma1l changes can 
only be small, inviting only moderate speculation' 
Machlup, 1972, p 70. 
Essentially, exchange rates would adjust to offset differences in 
national inflation rates, but these changes would be predictable and 
gradual. Short-run currency flCMS through the capital account would 
not be reflected in short run fluctuations in the exchange rate, as 
currency speculation would contribute to the stabilization of currency 
markets. Speculators would buy when the currency was ICM in price, 
recognizing the temporary nature of the deviation from equilibriwn, and 
se1l when it was high for the same reason. Rational behaviour would 
ensure stability of the exchange rate, thus deviations from purchasing 
pc:Mer parity would be small due to speculative activities 
(Friedman, 1953). 
For by reducing uncertainty, instabi li ty and by-passing the problem 
of sticky prices, flexible exchange rates would isolate a country from 
shocks emanating from the rest of the world. As exchange rates would 
adjust to maintain canpetitiveness, ie the real exchange rate would 
remain calStant, this would allOH economies to have an independent 
rronetary policy without having to worry about balance of payments 
disequilibrium. Further, with flexible exchange rates trade imbalances 
N:JUld be smaller and there would be less political pressure for 
protectionism in response to a deficit. For example when in 1971 the 
OS trade balance went into def ici t for the first time in the post war 
period, Richard Nixal placed a tariff surcharge on imports, devalued the 
dollar and ended his governments canmi tment to sell gold for dollars to 
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foreign central banks. As argued by Dunn (1983), 
'Flexible exchange rates also promised to eliminate mercantilism as 
an argument for tariffs and other protectionist devices, thus 
producing an era of free or at least more liberal trade. Harry 
J'ohnson noted that a tariff merely causes an appreciation of the 
local currency which taxes export and unprotected import competing 
industries without improving the trade account or increasing 
aggregate demand... The expectation that protectionism can 
improve the balance of payments and generate an increase in 
aggregate demand obviously makes no sense if the exchange rate 
adjusts to maintain payments equi librium with IOOSt of the payments 
adjustment in the exchange rate occurr ing in the current account'. 
Dunn, 1983, p 6. 
Central banks would also have less need to hold foreign exchange as 
reserves simply because they would have less need to use them. 'I1lus 
the concern about ensuring an adequate supply of reserves for the world 
ecc:nomic system manifested in the creation of Special Drawing Rights in 
the 1960s, would be solved. It was also argued that any increase in 
foreign exchange risk that the move to a floating exchange rate system 
may bring would be offset by the development of existing markets in 
forward exchange and other hedging instruments, thus reducing the costs 
of short-term uncertainty which may retard trade and investment. 
Such were the arguments for flexible exchange rates. Advocates of 
S\.ICh a system saw the flexibility of exchange rates as ensuring 
international monetary order via continuous adjustment to purchasing 
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pc:N!r parity value, which in turn would be a product of efficient 
financial and commodity arbitrage. 
'!he recent experience with floating exchange rates has, hcMever, 
not accorded with this textbook ideal. Indeed, the period since 1973 
has generated a series of empirical anomalies which have yet to be 
satisfactory explained (eg see Dornbusch, 1987). Forerrost among these 
is the oJ:served and persistent deviations of major exchange rates from 
their purchasing power parity levels since the early 1970s. These 
deviations are strikingly evident from a comparison of the variation in 
the relative national price level with the gyration of the sterling-US 
dollar exchange rate over the period (figure 1) (2). Such anomalies have 
been noted, for example, by Mussa (1984) who notes that, during the 
1970s the standard deviat ion of month I y changes in the logar i thin of the 
spot exchange rates between major currencies and the US dollar has 
frequently been above 5 percent, where the standard deviation of 
Consumer Price indices has been around 1 percent per month, with monthly 
changes virtually never excee:iing 5% (Mussa, 1984). Further, Dooley 
and Isard, 1981 and others eg Mussa, 1979, and Frenkel and Hussa, 1980, 
argue that oI:served monthly changes in exchange rates during the 1970s 
were precianinantly unexpected and unpredictable. MacDonald (1988) 
cx:llIuents on the persistence of this volatility into the 1980s, giving an 
example of the daily percentage changes of four bilateral exchange rates 
------------------------------------------------------------------------
(2) In figure 1 the exchange rate is the danestic price of a unit of 
foreign currency, the price term is canputed using consumer price 
indices, and both exchange rate and price are expressed in logarithms. 
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against the pound sterling, as being typical of the recent float: 
Tuesday, 4 June 1985 
Deutschmark 0.89 
French franc 1.04 
.Japanese yen 
Swiss franc 
1.55 
1.06 
MacDanald, 1988, p 8. 
A response to this phencmenon was the replacement of the early 
flexible pr ice rrodels of exchange rate determination which assume 
cc::ntinuous purchasing pJWer parity (Frenkel, 1976), with a sticky-price 
version which generates exchange rate overshooting (Dornbusch, 1976). 
The extent and persistence of real exchange rate volatility over 
the period still remains a major p.lZzle however. Dornbusch (1987), 
notes that 
'While the overshooting theory does seem to explain gross movements 
in the real exchange rate, better at least than competing theories, 
shorter-term movements remain completely unexplained. At times it 
seems that the exchange rate "overshoots the overshoot ing 
equilibrium." ••• The chief problem with the overshooting theory, 
• •• is that it does not explain well the shorter-term dynamics' • 
Dornbusch, 1987, pp 18-19. 
Dornbusch explains the real appreciation of the dollar between 1980 and 
1984 as matching fairly well the expected rate of real appreciaticn as 
eml:xx:lied in the long-run real interest differential. Between 1985 and 
1987 US real interest rates fell and 
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'the dollar followed sui t ' • 
O:>rnbusch, 1987, p 18. 
In the shorter term however, especially the appreciation that took 
place between J'ul y 1984 and February 1985 
, ••• all measurable fundamentals - not only real interest rates, but 
also rroney growth rates, real growth rates, the current account, 
and the country risk premium versus the Eurodollar market ••• were, 
if anything, moving in the wrong direction. It appears that the 
dollar overshot the overshooting equilibrium' • 
O:>rnbusch, 1987, pp 18-19. 
An examinaticn of figures 1 and 2 (pp 49-50) ~ld seem to confirm 
this view. '!he longer-term trends in exchange rates are not captured 
by trends in relative prices, especially fran 1977 onwards. Thus 
movements in nominal exchange rates have resul ted in real exchange rate 
changes. Similarly, between mid 1984 and early 1985 US real interest 
rates fell dramatically, reducing US-OK real interest differentials, 
which were not tracked by exchange rate movements (3) • 
There also appears to be scant evidence that the speculation that 
takes place in foreign exchange markets is stabilizing. Firstly, the 
forward rate has been shown in many studies to be less than optimal 
predictor of future spot rates (see Essay II below), a fact which is 
often attributed to the existence of an exchange risk premium, but one 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
(3) In figure 2, RIUS is the US real interest rate and RIOK, the OK 
real interest rate. 
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which quest ions forward market eff iciency. Second I y, randcxn walk 
results for exchange rate behaviour (eg see Frankel and Froot, 1987) 
suggests that rational agents wi 11 use the current spot rate as an 
cptimal predictor of the future spot rate ani not as argued by Friedman 
the fundamental equilibriwn of the purchasing power parity condition. 
'If 'expected depreciation' is a variable that is always equal to 
zero, then it cannot have a stabil izing effect on investor 
behaviour' • 
Lbmbusch, 1987, p 20. 
Perhaps JOOSt damning to the view that agents in foreign exchange 
markets heed fundamentals in the short nm is the growth in recent years 
of teclmical analysis as a forecasting methodology. Euranoney 
(August, 1987) reports that forecasting services offering fundamental 
forecasts tended to offer them for longer horizons while only a few 
services canbined the forecasting and technical techniques. The JOOSt 
profitable forecasters were those who were teclmical rather than 
fundamentalist. 
We are therefore led to questicn aspects of the perceived behaviour 
of agents in foreign exchanqe markets. We question whether exch.anqe 
rate ItDVeI'!IeIlts are based on fundamentals as embodied in covered and 
uncovered interest parity, purchasing power parity and real interest 
parity, all of which are a result of efficient oommodity and financial 
arbi trage. 'lhus viewing the exchange rate as an asset price, where 
price is determined in a highly organized, efficient market, and 
building no:1els with such a philosophy in mind becanes a crucial issue. 
23 
'Ibe exchange rate as an asset price and the role of parity conditions in 
roodels of exchange rate determination are discussed in the following two 
sectialS. 
24 
~ 'Ibe Exchange Rate: An Asset Price 
The volatil i ty of exchange rates during the recent float has led to 
the view that deviations fran long-run equilibrium can be explained in 
terns of 'well behaved' speculative behaviour with respect to asset 
supplies and asset demands. SUch an approach is at the heart of the 
literature en mc:dern theories of exchange rate determination. 
M;)ney, it is argued, is a financial asset - a stock - and, as the 
exchange rate is by definition the price of one country's money in terns 
of another, the price will be determined by the demand and supply for 
the stock of foreign exchange. Hence the proponents of such a view 
argue that the exchange rate should be analysed in terms of outstanding 
stocks and demands of two monies (Mussa, 1984). 
such a view constitutes an alternative to the view where exchange 
rates are explained in terms of flows through the balance of payments 
accounts, clearing international trade flows of goods and services. 
MacDonald (1988) descr ibes the use of f1~ demand and supply as 
erroneous because: 
'the factors which I'IOtivate deinanders and suppliers of an ordinary 
good (goods other than assets) are not the same as these IOOtivating 
bJyers and sellers of assets. Thus the demand for an ordinary 
good depends upon consumer tastes, relative prices and income, 
whereas supply depends, cuocngst other things, upon productivity, 
technology and the prices of factors of production. The suppliers 
and demanders of assets are, however, I'IOtivated by the same basic 
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forces' • 
MacDona1d, 1988, p 90. 
'!he argument is that the price of foreign exchange will change 
because the market as a whole changes its view on what the currency is 
HOrth, the change in price depending on the degree to which the market 
agrees on how nruch the value of the currency should change. If 
everyone agrees that the new price is the 'correct' price, then the 
exchange rate will jump to this value and no trading will occur. Hence 
trading in foreign currency reflects the differences of opinion of 
agents operating in such markets and such differences of opinion wi 11 be 
based on differences in information and judgement. (MacDona1d, 1988). 
Equilibrium being where stock demand equals stock supply. It follows 
from this that there will exist a negative relationship between market 
certainty and volume of trading in a free market environment. If the 
expectation of the future exchange rate changes, in an efficient market 
this wi 11 affect the current rate by the same ancunt, otherwise an 
unexploited future return NJUld exist, indicating inefficiency. Such 
an argument NJUld seem to explain the vo1ati li ty of nanina1 exchange 
rates during the recent float. 
While there exists a whole range of alternative formulations of 
asset type models, since the 1970s there has emerged tHO main views of 
exchange rate behaviour: the rnc:netary approach and the portfol io balance 
approach, differing in the extent to which they allow limitations to 
pari ty relationships. An analysis of such parity concH tions may help 
to decide which model is the more convincing reflection of the real 
world, thus aiding policy makers to devise policies to anticipate 
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movements in exchange rates. Persistent long-run misal igrunent for 
example would suggest that shocks to the exchange rate can be considere:i 
permanent, affecting the real economy via real canpetitiveness. 
Dombuscb (1987) argues that the consequences of persistent exchange 
rate misalignments has a hysteresis effect which can be analysed in 
terns of an 'industrial organisaticnal approach'. When firms are 
exposed to foreign canpet it ion, persistent misalignments may cause 
them to close down in the high wage country and perhaps re-locate in 
the lCM wage country. Further, firms already locate:i in the lCM wage 
c:ountry will have incentive to expand investment and enter the market 
where domestic firms are at a disadvantage as a result of high priced 
labour. 
'A period of overvaluation or undervaluation thus changes the 
industrial landscape in a relatively permanent fashion'. 
Dornbusch, 1987, p 9. 
Ultimately therefore, a period of sustaine:i misalignment in the opposite 
direction fran the initial misalignment is require:i to remedy the trade 
effects. Bean (1987) finds evidence for the existence of a hysteresis 
effect in the OK, hence the recent overvaluation of sterling may have 
permanently damaged the relative competitiveness of the OK industrial 
base. A means by which to discriminate between roodels of exchange rate 
determination is therefore of crucial importance giving further 
justifications for the examination of the keystones of such models, ie 
parity conditions. We consider these roodels and summarize tLeir 
empirical performance in the next two sections. 
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~ Monetary Mcx:lels of Exchange Rate Determinaticn 
Monetary IOOdels can be divided into three types: flex-price (eg 
Frenkel, 1976), sticky price (eg Dornbusch, 1976) and real interest 
differential IOOdels (eg Frankel, 1979). Smith and Wickens (1987) 
differentiate between models according to how the concH tions in the 
current account of the balance of payments are viewed and the degree of 
generality built into the model. Frankel (1979) for example, builds a 
model which is general enough to allow the flex-pr ice and st icky-pr ice 
type models of Frenkel(1976) and Dombusch (1976), to be included as 
particular cases. This section will consider each type of model in 
turn. 
Flex-price Mcx:lels 
Flex-price models assume the purchasing power parity condition will 
hold; a stable deman::l for money function and efficient foreign exchange 
markets where 
'the exchange rate must adjust instantly to equilibrate the 
international demand for stocks of national assets' 
Frenkel, 1983, p 84. 
'Ihe logarithm of money demanded is assumed to be a function of the 
logarithm of real incane, y, the logaritlun of the price level, p, and 
the level of interest rates, i. Gi ven that the demand for currency is 
restricted to the demand for danestic currency, danestic and foreign 
equilibria can be given by 
ItS • P + ~y - Ai (1 ) 
ItS· • p. + fry· - Iti· (2) 
where an asterisk denotes a foreign variable. 
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As capital is perfectly mobile, i is assumed to be rigidly linked 
to the N:)rlds interest rate and, as the effect of the presence of a 
foreign goods sector is assumed to result in continuous purchasing power 
parity, ie 
(3) 
where s is the logarithm of the sp::>t exchange rate; p is the logarithm 
of the price level and an asterisk denotes a foreign variable, 
fundamental equilibrium will be maintained, thus a zero expected change 
in the exchange rate. Uncovered interest parity must therefore also 
hold, ie the current exchange rate should reflect the uncovered 
interest parity condition 
(4) 
-where LlSt ... 1 is the expected change in the logarithm of the sp::>t 
exchange rate between t and t+1, defined as the d.anestic price of a unit 
of foreign currency, it - it· is the interest differential between 
d.anestic and foreign bonds, identical in every respect except currency 
of c:1enanination(4). 
(4) Exchange rates are normally expressed in logarithms when testing 
effiCiency in order to circumvent the so-calle:i 'Siegel paradox' (Siegel 
1972) that an agent cannot simultaneously have an unbiased expectation 
of, say, the dollar-mark rate and of its reciprocal, the mark-dollar 
rate, because of Jensen's inequality. r-tOllloch (1974) has, however, 
s.hown (using 1920s data) that the operational significance of the 
Siegel paradox may be sI ight. In the present context, we use 
logari thmic transformations so that rnc:st of the quanti ties in our 
estimating relationshiI=S are in percentage terns, thus facilitating 
canparisons across exchange rates. 
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As the foreign pr ice level, p., is assumed to be exogeneous to the 
domestic econcmy and independent of the domestic price level, p, the 
exchange rate must be determined by relative roney supplies. If we 
substitute equations (1) and (2) into equation (3), we obtain: 
s • (ms - ms-) - ~y + ~.y. +A.i - Ai· 
Hence the flex-price monetary m:xiel assumes continuous existence of 
(5) 
PJrChasing paier par i ty and perfect asset subst i tutabi I i ty • Agents in 
foreign exchange markets are therefore risk neutral and are efficient, 
in that they use all currently available information when engaged in 
arbitrage activities (Fama, 1970). 
Any increase in the danest ic interest rates brought about by a 
change in the danestic money supply, will decrease the demand for money 
and as demand for foreign qocxis and assets declines a higher domestic 
price level will achieve lOClIley market equilibrium, resulting in a 
depreciation of the exchange rate. If hc:Mever the rise in interest 
rates ensue because of inflationary expectations, say an increase in the 
noney supply, and real interest rates are constant, ie 
-i • r + Ap (6) 
-where i is the naninal interest rate, r the real interest rate and A p , 
is the expected change in prices, and if we further assume real interest 
parity, ie 
(7) 
where an asterisk denotes a foreign variable, then any increase in 
domestic interest rates relative to foreign interest rates must reflect 
an increase in expected domestic inflation relative to expected foreign 
inflation, ie, 
- -(1 - i-)· (Ap - Ap·) (8 ) 
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'Ihus an increase in the danestic interest rate wi 11 be the result of an 
increase in inflationary expectations and will therefore be ~iated 
with a low domestic exchange rate, (high s). Hence with the additional 
assumption of real interest parity the counter intuitive pc:sitive 
relationship between the interest rate and spot rate (as previously 
defined) becanes less defiant to instinctive reasoning. 
One of the first tests of the reduced form of the flex-price model 
(equation 5) was conducted by Frenkel (1976), for the period 
corresponding to the German hyper-inflation, 1920 to 1923, between the 
Reichmark and US dollar exchange rates. Whi le his tests offered support 
for the flex-price rocdel, as did tests for the early part of the recent 
float (eq see Bilson, 1978, Hodr ick, 1978, Dornbusch, 1979, Putnarn and 
~, 1979), when the sample period extends beyond 1978, the models' 
have poor explanatory pcMer (eq see Dornbusch, 1980, Frankel, 1984, 
Haynes and stone, 1981, Meese and Rogoff, 1983). One particular 
feature to emerge fran empir ical studies of exchange rate movements in 
the 1970s was the implication that an increase in relative money 
supplies led to an exchange rate appreciation when inflationary 
expectations are high. While this N:>Uld seem to explain a 'mystery' of 
the late 1970s, when although Germany was running a large current 
a.ccc:nmt surplus and the US a large current account deficit, the demarrl 
for the mark increased, the evidence does not accord with the 
predictions of the roonetary model. Frankel (1982a) suggests that the 
'mystery of the multiplying marks' is solved if one considers that 
current a.c::c:ount imbalances reflect a redistribution of wealth fran the 
deficit country to the surplus country, thus increasing the demand for 
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the surplus currency and reducing deman:i for the deficit currency. An 
increase in rroney supply initiated by a current account surplus would 
then lead to an expected appreciation of the currency and, in an 
efficient market, an actual appreciation of the currency. 
MacDanald (1989) in his survey on empirical evidence on the validity of 
asset market IOOdels, considers the research effort expended in an 
attempt to trace the source of the failure of flex-price models of 
exchange rate determination. Relaxation of subtractive constraints 
imposed on relative rroney, incane and interest rate tenns does not lead 
to improvement of performance (eg see Hayes and stone, 1981), while 
relaxing non-zero wealth restrictions results in improved in-sample 
performance (eg see Frankel, 1984). Autcx:orrelat ion and dynamic 
misspecification problems have, in recent research, been addressed by 
seeking to test the val idi ty of monetary approaches by the use of a form 
of the error correction medel (eg see Boothe and Glassman, 1987) and are 
generally unable to give support to the rronetary IOOdel. Hoffman and 
Schlagenhauf (1983) and Kearney and MacD::>na.ld (1987) test versions of 
the monetary model where the simultaneous relationship between the 
relative interest rate/forward premium term and the exchange rate is 
dealt with by offering a rational expectations solution. SUch research 
activity has met with some success and has led to further empirical ~rk 
which tests for the presence of speculative bubbles in tenns of multiple 
rational expectations solutions. Kearney and Ma.cOonald (1987) for 
example, cannot reject the no-bubbles hypothesis for the Austral ian-tE 
dollar exchange rate, while Meese (1986) rejects the no-bubbles 
hypothesis for dollar-yen, dollar-mark and dollar-sterling exchange 
rates. The above tests were concerned wi th in-sample performance of 
the flex-price approach. The conclusion to emerge from empirical 
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research on out-of-sample performance is that such mcxiels fai I to out 
perform a simple random walk roodel for most major currencies, Meese and 
Rogoff (1983), Finn (1986). The empirical evidence on such models 
tends therefore to be inconclusive and an examination of its assumptions 
justified. 
sticky-price Models 
The sticky-price version of the nonetary approach to exchange rate 
determination differs fran the flex-price approach in t~ important 
respects: firstly the sticky-price approach relaxes the assumption of 
continuous existence of purchasing pcN!r parity and secondly, relaxes 
the assumption that c::ianestic interest rates are rigidly linked to 
foreign interest rates, thus allow domestic interest rates to be altered 
by monetary policy. If we follow the Farna (1970) definition of 
efficiency, where agents in foreign exchange markets use all available 
information when setting price, the implication is that the expected 
future spot rate will only randomly deviate fran the forward rate 
(deviations being the result of 'news' hitting the market during the 
forward contracts term to maturity). Hence the expected change in the 
spot rate will be equal to the forward premium plus a randan forecasting 
error. If we consider equation (4), ie, the uncovered interest parity 
ccn:iition, this implies a link between the international interest rate 
differentials and the forward premium for the same maturity, ie, the 
covered interest parity condition: 
F 1 + i 
S 1 + i* 
(10) 
where S is the spot exchange rate, i is the interest rate and F is the 
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forward exchange rate of the same maturity as the interest rate. An 
asterisk denotes a foreign variable. If foreign exchange markets are 
efficient, the relationship expressed in equation (10) will hold 
ccntinuously (subject to transactioo ccsts), any profitable 
opportunities being risklessly arbitraged aJIfay as soon as they arise. 
Covered interest parity then assumes the role of an identity to be used 
in key relationshiFS such as uncovered interest parity. 
Essentially, sticky-price JOOdels can be described as follas: 
Say we have a rise in interest rates initiated by a tight monetary 
pol icy. This can be represented as 
di • -( 1/ A)drns 
Hence an unanticipated fall in the money supply, with sticky gocds 
market prices, will lead to a rise in the interest rate to clear the 
(9) 
money market. The exchange rate will overshoot (s will fall) its long-
run purchasing power parity value in order to maintain covered interest 
parity, ie, equation (10). Agents will exploit all available 
profitable opportunities by arbitraging aJIfay any deviation fran covered 
interest parity via an exchange rate appreciation. Agents will also be 
aware that the current interest rate wi 11 not be expected to rule in the 
future thus uncovered interest parity will be violated, ie equation (4), 
repeated here for convenience: 
(4) 
The exchange rate will therefore depreciate as a result of speculative 
behaviour until equation (4) holds. ~r this may only be a short-
run equilibrium as while equation (4) represents equilibrium in the 
capital acx::ount of the balance of payments, the relationship may not 
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represent equilibrium in the current account, ie, the purchasing power 
parity condition. As prices begin to fall in response to the initial 
contraction of the money supply and interest rates decline to ensure 
noney market equilibrium, the exchange rate will depreciate further, 
converging towards its long-nm purchasing power parity value, arbitrage 
ensuring that in the long-nm both the capital and current account of 
the balance of payments being are in equilibrium. Hence purchasing 
power parity ties the system d.am in the long-run, while covered 
interest parity and uncovered interest parity determine the short-run 
movements in the exchange rate. 
Early tests of sticky-price models had mixed results. While 
there was sane evidence of overshooting (Wallace 1979), in other 
respects, such as insignificant and wrongly signed coefficients (eg see 
Hacche and Townend 1981), the performance of the mxlel has been poor. 
Early tests of the sticky-price mxlel also suggest they have a poor 
record when fitted out of sample (Meese and Rogof£, 1983). More recent 
tests hcMever seem to give sane support to the mxle 1. Pappe 1 (1988 ) 
incorporates cross equation constraints and assumes rational 
expectations to estimate the IOOdel for Germany, Japan, the UK and US 
fran 1973 to 1984, concluding that his results give empirical support to 
the sticky-price model. Smith and Wickens (1987, 1988) and Barr (1989) 
also find support for the model. Smi th and Wickens (1987) for 
instance, find that the exchange rate overshoots by 21 percent in 
response to a 5 percent change in the money supply. 
Mac:Donald (1988) also suggests that in periods of extremely tight 
monetary policy overshooting may offer a 
35 
'concise description of the real world behaviour of exchange rates' 
MacDonald, 1988, p 97. 
MacDonald gives the example of 'Ihatcherist monetarist policies 
leading to very high interest rates in the UK relative to the US for the 
period 1979 to 1981, the protracted real exchange rate appreciation 
affecting the real sector of the econany. 'Ihus 
'high interest rate pol icy .•• a crucial issue for the pol icy 
makers in a world of high capital nobility, sticky prices and 
flexible exchange rates'. 
MacDonald, 1988, p 98. 
As with the flex-price model, it would seem that the sticky-price 
version has also had mixed support and, while more recent evidence would 
seem to be favourable to the model, an examination of the foundations of 
the model is warranted. 
Real Interest Differential Models 
'!he real interest differential approach to exchange rate behaviour 
nests the flex-price approach and the sticky-price approach within a 
Jrore general model (eg see Frankel, 1979), by emphasizing the role of 
moderate inflationary expectations within a sticky-price framework. 
Hence monetary impulses do not daninate in the short-nm, but are of 
long-nm fundamental importance, thus will be incorporated into market 
participants expectations of the future value of the exchange rate. 
'!he spot exchange rate is 
'negatively related to the nominal interest rate differential but 
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positively related to the expected long-run inflation 
differential' • 
Frankel, 1979, p 610. 
and will 
'differ fran, or 'overshoot' its equilibrium value by an anotmt 
proportional to the real interest differential, that is, the 
ncminal interest rate differential minus the expected inflation 
differential' • 
Frankel, 1979, p 611. 
'Ihus equilibrium in the capital account, ie uncovered interest 
parity, is modified to include inflationary expectations: 
- - -~ s • - ."(s-s)+ ~p- ~p. (11 ) 
where s denotes equilibrium purchasing pcMer parity value of the spot 
- -exchange rate and o!1p ando!1p· are the current inflationary expectations 
at hone and abroad. !be dynamics of the IOOdel are such that when s-s 
the exchange rate will change according to the expected long-run 
inflation differential, thus ex-ante purchasing ~r parity, but in the 
short run it will differ fran its equilibrium value by a real interest 
differential. Substituting equation (11) into equation (4), ie the 
uncovered interest parity condition, 
(1 ) 
yields 
1 
- -s-s • - - (i-~p) - (i.-~p.)] ( 12) 
where the term in square brackets represents the real interest 
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differential. Thus if a fall in the cianestic money supply cause agents 
to revise their inflationary expectations, the initial exchange rate 
a,wreciation or overshooting must be greater than that in the sticky-
price no:iel where only naninal interest rates are considered, the 
expected, therefore anticipated, inflation differential affecting the 
initial rise in interest rates as well as the initial unexpected fall in 
the money supply. 
As with the flex-price no:iels, tests of the real interest differential 
rrodels have sane empirical val idi ty for periods before 1978 (eg 
Frankel, 1979), }:ut Ibrnhlsch (1980), Hayes and stone, (1981), Driskell 
and Sheffrin, (1981) and Baillie and Selover (1987) argue such mcxiels 
break c:bm when estimated for periods beyond 1978. SUch evidence 
suggests the inability of monetary asset-type no:iels consistently to 
explain exchange rate behaviour. 
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~ Portfolio Balance Approach to Exchange Rate Determination 
A fundamental assumption in monetary rocdels of exchange rate 
determination is that domestic residents and foreign bonds are 
assumed to be perfect sul::sti tutes. ~ver, within a system of 
floating exchange rates it is reasonable to suppcse that when the 
range of assets available to agents includes bonds issued in 
different COlmtries, then factors such as differential tax risk, 
poli tical risk, exchange risk etc, become important issues. This 
implies that assets should not be viewed as perfect sul::stitutes. 
'Ihus uncovered interest parity may not hold exactly but may 
incorporate a risk premium to allow for imperfect sul::stitutability. 
Equation (4) then becanes 
-
.1s - i-i· - A. (13) 
where A. is a risk premium. If pJrtfolio holders perceive foreign 
investments as increasing portfolio risk, in an efficient market 
agents will reallocate their bond portfolios to minimize the effects 
of the revaluation on their wealth. 
Thus the foreign rate of return plus the expected change in the 
dcmestic exchange rate must exceed the domestic interest rate so as 
to compensate investors for increased risk taking, ie 
Similarly if foreign investments reduce portfolio risk then domestic 
interest rates must exceed the foreign rate of return plus the 
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(14) 
expected change in the domestic exchange rate, ie 
.. 
i > i· + L1s 
Investors will reallocate their portfolio until returns are 
equalized, risk accounting for the observed deviation from the 
Ul'lC.'OVered interest parity condition as represented by equation (4). 
Hence expected exchange rate movements and by defini tion, 
current exchange rate movements, will to some extent depend on the 
perceived risk of holding foreign assets. If the perceived risk is 
not canpensated for in actual and expected returns, eg say the 
expected return from holding foreign bonds is less than the expected 
return from holding domestic bonds, then the domestic exchange rate 
will appreciate (s falls) as foreign bonds are sold. Thus the risk 
premium is positive if foreign investments increase portfolio risk 
and negative if foreign investment reduce portfolio risk. The risk 
premium will therefore be time-varying, the time variance depending 
en the innovations in asset markets and the political and economic 
reactions to those innovations. It is reasonable to assume 
therefore that risk premiums will tend to have the same sign over 
(15 ) 
several time periods. Further, if a risk premium exists, there will 
be a degree to which asset suppl ies and foreign exchange reserves can 
be manipulated without off-setting movements in exchange rates. 
'!be portfolio balance approach to exchange rate d!termination also 
differs from the monetary approach in that the dynamic adjustment 
from short-run to long-run equilibrium highlights the role of a 
current ao::ount imbalance without the need to impose sticky prices. 
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The current account imbalance (deviation fran purchasing pc:Mer 
parity) is thought of as being determine:i by the trade balance plus 
the interest earnings fran holdings of foreign assets. As the 
capi tal account represents the change in the net domest ic holdings of 
foreign assets, foreign assets can only be accumulated by the country 
l"UIUling a current account surplus as only with a surplus will 
interest rates be falling and the danestic exchange rate be expecte::l 
to depreciate, thus making the purchase of foreign bonds a profitable 
exercise. 
Feedback effects however are also important. As the level of 
wealth changes this will subsequently affect consumption (life cycle 
hypothesis) and future asset demand via the effects of the change in 
weal th on money demand - thus future behaviour of exchange rates. 
Persistent current account imbalances would then represent a 
continuous transfer of weal th as flCMS canpound. 
Portfolio balance models of exchange rate determination have 
been developed by eg Branson (1977), lsard (1980), Dornbusch and 
Fischer (1980), and can be fonnally represented as follCMS: 
. -• 
B - B(i,i)W 
.. 
SF - F( i ,i, )W 
.... 
M - M( i, i,)W 
W-M+B+SF 
(16 ) 
(17 ) 
(18 ) 
(19 ) 
where W is wealth (a hcm::lgeneous scale variable enabling the analysis 
to be conducte:i in ncminal terms), B represents the holdings of 
danestic bonds, SF are holdings of foreign bonds denaninated in 
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domestic currency (where S is the domestic price of a unit of foreign 
currency), and M is domestically issued money. S, SF and M are 
functions of domestic and foreign interest rates, i and i· 
respectively. Hence, 
B 
'Y - -
W 
mere "f represents the share of portfol io allocated to domest ic 
assets and holdings of B are an increasing function of expected 
relative returns. In preferred habitat models, residents in each 
country are assumed to have a preference for domestic assets, hence, 
the distribution of assets is allCMed to have an effect on the 
exchange rate. In contrast the uniform preference view assumes the 
same portfolio preferences therefore the distribution of assets 
between countries has no effect on the exchange rate. 
There has been relatively little empirical work done on the 
portfolio balance approach in comparison to the monetary approach. 
Ma.cDc:rlald and Taylor (1989a) suggest that this is in part due to the 
limited availability of good disaggregated data on non-monetary 
assets. We argue however that as such models rely heavi ly on the 
existence of a time varying risk premium, then an indirect test of 
such an approach is to determine whether a risk premium exists (eg 
see Frankel, 1982, Fama, 1984). Such studies ~ld suggest the 
existence of a risk premium. 
Results of existing direct tests of the portfolio balance model 
however are mixed. Whi le in-sample tests of the models are in sane 
cases statistically supportive of the approach (eg Branson and 
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(20) 
Hal tunen , 1979), residuals in the OIS equations are highly 
autc:corre 1 ated , implying inconsistent coefficient variances. such 
results are therefore indecisive. Bisignano and Hoover (1983) 
modify the Branson and. Haltunen implementation of the model arrl 
report moderately successful results. 
More str ingent out of sample tests have also qi ven mixed 
resul ts. Meese and Ragoff (1983) conc:luded that none of the asset 
type reduced forns outperformed the simple randan-walk rocx:1el. In a 
further paper however, (Meese and Rogoff, 1984), the authors found 
that when forecasting beyond a horizon of one year, the portfolio 
balance model performance increased dramatically compared to the 
randan walk rocx:1el, suggesting that the portfolio balance approach may 
have val idi ty over the longer term. Broughton (1984) also tests the 
preferred habitat model against a random walk rocx:1el and in every 
instance the preferred habitat rocx:1el out performs that of the random 
walk. Similarly, Schinasi and SWamy (1987) using a time-varying 
IOCldel find their forecasts are consistantly better than that of a 
simple random walk model. Overall, therefore, it would seem that 
modelling risk premia in a period such as the 1920s, would be a 
worthwhile exercise. 
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§. Overview 
'!he preceding sect ions have highl ighted the histor ical and 
theoretical importance of parity conditions in international monetary 
econanics. We naq turn to an overview of the four essays that 
comprise the rest of the thesis. 
Each of the four essays are concerned with a particular 
international parity condition and with the salient issues 
surrounding it. '!he general approach use::l throughout is to discuss 
the theoretical foundations of the relevant parity condition, its 
econanic implications, and to provide a critical appraisal of 
previous empirical evidence. Before proceeding to our own empirical 
analysis, we give some considerable thought to appropriate tools of 
analysis. '!hus we suggest that increasingly sophisticated 
econometric methods are useless in an analysis of covered interest 
rate parity, where what is required is a meticulous attention to 
institutional detail and data quality. On the other hand, when 
testing real interest rate parity, or attempting to model risk-
premium deviations from uncovered interest rate parity, we apply 
state of the art advanced econometric methods. Hence, not wishing 
to be accused of using elaborate econometric techniques without 
justification, each essay devotes at least one section to a 
discussion of methodology and testing procedures in order to explain 
the use of a particular technique in the analysis of a particular 
problem. We believe that the analysis of an economic problem 
requires not only technical skills, but the ability to be discerning 
in how we might achieve our objective. 
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'Ihe general structure of each essay is therefore simi lar. We 
intrcxiuce the topic and issues; discuss the relevant theory and 
evidence; explain methodology and testing procedures; report 
empirical findings and draw conclusions. 
Essay I is primarily concerned with market efficiency and the 
role of covered interest rate arbitrage in effecting market 
efficiency. The question we examine is whether agents engaged in 
covered interest arbitrage in foreign exchange markets are efficient 
in the sense that market prices 'fully reflect' all currently 
available information (Fama, 1970), so that no profit opportunities 
are left unexploited. Covered interest parity is argued to be a 
condition which approximately reflects the efficient markets 
hypothesis. In a well developed market, with rational, profit 
seeking agents, arbitrage opportunities will be exploited as soon as 
they arise. Equil ibrium in such a market should therefore be 
continuous, the market characterized by a 'no arbitrage' condition. 
'!he 'no arbitrage' condition however conceals important relationships 
between prices of foreign exchange and domestic and foreign bonds 
which we argue can only be analysed effectively by attention to 
institutional detail. FUrther, efficiency implies that the 
exploitation of profitable arbitrage opportunities will be invariant 
to the turbulence present in the market. We a.ccontroda.te such 
consideratiCllS into our analysis by using contemporaneously sampled, 
five minute data, sampled around the intrcxiuction of 'news' into the 
market. The 'news' takes the form of US and OK econcmic indicators 
announced in August and September 1987, (eg money supply figures and 
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tmemployment figures). By using the exact formula as used by market 
traders we are able to measure the effectiveness of agents in 
maintaining the 'no arbitrage' condition for sterling, dollar and the 
deutschmark, during periods when prices of foreign exchange are at 
their mcst volatile, thus riskless profitable opportunities are mcst 
I ikely to arise. 
In Essay 11 we turn the focus of our analysis to the period of 
floating exchange rates in the 1920s. We take as our starting point 
the rejection of speculative efficiency for this period (MacD:Dald 
and Taylor, 1989a). But the speculative efficiency hypothesis 
(Bilsan, 1978) is itself a joint hypothesis that agents are endowed 
with rational expectations and that they are risk neutral. Failure 
of the joint hypothesis may thus be due to a number of factors: 
irrationality, speculative bubbles (so that agents find it hard to 
locate the rational expectations equil ibrium), or risk aversion. In 
this essay, we examine one of these possibilities in detail - ie 
whether rejection may be due purely to risk aversion. 1920s data 
seems ideally suited to this purpose, indeed one section of the essay 
is devoted to a discussion of the historical background of the data. 
We apply two econometric models of the risk premium which have 
recently been applied to the contemporary foreign exchange market, to 
1920s data. The ARCl:1 (or GARCH) formulation no:lels the risk premium 
as a function of the conditional variance of forecast errors, while 
the DYMIMIC formulation no:lels risk as a latent variable in a 
stochastically noisy environment. We apply the tests to dollar-
sterling, franc-sterling, reichmark-sterling, franc-dollar and 
reichmark-dollar exchange rates during the period January 1921 to 
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May 1924. We also apply the ARCli tests to the reichmark-dollar and 
reichmark-sterl ing exchange rates for the period January 1921 to 
March 1923. We therefore sample out the period of rapid German 
hyperinflation against two major currencies. 
A major difference between the floating rate experience of the 
1920s and the recent experience, is that purchasing power parity 
appears a reasonable approximation to the long-nm tendencies of 
exchange rates during the former period (Taylor and M::Mahon, 1988) 
rut not during the latter period (eg see Dornbusch and Frankel, 1988, 
Taylor, 1988d). Much of the previous work on the long-run 
tendencies of exchange rates during the recent float has concentrated 
on aggregate national price data. In Essay III we attempt to look 
behind the veil of aggregation in an analysis of the' law of one 
price' as viewed as a long-nm phenanenon holding between traded 
industrial goods. We apply a recently developed econanetric 
technique - cointegration - which essentially tests for long-run 
relationshiIS by focusing on short-run deviations to see if they have 
mean-reverting tendencies. We use cointegration to test for mean-
reverting properties in a sample of 35 industries, constituting 24 
percent of the net manufacturing output of the UK during the period 
under consideration. The implications of our analysis are discussed 
in terns of the extent to which purchasinq power parity can then be 
considered as a long-nm fundamental equilibrium condition to which 
the exchange rate must at least have a tendency to converge if the 
price mechanism is an efficient allocator of scarce resources. 
47 
We remain in the contemporaxy pericxi of floating exchange rates 
in Essay IV, but utilize data for the period 1979 to 1986 to test for 
the existence of real interest pari ty between country pairs fran US, 
Europe and Japan. We discuss the theoretical argument for the 
existence of real interest parity in terms of parity conditions: ex-
ante purchasing power parity and uncovered interest parity, in 
canbinatioo with the domestic and foreiqn clcsed Fisher condition. 
Under real interest rate parity and rational expectations, the 
naninal interest rate differential becomes an optimal predictor of 
the future inflation rate differential. We exploit this fact to 
employ an efficient, direct test of real-interest parity which tests 
the implications of the rational expectations hypothesis for both the 
first and second nanents of the distribution of forecast errors. By 
the ill\lXlSiticn of the set of restrictions implied by rational 
expectations we are able to analyse the extent to which real interest 
parity held during a period when capital controls were relaxed and 
the nu-opean t-t::netary System was in operation. 
Hence the scope of this thesis is wide in that it allows a range 
of ec:axxnetric techniques to be employed to particular problems. 
'!be problems are linked however by their nature, in that they arise 
fran the CC4'lSideraticn of a particular set of parity conditions which 
are thalght to play an i~rtant part in determining the behaviour of 
exchange rates. 
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CX>VERED INlERESr PARITY 
ARBI'1RAGE AND NEH) .:. AN El>1PIRICAL ANALYSIS 
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1.1 Introduction 
Covered Interest Parity is a key relationship in international 
econanics in that it provides a theoretical economic link between 
international nominal interest rate differentials and spot and forward 
foreign exchange rate differentials. The covered interest parity 
theorem asserts that the interest differential between two assets, 
identical in every respect except currency of denanination, should be 
zero once allowance is made for cover in the forward exchange market. 
Hence the essential notion underlying covered interest parity is that of 
COVered arbi trage. Agents in foreign exchange and eurooeposi t markets 
will switch portfolios depending on relative rates of interest 
available internationally until all profitable opportunities are 
exploited. Keynes (1923) described the relationship as being one where 
, ••• forward quotations for the purchase of the currency of the 
dearer money market tend to be cheaper than spot quotat ions by a 
percentage per lTalth equal to the excess of the interest which can 
be earned in a month over the dearer market over what can be 
earned on the cheaper.' 
Keynes, 1923, p 124. 
If covered interest arbi trage represents r iskless arbi trage 
cpportunities, then profitable deviations from covered interest parity 
will irdicate market inefficiency in that prices of foreign exchange do 
not reflect all available infonnation (Farna, 1S70). As prices can be 
thought of as aggregators of structural information, inefficient covered 
arbitrage will have implications for allocative efficiency at both 
microeconanic am macroecananic level. At a microeconanic level the 
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arbi trageur suppl ies the forward contracts that hedgers and speculators 
in forward exchange markets demand. For example a hedger, in seeking 
to divest risk by demanding currency forward, will have brought about a 
situation whereby interest rate differentials do not match the forward 
premium on the currency concerned, and arbitrageurs, by acting on this 
anomaly, will transmit the hedgers demand for forward currency into a 
spot demand which they will then lend and, by doing so, ensure neither 
party bear exchange risk. (l-t:Kinnon, 1978). Similarly, if the 
current forward rate is below the expected future spot rate, speculators 
will also expect the currency to appreciate and will create a net demand 
for forward currency, which will be met by covered arbitrage. Such an 
argument follows from the consideration of the so-called Modern Theories 
of Forward Exchange, which hypothesize that the forward exchange rate is 
determined by the activities of speculators and hedgers as well as by 
interest arbitrageurs' (see Officer and Willett, 1970 for a discussion 
of such models). A consequence of such a mechanism is that arbi trage 
has a role in 1 inking the term structure of interest rates to the term 
structure of forward premia. The macroeconomic importance of covered 
interest arbitrage is merely an extension of the above argument in that 
if it is assumed that economic agents make decisions on the basis of 
oJ:served prices, then, given an efficient market, the arbitrage 
rationale is a necessary condition for optimal international allocation 
of scarce resources between al ternati ve uses. 
A further aspect of the importance of covered interest par i ty 
arises from the fact that relationships which depend on efficient 
arbitrage are often used as an identity in other key relationships. 
For example, if we assume covered interest parity, then a test of 
53 
uncovered interest parity is reduced to a test of the forward rate as an 
optimal predictor of the future spot rate (the optimality being implied 
by an additional assumption of rational expectations). As such an 
assumption is often invoked in empirical studies (ie see Essay II of 
this thesis), the maintained hypothesis of covered interest parity 
becanes a critical issue. Moreover, as discussed in the introduction 
to this thesis, asset type models of exchange rate determination often 
assume that covered interest parity will be maintained. For instance, 
in the Dornbusch (1976) sticky-price exchange rate model, a tightening 
of monetary policy will fix the forward rate one period prior to the 
terminal period (where purchasing power parity is expected to hold) to 
equate the forward rate with the terminal periods expected spot rate. 
The current spot rate one period prior to the terminal period will be 
determined by the relative interest rates expected to rule, in order to 
maintain covered interest parity. As prices are sticky, real and 
nccninal interest rates wi 11 rise in response to nominal monetary shocks, 
thus the spot rate wi 11 have to jump or over-shoot the long-run 
p.JrChasing pcMer equilibrium to offset the domestic favourable interest 
differential and maintain covered interest parity. 
M:x:lels of exchange rate determination that invoke continuous 
est ab 1 ishment of covered interest par i ty assume therefore that there 
exists a l:x::dy of market traders with sufficient liquid funds to exploit 
all prof i table arbi trage O9POrtuni ties as they occur, or that the market 
is fully efficient in that all agents are rational and fully informed, 
hence deviations from parity do not occur (eg see Taylor, 1989). 
Accordingly the frequency with which data are sampled becomes an 
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important issue in testing arbitrage efficiency(1). 
While there are empirical studies of covered interest parity which 
report deviations from parity for a wide range of assets and currencies 
(eg see Officer and Willett, 1970 for a survey), more recently, the 
focus of empirical work has been an attempt to rationalize deviations 
from parity in terms of optimal behaviour. SUch a philosophy views 
deviations from parity as a response to 'real world frictions', eg 
transaction costs (Frenkel and Levich, 1975, 1979), capital controls 
(Dooley and lsard, 1980) and capital market imperfections (otari and 
Tiwari, 1981), such 'frictions' creating a neutral band around the 
theoretical parity condition within which it would be unprofitable to 
engage in arbitrage activities. A feature of such studies however is 
that the empirical models are developed using published data, often 
averages of sane kind, which can introduce imperfections into the data 
and in doing so may bias results (eg see Agmon and Bronfeld, 1975). 
Taylor (1989) argues that as true deviations from parity 
'presents a profitable arbitrage opportunity at a particular point 
in time to a market trader ••• it is important to have data on the 
appropriate exchange rates and interest rates recorded at the same 
instant in time and at which a trader could have dealt'. 
Taylor, 1989, p 382. 
Hence an unbiased test of covered interest parity should be conducted 
using data that market traders actually faced at particular points in 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
( 1 ) Such an argument confonns to the view that the exchange rate is an 
asset price, therefore actual trading will only take place when agents 
in foreign exchange markets hold different opinions on what the 
'correct' price is. 
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time, ie contemporaneously sampled data. Furthernore an effective test 
of market efficiency could be provided by an analysis of trading data 
covering periods around the time when 'news' was introduced into the 
market. If riskless opportunities arising fran turbulence are quickly 
exploited, then the market can be considered to be efficient. In 
addition, the power of our efficiency tests will be enhanced. 
In this essay, we therefore test for covered interest par i ty using 
intra-day data sampled around the release of economic figures. We use 
high frequency, high qual i ty, actual trading data, for the months of 
August and September 1987, sampled as news of important economic 
indicators were announced. We also use the same formulae as that used 
by actual market traders, thus allowing for the bid-offer spread when 
calculat ing arbi trage opportunities and other insti tutional 
peculiarities. We consider arbitrage between sterling-dollar, dollar-
sterling, dollar-deutschmark, deutschmark-dollar and between sterling-
deutschmark, and deutschmark-sterling calculated by triangular 
arbitrage. By using the dollar as a vehicle currency in triangular 
arbitrage we are thus indicating the efficiency of arbitrage in keeping 
cross exchange rates consistent. 
The remainder of this essay is organized as follows: section 1.2 
formally considers the covered interest parity theorem: section 1.3 
surveys previous empirical ~rk on covered interest parity: section 1.4 
discusses the nature of the data base used in this empir ical study and 
the periods examined: section 1.5 describes the testing methcxlology of 
the study in terms of the specific calculations performed. to establish 
the existence of unexploited covered arbitrage opportt.mities: 
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section 1.6 reports the empirical results of the study, while a summary 
and concluding remarks are contained in section 1.7. 
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1 .2 "nle Covered Interest Par i ty 'lbeorem 
Equilibrium in eurodeposit and foreign exchange markets requires 
the condition of covered interest parity. Covered interest parity can 
be approximated by 
- - ------ (1.1 ) 
S 1 + i 
where i· and i are the domestic and foreign interest rates on similar 
assets of a certain maturity, S is the spot exchange rate, defined as 
the foreign price of a unit of domestic currency and F is the forward 
exchange rate of the same maturity as the interest rates (upper case 
letters denote variables expressed in nominal terms). Equation (1.1) 
can be considered as an approximat ion to covered interest par i ty as it 
fai Is to take account of the bid-offer spread which can be thought of as 
an element of transaction costS(21. 
'lbe covered interest parity hYiX'thesis is therefore a proposi t ion 
that ensures the efficiency of markets. Any gain from interest 
differentials on financial assets, identical in every respect except 
currency of denanination, will be exactly offset by the differential 
between spot and forward exchange rates. Deviations from parity 
represent riskless profitable opportunities. Arbitrageurs can react to 
an interest rate differential by borrowing the currency where the 
interest rate is relatively lat, selling it spot for the currency where 
the interest rate is relatively high, thus earning the higher rate of 
interest, and cover themselves against exchange risk by buying back the 
------------------------------------------------------------------------
(2) Frenkel and Levich (1975) suggest that bid-offer spreads are 
greater during periods of uncertainty as dealers protect themselves 
against the superior information that may be held by several traders. 
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original currency borrowed in the forward exchange market. Such 'round 
trip' activity ensures firstly, that arbitageurs realise a gain and 
secondly, that exchange rates and interest rates will quickly alter 
until it is no longer profitable to trade, ie until equation (1.1) 
holds. 
'Ibus if the market is efficient few unexploited opportunities for 
covered arbi trage wi 11 exist, as arbi trageurs in their pursui t of pure 
profit will quickly eliminate interest rate differentials. In a fully 
efficient market equation (1.1) will hold in the absence of covered 
interest arbitrage, prices will jump to their 'correct' value as all 
agents will be rational and fully informed. 
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1.3 Previous Empirical Work on Covered Interest Parity 
The empirical work an covered interest parity in well developed 
financial markets is abundant. Many of the studies attempt to validate 
one or rrore of the canmon explanations for deviations from covered 
interest parity. Officer and Willett (1970) in their survey of 
devel~ts in the study of covered interest parity pose the question 
why similar domestic and foreign financial assets are still less than 
perfect su1::stitutes when exchange risk is removed by buying forward 
cover. Fssentially they argue arbitrageurs may be influenced by the 
CUllfOSition of F, S, i and i· , as well the value of the interest rate 
differential. For example, arbi trageurs may engage in a wide range of 
trading activities and may be influenced by the expected return on spot 
speculation via for example, uncovered interest arbitrage. 
As covered arbitrage is essentially an inter-bank activity it may 
be prudent to assume their information set does in fact include a wide 
set of variables. If for example traders are expecting threatened 
central bank intervention in the market place in an attempt to keep 
currencies within certain trading limits, then a particular speculative 
rate of return from an expected central bank intervention may be greater 
than the expected rate of return from covered interest arbi trage on 
longer term maturities. Market prices can therefore deviate from the 
parity condition by widening the available information set without 
necessarily relaxing the efficiency constraint. Officer and Willett 
also point out that as those engaged in arbi trage are predominant I y 
banking institutions, they may be increasingly unlikely to sacrifice 
spot I iquid assets for a return far into the future. This suggests 
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that I iquid assets may in fact yield sane form of return on its 
convenient nature, implying that deviations may in fact increase with 
the length of maturity. The findings of Taylor (1989) support the 
aOOve arguments. He argues that in practice agents engage in a wide 
range of activities and dealers in covered interest arbitrage work 
wi thin I imi ts laid down by management regarding the credi t worthiness of 
other banks and the size of I iabi I i ties to have outstanding with each 
'named' bank. Such credit limits can therefore operate as a liquidity 
constraint as well as leading to a concentration of arbitrage activity 
in the shorter termed maturities as credit limits will be tied up for 
shorter periods. 
The Officer and Willett survey concludes by suggesting that 
deviations from covered interest parity need not imply disequilibrium or 
market imperfections if viewed within a generalised portfolio approach 
to international captial movements. Such an approach implies there may 
be rewards from empirical research directed ta-lards explaining 
deviations from parity in terms of optimizing behaviour. 
Aliber (1973). for instance, explains the apparent deviations from 
covered interest parity when assets are denaninated in different 
currencies, as reflecting 'political risk' arising out of differing tax 
tariff structures or capital controls, and the expected change in these. 
Aliber tests his hypothesis by comparing the interest rate differential 
on sterling-dollar and mark-dollar assets in Paris and London, with the 
corresponding exchange rate differentials. The author concludes that 
arbitraqeurs carry political risk, thus deviations from parity may 
represent a risk premia impcseci,by arbitrageurs as a price for carrying 
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such risk. 
Iboley and lsard (1980) explore Aliber's (1973) notion further by 
constructing a model of portfolio behaviour to study the effects of 
German capital controls (in force between 1970-1974) and their 
relationship with deviations from covered interest parity. Iboley and 
lsard 's findings suggest that the 
'interest rate differential due to political risk, given the 
prospect of future capital controls, depends essentially on the 
gross stocks of debt outstanding against different governments and 
the distribution of world wealth among residents of different 
political jurisdictions'. 
Dooley and lsard, 1980, p 370. 
The riskiness of capital controls is also explored by otari and 
Tiwari (1981) who examine the extent to which capital controls influence 
deviations from covered interest parity in Japan for the period 1978-
1981. The authors conclude that capital controls do create distortions 
in foreign exc:hanqe markets. 
Frenkel and Levich (1975) provide a procedure for est imat ing 
frictians to short-run capital mobility by inchlding in the concept of 
'transaction ccsts' such risk factors as capital controls, political 
risk as hell as brokerage fees. 
'This estimate includes brokerage fees, the ccst of being ill 
informed and all other costs associated with foreign exchange 
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transact ioos. 
Frenkel and Levich, 1975, pp 328-329. 
Frenkel and Levich suggest that the introduction of such costs into 
the foreign exchange market will create a 'neutral band' around the 
interest rate parity line. Thus if assets are not denominated in the 
currency of the same political jurisdiction, this 'neutral band' will 
reflect 'transaction costs'. Any interest rate differential falling 
within this band will be equilibrium points in the sense that no 
additional arbitrage will be profitable as transaction costs are greater 
than arbitrage profits. Frenkel and Levich estimate such costs 
indirectly by the study of the behaviour of triangular arbi trage, the 
essence of which is to keep cress exchange rates consistent. Thus any 
aJ::solute discrepancy between exchange rates reflects transaction costs. 
'!he authors conel ude that allowance for such costs accounts for most of 
the apparent deviations fran covered interest parity for the currencies 
studied during the period of the study, January 1962 to November 1967. 
In a sul:sequent study Frenkel and Levich (1977) suggest that the degree 
of turrulence may be an important fact in an analysis of covered 
interest parity, their evidence suggesting that while 'transaction 
costs' played a similar quantitative role in accounting for deviations 
fran covered interest parity during the period of the 'tranquil peg' 
1962 to 1969, and the 'managed float' 1973 to 1975, the importance of 
such costs was reduced during the turbulent peg 1968 to 1969. 'thus 
classification of data periods according to degree of turrulence may be 
more sensitive to tests of 'efficiency' than other criteria, eg whether 
a fixed or floating exchange rate regime is in force. 
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While the Frenkel and Levich (1975) analysis attempts to construct 
a rationale for optimal deviations fran covered interest parity by 
utilizing what is essentially Marshallian price theory, the results fran 
such empirical studies are limited by the quality of the data used. 
(~nnick, 1979). '!hus Agman and Bronfeld (1975) and Taylor (1987a) 
are largely concerned that the apparent unexploited profit opportunities 
of previous studies may have resulted fran the use of inappropriate 
data. While Frenkel and Levich (1977 p 1224), note that differentials 
may reflect measurement error as data used in the study are based on the 
averaging procedure (averaging of bid offer spreads), they attempt to 
correct for the introduction of bias adhoc, using 95 percent of the 
measured deviations fran triangular arbitrage in their calculations. 
Agnon and Bronfeld (1975) attempt to remedy this problem by the use of 
trading data recorded on Reuters telex which is based on the 
Ellrocurrency market in wndon, the quotation being 11am prices. 
However the authors admit that the specification problem is not fully 
overcome as Reuters data are not actual trading data. '!he data 
imperfection issue highlights the ongoing debate of what constitutes the 
roost appropriate data to use in empirical studies of parity conditions. 
We argue that an unbiased test of whether unexploited profit 
opportunities exist in foreign exchange markets will only be effectively 
provided by the use of data which captures insti tut ional detail. 
Failure or success of the efficiency hypothesis can then be directly 
attributed to the behaviour of agents operating in foreign exchange 
markets. Taylor (1987a) using high frequency (ten minute) actual 
trading data contemporaneously sampled for November 11 th, 12th and 
13th 1985, overwhelmingly confinned the covered interest parity 
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condition - finding only one small deviation. Similarly in a 
subsequent study, Taylor (1989), using data construc::ted fron Bank of 
England 'dealers pads' for five historical periods during which markets 
were knc:Mn to exhibit turbulence and one 'calm' (control) period, 
reports qualified support for the covered interest parity theorem 
(qualified in the sense that the author found a few persistent 
deviations in longer maturi ties). 
'Ihe above tests of covered interest parity rely on computing actual 
deviations fran parity and relating them to a particular type of optimal 
behaviour. Another method which has been used for testing the validity 
of covered interest parity is that of regression based tests. A 
typical estimating equation is 
( 1.2) 
where f t is the logarithm of the forward rate at time t for maturity a 
certain number of periods ahead, St is the logarithm of the spot rate 
• (domestic price of foreign currency) and it and it denote danestic and 
foreign interest rates on appropriate financial assets of the same 
maturity as the forward rate. 
In the absence of transaction costs, if covered interest parity 
holds equat ion (1.2) should result in a - 0, B-1. A signi f icant 
estimated value of a NJUld suggest the presence of a catch-all risk 
premium. 
Taylor (1987a) notes however that although a - 0 , B. 1 cannot be 
rejected, the residuals may represent unexploi ted arbi trage 
opporttmities. He argues that regression based tests are only able to 
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determine on average over a particular period whether covered interest 
parity held. For all unexploited arbitrage opportunities to be 
rejected would require a-O, B-1 and R2_1, ie the regression line be a 
perfect fit. 
Thus whi le regression based tests may val idate the use of covered 
interest parity as axicms in nodels of exchange rate determination, they 
have little to say about market efficiency. Tests of equation (1.2) 
have been carried out by Branson (1969) who, using treasury bill rates, 
cannot reject a • 0 , B • 1 for the US-UK during the period July 1962 to 
December 1964, but rejects the null hypothesis for Canada-US for the 
same period. other studies eg Marston (1976), Ccsander and Laing 
(1981) and Fratianni and Wakeman (1982), use euro-deposi t rates when 
testing equation (1.2) and generally find that in a substantial amount 
of cases deviations from covered interest parity, as measured by 
equation (1.2), occur. Turnovsky and Ball (1983), testing covered 
interest parity for Australia over the period September 1974 to 
December 1981, estimate 
n 
f t • Ba + ~ B1 (iA -iUS}t_1 + Ut 
J.-1 
(1.3 ) 
where f t is the forward premium on US currency, iA is the Australian 
interest on Canmercial Bills of three roonth maturities and iUS is the 
eurodollar inter-bank deposit rate. The estimating equation takes the 
form of (1.3) as the Australian forward rate was continually set by the 
Reserve Bank during the period under consideration, rather than market 
determined. The authors hypothesise that the margin set was consistent 
with attaining covered interest parity over a period of time. Thus 
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they test, 
n 
a - 0, ~ a i - 1 
Using overlapping monthly data and specifying a moving average structure 
for the error term (third order moving average process) the F statistic 
suggests that the joint restrictions cannot be rejected at 5 percent 
level of significance. 
Using quarterly average data for the same perio:l, the authors estimate 
equation (1.3) with a fourth order autoregressive process. They find 
that they cannot reject the joint hypothesis at 5 percent level of 
significance and thus confirm the results fran the alternative data set, 
ie covered interest parity held, on average, throughout the perio:l under 
c:onsideraticn. 
Rolay (1987) haEver, when examining the rSSlX>IlSSS of Japanese 
financial markets to US money announcements for subperiods between 
O=tober 1977 and May 1985, reject the null hypothesis of covered 
interest parity at the 5 percent level for all subperiods, although the 
magnitude of the deviations fran parity decline fran 1984. The author 
concludes that resrictions on capital mobility in Japan is the most 
likely cause of the deviations fran parity, and the observed post 1984 
reduction in the value of such deviations due to a liberalisation of 
restrictions on Japanese forward exchange transactions implemented in 
April 1984. 
The arrount, persistence and direction of studies on covered 
interest parity can be thought of as perhaps reflecting the uneasiness 
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felt by economists that unexploited - and largely riskless - profit 
c:pportlmi ties may exist in what is thought to be one of the most 
efficient markets in the world. Hence, empirical studies of covered 
interest parity have either attempted to justify deviations from parity 
by economic argument or have judged the appropr iateness of using covered 
interest parity as a modelling relationship:; by testing to see if the 
condition holds on average. 
The data imperfections argument however goes further, questioning 
the findings of studies that do not take account of institutional detail 
in their analysis, suggesting that failure to focus on actual trading 
data may account for many of the previously observed deviations from 
covered interest parity. In this study we use actual trading data 
which is described in the next section. 
68 
1.4 The Data 
'!he data were recorded in the Bank of England deal ing rc:x:ms on 
dates between 7.8.87 and 1.9.87. Brokers' rates were recorded for the 
rE dollar-OK sterling and US dollar-German mark spot exchange rates: the 
forward exchange rates for US dollar-OK sterling and OS dollar-German 
mark for one, t~, three, six and twelve months maturities; eurodeposit 
interest rates for the sterling, mark and dollar one, t~, three, six 
and twelve I'OC>llth maturities. Brokers' rates were used as they 
represent the highest bid, lowest offer prices available in the market 
at a point in time. The decision to use eurodeposi t rates arose from 
the consideration that since they 
'can be comparable in terms of issuer, credit risk, maturity and 
all other respects except currency of denomination, they offer a 
proper test of [CIP] , 
Levich, 1985, p 998. 
Under such conditions deviations from parity, should they occur, are 
less likely to be a result of an \ll'lOhservable risk premium. 
Observations were recorded every five minutes, before and after the 
release of OK and US news. The criteria employed in the choice of 
information sets to monitor was t~-fold. Firstly, they were chosen 
according to their importance as indicators of recent economic 
performance and future policy prescription and secondly, to enable us to 
mcni tor the effect of as wide a range of econcmic indicators as 
lXSSible. Information on market expectations immediately prior to the 
release of the figures was collected from the Financial Times. Dates, 
information and market expectations are listed in Table 1. 
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1.5 Testing for Covered Interest Parity 
Testing the hypothesis that the market for foreign exchange is 
'efficient', reduces to testing whether or not markets fail to exploit 
profitable arbitrage opportunities. As argued in previous sections it 
is important to employ the exact formulae used by market traders to 
calculate whether arbitrage was possible at each of the data points. 
'!he formulae used by market traders takes a.ccotmt of bid-offer spreads 
for interest rates and spot and forward exchange rates. They also take 
acc::ount of the British habit of basing interest calculations on a 365 
day basis as ~ to the standard 360 days. Dollar-sterling rates 
are quoted dollars per pound and dollar-deutschmark, as deutschrnarks per 
dollar. 
The actual equations are listed on Table 1.1, but following 
Taylor (1987a), it is perhaps prudent to illustrate the use of the 
equations by S1..IImICIIizing the steps in a hypothetical covered interest 
arbitrage prcx::ess from sterling into dollars, termed, US bid $/£ 
arbitrage and fran the deutchrnark into sterling (via dollar triangular 
arbitrage), termed, t1K bid £/tf.f arbitrage, as follCMS: 
1) Take a deposit of sterling at the offer side of the (annualised) D-
day Eurosterling interest rates (i0£) which is repayable with 
interest in D-days time; 
2) Exchange the sterling into dollars (sell sterling) at the bid side 
B 
of the spot dollar-sterling rate (S.E): 
3) Lend these dollars at the bid side of the (annual ised) D-day 
B 
Ellrodollar interest rate (is), principal plus interest being 
receivable in D-days time; 
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4) Exchange the maturing dollar asset for sterling (buy sterling) in 
the forward exchange market at the offer side of the D-day dollar-
o 
sterling forward rate (FsE). 
For no profitable opportunity we must have: 
B 
SsE & D ° D (1 + i ---) - (1 + i ---) S 0 
fOSE S 360 E 365 
Where equat ion (1.1) has been replaced by equat ion (1.4) thereby 
accounting for the bid offer spread and institutional differences 
reflecting in the basis on which interest payments are calculated. 
(1.4) 
If arbitrage is profitable, then the value of the maturing dollar 
asset covered in the forward market must be greater than the sterling 
liability D days forward. Thus 
[ S:E E Return -100 --- (1 + i ---
F<lSE S 360 
B D 
° D 1 ) - (1 + i ---) 
E 365 
(1.5 ) 
where if equaticn (1.5) - x, then x is the percentage period return in 
sterling from arbi traging sterling into dollars. Thus if ENrnn were 
arbitraged in this way then a profit of ENx/100 would be realized and 
the ol:::served misal ignment between the forward pip and the interest rate 
differential corrected(3). 
tJK BID Elm ARBITRAGE (m to n (TRIMnlLAR ARBITRAGE) 
1 ) Take an offer of [l.f at the offer side of the annual ised) D day 
Euromark interest rate (i 0r:t>i) which is repayable with interest in 
------------------------------------------------------------------------
(3) Forward 'pip' is the tenn used by dealers in foreign exchange 
markets to denote the forward premi urn. 
71 
D days time: 
2) Exchange the [M into dollars (buy dollars) at the offer side of the 
o 
spot [M-dollar rate (SI:»VS) and exchange the dollar into sterling 
(buy sterling) at the offer side of the spot dollar-sterling rate 
o 
(Ssld: 
3) Lend the sterling at the bid side of the (annualised) D day 
B 
Ellrosterling interest rate (is) principal plus interest being 
recei vable in D days time: 
4} Exchange the maturing sterling asset for dollars (sell sterling) in 
the forward exchange market at the bid side of the dollar-sterling 
B 
forward rate (FSE ) and exchange the dollars for [M (sell dollars) in 
the forward exchange market at the bid side of the CM-dollar forward 
B 
rate (Fr:.vs). 
For no prof i table opportW'li ty we must have: 
B B 
FSE • FDM/s 
--------------
B D 0 D 
(1 + i£ --- ) - ( 1 + iDM --- ) s 0 
365 360 
(1.6) 
Similarly if arbitrage is profitable, then the value of the maturing 
sterling asset covered in the forward market by triangular arbitrage, 
must be greater than the tM Liability D days forward. Thus 
[
BB 
FSE • FCM/ S B D 
CM return - 100 -------------- (1 + i£ --- ) 
SOCM/S • SeSE 365 
° D 
- ( 1 + itM ---
360 
] (1.7) 
where if the period return fran equation (1.7) - x , then I:f.1Nmn 
arbitraged in this way would realize a profit of DMNX/100 and cross 
exchange rates would be consistent. 
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1.6 Empirical Results 
Relations A to F, listed on Table 1.1, were calculated for one, 
tNl, three, six and twelve month maturities over 211 differing time 
periods (6330 data points), for arbitrage between OK sterling - US 
dollar, OK sterling - German mark, and German mark - OK sterling 
exchange rates. '!he results are tabulated on Tables 1.11 - 1.X1. 
Positive figures indicating deviations from parity ar~ marked with an 
asterisk. 
'!he resul ts appear remarkably consistent. Onl y twenty one 
profitable arbritrage opportunities arose from a possible 6330. Of 
those twenty one deviations frem parity, eight arose in twelve month 
maturities on 7.8.87, between 12.30 and 12.45, prior to the introducticn 
of the US unemployment figures for the month of J'ul y 1987 (Table 1.11). 
Four of these eight opportunities occur for US dollar - German mark 
arbi trage, where between tM2800 and IJ.i3000 could have been realized for 
arbitraging OM1mn. Similarly between £2400 and £2800 could have been 
risklessly realized by arbi traging £1mn at the same time and for the 
same maturity, but between OK sterling - German mark currencies. The 
fact that the profitable opportunities are relatively small and cx:::cur 
exclusively in the later maturities, may reflect the liquidity 
preferences of arbitrageurs and/or credit limits imposed by banking 
institutions. 
One very small arbi trage opportunity arose at 10.50 am in one month 
maturity, on 17.8.87 in OK sterling - US dollar arbitrage, prior to the 
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release of the OK retail sales figures for the month of .July 
(Table 1. VI) • It is certain however that brokerage fees once accounted 
for ~ld more than cancel the £142 that could be real ized from 
arbitraging £1mn.(4) 
A further twelve apparently profitable arbitrage opportunities 
occur between 12.30 and 2 pn on 21.8.87 around the time of the release 
of the US second quarter rnP figures and the US CPI (Table 1.VIII). of 
these twelve, seven occur in six month maturities where only between £10 
and £47 (gross) could have been realize::1 by OK sterling - US dollar 
arbitrage of £1mn. Similarly the other five arbitrage opportunities 
arising in US sterling - German mark arbi trage with six months 
maturities, could only have realize::1 between £139 and £262 (gross) by 
arbitraging £1mn. It is certain that such transactions would have been 
unprofitable when transaction costs were accounted for. 
In all other cases no profitable opportunities arose even although 
'news' released was quite significant. For example, on Thursday 
20th August at 11.30 am, the OK money supply figures for June were 
released, the news being far worse than than expecte::1. There had been 
a record surge in bank lending the previous month (rising £4.9bn), 
leading to fears that inflationary pressures in the econany may be 
blilding up. Although there was a bearish tone in the market 
(Financial Times, 21.8.87, page 23, column 1), no deviations from 
------------------------------------------------------------------------(4) While brokerage fees can be specifically accounte::1 for in 
calculations by adding bt to the offer price and subtracting bt from 
the bid price (eg see Taylor, 1988b), the estimation of costs in 
particular transactions has becane more difficult to compute as 
brokerage houses have, since January 1986, offered volume discounts on 
brokerage charges. 
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covered interest parity were observed (Table 1. VII) • Similarly on 
12th August OK Trade Figures were released (Table 1.III), showing a 
deficit of £768bn in June compared with a £1.13bn gap in May; while this 
was in line with expectations, the immediate reaction to the figures was 
confused by chaotic conditions on the Ialdon International Financial 
Futures Exchange (LIFFE). An incorrect price for a long-gilt future 
contract had been fed into LIFFE'S eletronic system - confusing traders 
and leading to a dramatic temporary fall in the contract which unsettled 
other markets (Financial Times, 12.8.87, page 1 columns 7 and 8). 
Arbi trageurs would, however, have seemed to handle such confusion 
efficiently as no unexploited arbitrage opportunities arose, for the 
currenc i es and matur i ties cons idered in thi s study, between 1 O. 15 and 
12.30 on that day. 
'!he empirical evidence of this study suggests support for covered 
interest parity for the currencies, maturities and times considered. 
cnly eight possibly significant deviations from the equil ibrium 
conditions arose from a data set comprising of 6330, possible arbitrage 
opportuni ties. Further, as they arose before the introduction of the 
news into the market, they cannot be considered to be a direct 
consequence of the inability of dealers to act efficiently to 
turbulence. This accords with Taylor's 1989 finding that market 
efficiency has risen to high levels over the past twenty years. 
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1.7 Conclusicn 
'!his essay has attempted to test the efficiency of foreign exchange 
markets by carrying out an analysis of covere:i interest arbitrage using 
high frequency, high qual i ty data, sample:i around the release of 
econanic figures during the period 7.8.87 to 1.9.87. 6330 data points 
were considere:i and explici t allowance was made for institutional detai I 
such as bid-offer spread, contemporaneously sample:i data and the exact 
formulae as used by market participants. 'Ibe empirical work reveale:i 
support for covere:i interest arbitrage when institutional detail was 
considere:i and thus supports the data imperfection argument for 
explaining persistent deviations from covere:i interest parity. This 
implies that tests of market efficiency should pay meticulous attention 
to institutional detail and use prices that market traders were likely 
to face at particular points in time. Failure to do this may result in 
market inefficiency being undetecte:i thus affecting the allocative 
efficiency of the international economy. 
The implications for allocative efficiency drawn from this study 
are as follows: 
As foreign exchange markets are efficient during periods of turbulence 
in ensuring the term structure of exchange rates and the term structure 
of interest rates are effectively linked, the arbitrage mechanism, in 
its role of allocating scarce resources, is also efficient. There was 
~er an implication, rather than hard evidence, that the impcsition 
of restrictions on trading may have the effect of concentrating covered 
arbitrage activities in the shorter term maturities. 'Ibis would 
further imply there may be negative relationship between restrictions al 
trading activity and the effectiveness of financial instruments at 
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longer time horizons. 
The consideration that covered interest arbitrage is essentially an 
interbank activity and that international capital movements may follow a 
generalised portfolio balance approach, would further underline a 
preference of institutions to trade at the shorter end of the market. 
If market activity is influenced by the particular arrangement of 
exchange rates and interest rates, and if we assume that satisfaction 
gained fran a riskless return decreases with the length of maturity 
considered, then the return fran an expected event may be greater than a 
sure return six or twelve months hence. A typical example would be 
when a currency reached particular trading limits thought to trigger 
central bank intervention. In such circumstances the operative 
effectiveness of longer term financial instruments ~uld be likely to 
bear the cost. 
'!here is however overwhelming evidence to support the hypothesis 
that exchange rates wi 11 respond quickly to naninal monetary shcx:::ks. 
For example, a tightening of monetary policy, leading to an increase in 
naninal interest rates, wi 11 be reflected immediately on foreign 
exchange markets by the currency overshooting its long run value. 
Subsequent movements in exchange rates then depending on the extent to 
which speculative agents are efficient and the efficiency of commodity 
arbitrage. Such considerations are the subject of the remainder of 
this thesis. 
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7.8.87 
11.8.87 
13.8.87 
14.8.87 
17.8.87 
20.8.87 
21.8.87 
24.8.87 
25.8.87 
1.9.87 
Ebonomic Indicator· 
us Unemployment Figures 
us Non-Farm Employment Figures 
UK Trade Figures 
UK Industrial Production, 
Unemployment, and Vacancy Figures 
us Trade Figures 
UK Retai 1 sales Figures 
UK Money Supply Figures 
us GNP Quarter I y Figures 
us consumer Price Index 
us Personal Incane and 
Personal Expendi ture 
us Durable Goods Orders 
UK consumer credi t Figures 
Canments 
In line with 
expectations. 
(Financial Times 8.8.87. 
page 12, column 1) 
Better than expected. 
(Financial Times, 8.8.87, 
page 12, column 1) 
In line with 
expectations. 
(Financial Times, 12.8.87, 
page 1, column 7) 
In line with 
expectations. 
(Financial Times, 14.8.87, 
page 21, column 1) 
Deficit a great deal 
larger than expected. 
(Financial Times, 15.8.87, 
page 12, column 1) 
Stronger than expected. 
(Financial Times, 18.8.87, 
page 21, column 1) 
A great deal worse than 
expected (largest monthly 
increase on record). 
(Financial Times, 21.8.87, 
page 1, column 3) 
L::lwer than expected. 
(Financial Times, 22.8.87, 
page 12, column 1) 
L::lwer than expected. 
In line with 
expectations. 
(Financial Times, 25.8.87, 
page 23, column 1) 
Less than expected. 
(Financial Times, 26.8.87, 
page 25, column 1) 
A great deal larger than 
expected. 
(Financial Times, 2.9.87, 
page 1, column 8) 
• UK figures are released at 11.30 am and US figures at 1.30 pn (local 
time) • 
7:3 
Et 
8./£ 
--- (1 
F'ls/£ 
Et 
TASTE 1.1 
gpATICNS 
B D ° D 
+ i ---) - (1 + i ---) 
S 360 & 365 
F$/£ B D ° D 
--- (1 + i ---) - (1 + i ---) 
5°$/£ £ 365 S 360 
Et 
FCM/S B D ° D (1 + i ---) - (1 + i ---) 
SOCM/S S 360 CM 360 
Et 
8CM/s 
(1 
F'lCM/S 
o D ° D 
+ i ) - (1 + i ---
CM 360 $ 360 
Et 
• 5CM/s B D o D 
-------------- (1 + i ) - ( 1 + i ---
F'lCM/S • F'ls/£ CM 360 £ 365 
B Et 
F s/8o • FCM/S B D ° D 
-------------- (1 + i ---) - ( 1 + i 
50 CM/ S • SOs/£ £ 365 CM 360 
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(A) 
(B) 
(C) 
(D) 
(E) 
(F) 
tE UNEMPIDYMENI' FIGURES AND US 
~-FARM EM'IDYMENI' FIGURES 
RELEASED 13.30 7.8.87 
Table 1. II cgnprises 
ARBITRAGE OPFORruNITIES g to ~ 
ARBITRAGE OPFORruNITIES ~ to g 
ARBITRAGE OPFORruNITIES IJ.i to ~ 
ARBITRAGE OPFORIUNITIES i to [M 
ARBITRAGE OPFORruNITIES g to [M 
ARBITRAGE OPFORruNITIES I:H to g 
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ARBITRAGE OPPORroNITIES g to ~ 
Time one rronth two rronths three months six rronths twelve months 
12.30 -0.0313 -0.0234 -0.0541 -0.0554 -0.1513 
12.35 -0.0506 -0.0429 -0.0738 -0.0757 -0.1728 
12.40 -0.0506 -0.0429 -0.0738 -0.0757 -0.1728 
12.45 -0.0378 -0.0300 -0.0609 -0.0626 -0.1593 
12.50 -0.0378 -0.0300 -0.0609 -0.0626 -0.1593 
12.55 -0.0507 -0.0430 -0.0741 -0.0762 -0.1737 
13.00 -0.0507 -0.0430 -0.0741 -0.0762 -0.1737 
13.05 -0.0507 -0.0430 -0.2943 -0.0762 -0.1737 
13.10 -0.0507 -0.0430 -0.2943 -0.0762 -0.1737 
13.15 -0.0507 -0.0430 -0.2943 -0.0762 -0.1737 
13.20 -0.0506 -0.0430 -0.2942 -0.0760 -0.1733 
13.25 -0.0506 -0.0429 -0.2941 -0.0757 -0.1728 
13.30 -0.0505 -0.0426 -0.2937 -0.0748 -0.1712 
13.35 -0.0505 -0.0426 -0.2937 -0.0748 -0.1712 
13.40 -0.0504 -0.0424 -0.2934 -0.0743 -0.1703 
13.45 -0.0504 -0.0423 -0.2932 -0.0739 -0.1695 
13.50 -0.0310 -0.0227 -0.2734 -0.0533 -0.1476 
13.55 -0.0504 -0.0423 -0.2932 -0.0739 -0.1695 
14.00 -0.0183 -0.0100 -0.2607 -0.0542 -0.1707 
14.05 -0.0505 -0.0426 -0.2937 -0.0883 -0.2071 
14.10 -0.0504 -0.0423 -0.2932 -0.0874 -0.2054 
14.15 -0.0504 -0.0424 -0.2933 -0.0877 -0.2059 
14.20 -0.0606 -0.0423 -0.2932 -0.0874 -0.2054 
14.25 -0.0414 -0.0229 -0.2737 -0.0674 -0.1844 
14.30 -0.0285 -0.0099 -0.2606 -0.0538 -0.1700 
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ARBITRAGE OPFOR'IUUTIES I to g 
Time one month two months three months six months twelve months 
12.30 
-0.0983 -0.1276 -0.1316 -0.1949 -0.3348 
12.35 
-0.1174 -0.1469 -0.1510 -0.2146 -0.3553 
12.40 -0.1174 -0.1469 -0.1510 -0.2146 -0.3553 
12.45 -0.1045 -0.1339 -0.1378 -0.2010 -0.3407 
12.50 -0.1045 -0.1339 -0.1378 -0.2010 -0.3407 
12.55 -0.1173 -0.1467 -0.1507 -0.2141 -0.3544 
13.00 
-0.1173 -0.1467 -0.1507 -0.2141 -0.3544 
13.05 -0.1173 -0.1467 -0.1194 -0.2141 -0.3544 
13.10 -0.1173 -0.1467 -0.1194 -0.2141 -0.3544 
13.15 -0.1173 -0.1467 -0.1194 -0.2141 -0.3544 
13.20 -0.1173 -0.1468 -0.1195 -0.2143 -0.3547 
13.25 -0.1174 -0.1469 -0.1197 -0.2146 -0.3553 
13.30 -0.1176 -0.1473 -0.1203 -0.2157 -0.3571 
13.35 -0.1176 -0.1473 -0.1203 -0.2157 -0.3571 
13.40 -0.1177 -0.1475 -0.1205 -0.2162 -0.3580 
13.45 -0.1179 -0.1477 -0.1208 -0.2167 -0.3589 
13.50 -0.0987 -0.1285 -0.1015 -0.1971 -0.3387 
13.55 -0.1179 -0.1477 -0.1208 -0.2167 -0.3589 
14.00 -0.0857 -0.1153 -0.0881 -0.1697 -0.2884 
14.05 -0.1176 -0.1473 -0.1203 -0.2023 -0.3220 
14.10 -0.1179 -0.1477 -0.1208 -0.2033 -0.3238 
14.15 -0.1178 -0.1476 -0.1206 -0.2030 -0.3233 
14.20 -0.1076 -0.1477 -0.1208 -0.2033 -0.3238 
14.25 -0.0884 -0.1283 -0.1012 -0.1832 -0.3028 
14.30 -0.0756 -0.1154 -0.0883 -0.1701 -0.2891 
82 
ARBITRAGE OPPORItlNITIES OM to ~ 
Time one ronth two ronths three ronths six ronths twelve ronths 
12.30 
-0.0434 -0.0741 -0.1025 -0.1689 -0.6458 
12.35 
-0.0435 -0.0742 -0.1026 -0.1693 -0.6466 
12.40 -0.0704 -0.1015 -0.1302 -0.2144 -0.6831 
12.45 
-0.0542 -0.0850 -0.1135 -0.1969 -0.6639 
12.50 -0.0646 -0.0746 -0.0979 -0.1656 -0.2889 
12.55 -0.0539 -0.0638 -0.0871 -0.1546 -0.2775 
13.00 -0.0806 -0.0905 -0.1139 -0.1817 -0.3051 
13.05 -0.0539 -0.0638 -0.3040 -0.1546 -0.2775 
13.10 -0.0539 -0.0638 -0.3040 -0.1545 -0.2771 
13.15 -0.0807 -0.0908 -0.3311 -0.1823 -0.3064 
13.20 -0.0806 -0.0905 -0.3308 -0.1817 -0.3051 
13.25 -0.0806 -0.0905 -0.3308 -0.1817 -0.3051 
13.30 -0.0805 -0.0904 -0.3306 -0.1813 -0.3042 
13.35 -0.0803 -0.0901 -0.3301 -0.1804 -0.3023 
13.40 -0.0804 -0.0902 -0.3302 -0.1807 -0.3028 
13.45 -0.0804 -0.0902 -0.3303 -0.1808 -0.3032 
13.50 -0.2818 -0.2922 -0.5323 -0.3849 -0.5103 
13.55 -0.0536 -0.0632 -0.3031 -0.1528 -0.2735 
14.00 -0.0804 -0.0902 -0.3302 -0.1807 -0.3028 
14.05 -0.0804 -0.0902 -0.3303 -0.1808 -0.3032 
14.10 -0.0803 -0.0901 -0.3301 -0.1804 -0.3023 
14.15 -0.0537 -0.0633 -0.3033 -0.1531 -0.2741 
14.20 -0.0536 -0.0632 -0.3031 -0.1527 -0.2734 
14.25 -0.0802 -0.0899 -0.3299 -0.1800 -0.3013 
14.30 -0.0801 -0.0898 -0.3297 -0.1795 -0.3004 
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ARBITRAGE OPPORTUNITIES ~ to rH 
Time one month two months three months six months twelve months 
12.30 -0.0415 -0.0373 -0.0301 -0.0378 0.2957· 
12.35 -0.0414 -0.0372 -0.0299 -0.0375 0.2965· 
12.40 -0.0680 -0.0638 -0.0565 -0.0473 0.2759" 
12.45 -0.0521 -0.0480 -0.0407 -0.0316 0.2911· 
12.50 -0.0417 -0.0584 -0.0564 -0.0634 -0.0961 
12.55 -0.0310 -0.0477 -0.0456 -0.0524 -0.0847 
13.00 -0.0577 -0.0747 -0.0728 -0.0803 -0.1142 
13.05 -0.0310 -0.0477 -0.0143 -0.0524 -0.0847 
13.10 -0.0310 -0.0477 -0.0144 -0.0525 -0.0851 
13.15 -0.0577 -0.0745 -0.0413 -0.0797 -0.1129 
13.20 -0.0577 -0.0747 -0.0416 -0.0803 -0.1142 
13.25 -0.0577 -0.0747 -0.0416 -0.0803 -0.1142 
13.30 -0.0578 -0.0748 -0.0418 -0.0807 -0.1151 
13.35 -0.0579 -0.0750 -0.0421 -0.0815 -0.1170 
13.40 -0.0579 -0.0750 -0.0420 -0.0813 -0.1164 
13.45 -0.0579 -0.0749 -0.0420 -0.0811 -0.1161 
13.50 -0.2606 -0.2796 -0.2486 -0.2936 -0.3419 
13.55 -0.0312 -0.0482 -0.0152 -0.0541 -0.0886 
14.00 -0.0579 -0.0750 -0.0420 -0.0813 -0.1164 
14.05 -0.0579 -0.0749 -0.0420 -0.0811 -0.1161 
14.10 -0.0579 -0.0750 -0.0421 -0.0815 -0.1170 
14.15 -0.0312 -0.0481 -0.0151 -0.0538 -0.0881 
14.20 -0.0312 -0.0483 -0.0152 -0.0542 -0.0888 
14.25 -0.0580 -0.0752 -0.0423 -0.0819 -0.1179 
14.30 -0.0580 -0.0753 -0.0425 -0.0823 -0.1189 
... denotes a profitable arbitrage opportunity 
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ARBITRAGE OPPOR'IUNITIES ,g to rM 
Time one month two months three months six months twelve months 
12.30 -0.0625 -0.0400 -0.0529 -0.0304 0.2795· 
12.35 -0.0817 -0.0594 -0.0725 -0.0005 0.2587· 
12.40 -0.1083 -0.0861 -0.0992 -0.0006 0.2376-
12.45 -0.0796 -0.0573 -0.0704 -0.0003 0.2667'" 
12.50 -0.0691 -0.0678 -0.0863 -0.0006 -0.1298 
12.55 -0.0713 -0.0700 -0.0885 -0.0007 -0.1324 
13.00 -0.0981 -0.0971 -0.1159 -0.0009 -0.1626 
13.05 -0.0713 -0.0700 -0.0885 -0.0007 -0.1324 
13.10 -0.0713 -0.0701 -0.0886 -0.0007 -0.1328 
13.15 -0.0980 -0.0969 -0.1156 -0.0009 -0.1613 
13.20 -0.0981 -0.0971 -0.1158 -0.0009 -0.1623 
13.25 -0.0980 -0.0970 -0.1157 -0.0009 -0.1618 
13.30 -0.0980 -0.0968 -0.1154 -0.0009 -0.1611 
13.35 -0.0981 -0.0970 -0.1158 -0.0009 -0.1630 
13.40 -0.0980 -0.0968 -0.1155 -0.0009 -0.1616 
13.45 -0.0979 -0.0966 -0.1152 -0.0009 -0.1604 
13.50 -0.2818 -0.2827 -0.3035 -0.0029 -0.3698 
13.55 -0.0712 -0.0698 -0.0882 -0.0007 -0.1323 
14.00 -0.0659 -0.0644 -0.0827 -0.0007 -0.1619 
14.05 -0.0980 -0.0969 -0.1156 -0.0011 -0.1979 
14.10 -0.0979 -0.0967 -0.1154 -0.0011 -0.1972 
14.15 -0.0712 -0.0698 -0.0882 -0.0008 -0.1681 
14.20 -0.0815 -0.0698 -0.0883 -0.0008 -0.1684 
14.25 -0.0890 -0.0775 -0.0960 -0.0009 -0.1771 
14.30 -0.0762 -0.0646 -0.0831 -0.0007 -0.1637 
-
denotes a profitable arbitrage opportunity 
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ARBITRAGE OPPOR'ruNITIES ~ to g 
Time one month two months three months six months twelve months 
12.30 -0.1310 -0.1803 -0.2020 -0.2993 -0.8488 
12.35 -0.1502 -0.1996 -0.2214 -0.3191 -0.8693 
12.40 -0.1771 -0.2268 -0.2489 -0.3641 -0.9058 
12.45 -0.1480 -0.1974 -0.2191 -0.3332 -0.8725 
12.50 -0.1585 -0.1870 -0.2035 -0.3019 -0.4975 
12.55 -0.1605 -0.1890 -0.2055 -0.3039 -0.4993 
13.00 -0.1871 -0.2157 -0.2323 -0.3309 -0.5269 
13.05 -0.1605 -0.1890 -0.2055 -0.3039 -0.4993 
13.10 -0.1605 -0.1890 -0.2054 -0.3037 -0.4990 
13.15 -0.1872 -0.2159 -0.2326 -0.3315 -0.5282 
13.20 -0.1872 -0.2158 -0.2324 -0.3311 -0.5273 
13.25 -0.1872 -0.2159 -0.2326 -0.3314 -0.5278 
13.30 -0.1874 -0.2161 -0.2329 -0.3320 -0.5286 
13.35 -0.1872 -0.2158 -0.2324 -0.3311 -0.5267 
13.40 -0.1874 -0.2161 -0.2329 -0.3319 -0.5282 
13.45 -0.1875 -0.2164 -0.2332 -0.3325 -0.5294 
13.50 -0.3697 -0.3990 -0.4163 -0.5171 -0.7166 
13.55 -0.1607 -0.1894 -0.2060 -0.3046 -0.4998 
14.00 -0.1554 -0.1841 -0.2007 -0.2861 -0.4608 
14.05 -0.1873 -0.2160 -0.2327 -0.3184 -0.4938 
14.10 -0.1874 -0.2162 -0.2330 -0.3189 -0.4945 
14.15 -0.1607 -0.1894 -0.2060 -0.2914 -0.4659 
14.20 -0.1505 -0.1894 -0.2059 -0.2913 -0.4657 
14.25 -0.1579 -0.1968 -0.2134 -0.2988 -0.4732 
14.30 -0.1451 -0.1838 -0.2003 -0.2854 -0.4591 
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Table 1. III canprises 
ARBITRAGE OProRIUNITIES g to ~ 
ARBITRAGE OPFOR'IUNITIES ~ to g 
ARBITRAGE OPFORIUNITIES I:M to ~ 
ARBITRAGE OPFORIUNITIES ~ to r:M 
ARBITRAGE OProRIUNITIES g to r:M 
ARBITRAGE OPPOR'lUNITIES rM to g 
UK TRADE FIGURES 
~ 11.8.87 
87 
ARBITRAGE OPFOR'IUNITIES g to l 
Time one month two months three months six months twelve months 
10.15 -0.0724 -0.0920 -0.3158 -0.1581 -0.2079 
10.20 -0.0403 -0.0596 -0.2832 -0.1245 -0.1725 
10.25 -0.0531 -0.0725 -0.2962 -0.1377 -0.1864 
10.30 -0.0531 -0.0725 -0.2962 -0.1377 -0.1864 
10.35 -0.0723 -0.0918 -0.3156 -0.1576 -0.2071 
10.40 -0.0531 -0.0726 -0.2963 -0.1380 -0.1869 
10.50 -0.0531 -0.0725 -0.2963 -0.1379 -0.1867 
10.55 -0.0531 -0.0725 -0.2963 -0.1379 -0.1867 
11.00 -0.0530 -0.0723 -0.2960 -0.1373 -0.1855 
11.05 -0.0723 -0.0917 -0.3154 -0.1572 -0.2062 
11.10 -0.0722 -0.0916 -0.3153 -0.1569 -0.2057 
11.15 -0.0529 -0.0721 -0.2955 -0.1364 -0.1839 
11.20 -0.0723 -0.0917 -0.3154 -0.1572 -0.2062 
11.25 -0.0727 -0.0926 -0.3169 -0.1603 -0.2120 
11.30 -0.0528 -0.0718 -0.2951 -0.1356 -0.1825 
11.35 -0.0528 -0.0718 -0.2951 -0.1355 -0.1824 
11.40 -0.0593 -0.0849 -0.3084 -0.1088 -0.1687 
11.45 -0.0270 -0.0522 -0.2753 -0.0878 -0.1315 
11.50 -0.0270 -0.0522 -0.2752 -0.0877 -0.1930 
11.55 -0.0589 -0.0841 -0.3070 -0.1196 -0.2253 
12.00 -0.0267 -0.0517 -0.2744 -0.0861 -0.1901 
12.05 -0.0589 -0.0841 -0.3071 -0.1198 -0.2256 
12.10 -0.0396 -0.0648 -0.2877 -0.0999 -0.2050 
12.15 -0.0396 -0.0648 -0.2877 -0.0999 -0.2050 
12.20 -0.0589 -0.0842 -0.3073 -0.1200 -0.2261 
12.25 -0.0590 -0.0844 -0.3075 -0.1205 -0.2270 
12.30 -0.0590 -0.0844 -0.3075 -0.1205 -0.2270 
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ARBITRAGE OProR'IUNITIES I to g 
Time ~ month two months three months six months twelve months 
10.15 -0.0893 -0.0981 -0.0982 -0.1335 -0.3211 
10.20 -0.0573 -0.0659 -0.0651 -0.1003 -0.2864 
10.25 -0.0702 -0.0788 -0.0788 -0.1138 -0.3006 
10.30 -0.0702 -0.0188 -0.0788 -0.1138 -0.3006 
10.35 -0.0894 -0.0983 -0.0985 -0.1340 -0.3220 
10.40 -0.0701 -0.0787 -0.0786 -0.1135 -0.3001 
10.50 -0.0701 -0.0788 -0.0781 -0.1136 -0.3003 
10.55 -0.0701 -0.0788 -0.0781 -0.1136 -0.3003 
11.00 -0.0703 -0.0790 -0.0791 -0.1142 -0.3015 
11.05 -0.0896 -0.0985 -0.0987 -0.1345 -0.3229 
11.10 -0.0896 -0.0986 -0.0989 -0.1348 -0.3235 
11.15 -0.0705 -0.0794 -0.0796 -0.1152 -0.3033 
11.20 -0.0896 -0.0985 -0.0987 -0.1345 -0.3229 
11.25 -0.0888 -0.0972 -0.0968 -0.1310 -0.3167 
11.30 -0.0706 -0.0796 -0.0800 -0.1160 -0.3047 
11.35 -0.0707 -0.0197 -0.0801 -0.1161 -0.3049 
11.40 -0.1026 -0.1053 -0.1058 -0.1823 -0.3598 
11.45 -0.0708 -0.0734 -0.0738 -0.1367 -0.3269 
11.50 -0.0708 -0.0734 -0.0739 -0.1368 -0.2670 
11.55 -0.1033 -0.1064 -0.1075 -0.1720 -0.3052 
12.00 -0.0711 -0.0740 -0.0748 -0.1385 -0.2700 
12.05 -0.1032 -0.1064 -0.1074 -0.1718 -0.3048 
12.10 -0.0839 -0.0868 -0.0876 -0.1514 -0.2832 
12.15 -0.0839 -0.0868 -0.0876 -0.1514 -0.2832 
12.20 -0.1032 -0.1062 -0.1072 -0.1715 -0.3043 
12.25 -0.1030 -0.1061 -0.1069 -0.1710 -0.3034 
12.30 -0.1030 -0.1061 -0.1069 -0.1710 -0.3034 
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ARBITRAGE OPPOR'roNITIES r:M to i 
Time one month two months three months six months twelve months 
10.15 -0.0471 -0.0180 -0.2253 -0.1686 -0.2881 
10.20 -0.0471 -0.0180 -0.2252 -0.1685 -0.2879 
10.25 -0.0788 -0.0498 -0.2571 -0.2006 -0.3204 
10.30 -0.0788 -0.0498 -0.2571 -0.2006 -0.3204 
10.35 -0.0521 -0.0228 -0.2298 -0.1724 -0.2901 
10.40 -0.0628 -0.0336 -0.2407 -0.1836 -0.3020 
10.50 -0.0522 -0.0229 -0.2300 -0.1727 -0.2907 
10.55 -0.0522 -0.0229 -0.2300 -0.1727 -0.2907 
11.00 -0.0786 -0.0494 -0.2564 -0.1993 -0.3176 
11.05 -0.0521 -0.0228 -0.2298 -0.1724 -0.2901 
11.10 -0.0626 -0.0333 -0.2403 -0.1828 -0.3002 
11.15 -0.0783 -0.0490 -0.2558 -0.1981 -0.3149 
11.20 -0.0626 -0.0333 -0.2402 -0.1826 -0.2999 
11.25 -0.0625 -0.0332 -0.2401 -0.1824 -0.2993 
11.30 -0.0626 -0.0332 -0.2402 -0.1825 -0.2997 
11.35 -0.0785 -0.0492 -0.2562 -0.1989 -0.3167 
11.40 -0.0625 -0.0332 -0.2400 -0.1823 -0.2991 
11.45 -0.0625 -0.0332 -0.2400 -0.1823 -0.2991 
11.50 -0.0783 -0.0489 -0.2557 -0.1979 -0.3144 
11.55 -0.0624 -0.0330 -0.2398 -0.1817 -0.2979 
12.00 -0.0624 -0.0329 -0.2396 -0.1814 -0.2972 
12.05 -0.0783 -0.0488 -0.2556 -0.1977 -0.3140 
12.10 -0.0782 -0.0487 -0.2555 -0.1974 -0.3135 
12.15 -0.0782 -0.0487 -0.2555 -0.1974 -0.3135 
12.20 -0.0625 -0.0330 -0.2398 -0.1819 -0.2982 
12.25 -0.0624 -0.0329 -0.2397 -0.1816 -0.2975 
12.30 -0.0625 -0.0330 -0.2399 -0.1820 -0.2984 
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ARBITRAGE OPPOR'ItlNITIES I to [M 
Time one month two months three months six months twel ve months 
10.15 -0.0269 -0.0665 -0.2552 -0.0268 -0.0617 
10.20 -0.0269 -0.0666 -0.2553 -0.0268 -0.0619 
10.25 -0.0589 -0.0988 -0.2878 -0.0604 -0.0976 
10.30 -0.0589 -0.0988 -0.2878 -0.0604 -0.0976 
10.35 -0.0324 -0.0724 -0.2614 -0.0338 -0.0710 
10.40 -0.0430 -0.0830 -0.2720 -0.0445 -0.0818 
10.50 -0.0324 -0.0723 -0.2612 -0.0336 -0.0704 
10.55 -0.0324 -0.0723 -0.2612 -0.0336 -0.0704 
11.00 -0.0590 -0.0992 -0.2883 -0.0615 -0.1003 
11.05 -0.0324 -0.0724 -0.2614 -0.0338 -0.0710 
11.10 -0.0431 -0.0832 -0.2723 -0.0453 -0.0836 
11.15 -0.0592 -0.0995 -0.2889 -0.0627 -0.1030 
11.20 -0.0431 -0.0832 -0.2724 -0.0454 -0.0840 
11.25 -0.0432 -0.0833 -0.2725 -0.0457 -0.0845 
11.30 -0.0431 -0.0833 -0.2724 -0.0455 -0.0842 
11.35 -0.0591 -0.0993 -0.2885 -0.0619 -0.1012 
11.40 -0.0432 -0.0833 -0.2726 -0.0458 -0.0847 
11.45 -0.0432 -0.0833 -0.2726 -0.0458 -0.0847 
11.50 -0.0592 -0.0996 -0.2890 -0.0629 -0.1035 
11.55 -0.0433 -0.0835 -0.2728 -0.0463 -0.0859 
12.00 -0.0433 -0.0836 -0.2730 -0.0466 -0.0867 
12.05 -0.0592 -0.0996 -0.2891 -0.0631 -0.1039 
12.10 -0.0592 -0.0997 -0.2892 -0.0633 -0.1044 
12.15 -0.0592 -0.0997 -0.2892 -0.0633 -0.1044 
12.20 -0.0432 -0.0835 -0.2727 -0.0461 -0.0856 
12.25 -0.0433 -0.0835 -0.2729 -0.0465 -0.0863 
12.30 -0.0432 -0.0834 -0.2727 -0.0461 -0.0854 
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ARBITRAGE OPFOR'IUNITIES g to rM 
Time one month two months three months six months twelve months 
10.15 
-0.0889 -0.1070 -0.3526 -0.1218 -0.7370 
10.20 
-0.0568 -0.0747 -0.3200 -0.0883 -0.7020 
10.25 
-0.1017 -0.1200 -0.3657 -0.1356 -0.7522 
10.30 
-0.1017 -0.1200 -0.3657 -0.1356 -0.7522 
10.35 
-0.0944 -0.1127 -0.3585 -0.1285 -0.7457 
10.40 -0.0858 -0.1042 -0.3499 -0.1198 -0.7366 
10.50 
-0.0751 -0.0934 -0.3391 -0.1086 -0.7249 
10.55 
-0.0751 -0.0934 -0.3391 -0.1086 -0.7249 
11.00 -0.1017 -0.1202 -0.3660 -0.1363 -0.7541 
11.05 -0.0943 -0.1126 -0.3583 -0.1281 -0.7449 
11.10 -0.1050 -0.1234 -0.3692 -0.1394 -0.7572 
11.15 -0.1018 -0.1203 -0.3661 -0.1366 -0.7552 
11.20 -0.1050 -0.1235 -0.3694 -0.1399 -0.7581 
11.25 -0.1055 -0.1246 -0.3711 -0.1433 -0.7644 
11.30 -0.0856 -0.1037 -0.3492 -0.1184 -0.7347 
11.35 -0.1015 -0.1198 -0.3653 -0.1350 -0.7519 
11.40 -0.0921 -0.1169 -0.3626 -0.0918 -0.7214 
11.45 -0.0598 -0.0842 -0.3295 -0.0708 -0.6845 
11.50 -0.0759 -0.1004 -0.3460 -0.0881 -0.7651 
11.55 -0.0918 -0.1162 -0.3615 -0.1032 -0.7794 
12.00 -0.0597 -0.0839 -0.3290 -0.0699 -0.7451 
12.05 -0.1078 -0.1324 -0.3779 -0.1203 -0.7980 
12.10 -0.0886 -0.1132 -0.3586 -0.1008 -0.7780 
12.15 -0.0886 -0.1132 -0.3586 -0.1008 -0.7780 
12.20 -0.0918 -0.1163 -0.3616 -0.1035 -0.7798 
12.25 -0.0919 -0.1165 -0.3620 -0.1042 -0.7814 
12.30 -0.0919 -0.1164 -0.3618 -0.1038 -0.7805 
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ARBITRAGE OPRJR'IUNITIES DM to g 
Time ~ month two months three months six months twelve months 
10.15 
-0.1258 -0.1109 -0.1217 -0.2385 -0.4780 
10.20 -0.0939 -0.0788 -0.0895 -0.2057 -0.4442 
10.25 -0.1384 -0.1235 -0.1343 -0.2511 -0.4904 
10.30 -0.1384 -0.1235 -0.1343 -0.2511 -0.4904 
10.35 -0.1309 -0.1159 -0.1266 -0.2429 -0.4809 
10.40 -0.1223 -0.1072 -0.1177 -0.2338 -0.4716 
10.50 -0.1117 -0.0966 -0.1071 -0.2230 -0.4604 
10.55 -0.1117 -0.0966 -0.1071 -0.2230 -0.4604 
11.00 -0.1382 -0.1233 -0.1339 -0.2503 -0.4885 
11.05 -0.1310 -0.1161 -0.1268 -0.2433 -0.4818 
11.10 -0.1416 -0.1267 -0.1374 -0.2540 -0.4924 
11.15 -0.1382 -0.1232 -0.1338 -0.2500 -0.4875 
11.20 -0.1415 -0.1265 -0.1372 -0.2535 -0.4915 
11.25 -0.1407 -0.1252 -0.1352 -0.2499 -0.4849 
11.30 -0.1226 -0.1077 -0.1186 -0.2352 -0.4737 
11.35 -0.1385 -0.1238 -0.1347 -0.2517 -0.4909 
11.40 -0.1545 -0.1332 -0.1440 -0.3003 -0.5265 
11.45 -0.1227 -0.1014 -0.1123 -0.2554 -0.4946 
11.50 -0.1385 -0.1172 -0.1280 -0.2710 -0.4518 
11.55 -0.1550 -0.1341 -0.1454 -0.2896 -0.4723 
12.00 -0.1229 -0.1018 -0.1128 -0.2562 -0.4376 
12.05 -0.1708 -0.1499 -0.1612 -0.3053 -0.4881 
12.10 -0.1514 -0.1304 -0.1414 -0.2850 -0.4666 
12.15 -0.1514 -0.1304 -0.1414 -0.2850 -0.4666 
12.20 -0.1549 -0.1340 -0.1452 -0.2892 -0.4718 
12.25 -0.1548 -0.1337 -0.1448 -0.2884 -0.4702 
12.30 -0.1548 -0.1338 -0.1450 -0.2888 -0.4711 
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OK INOOSTRIAL, PRC>IX.CI'ICN UNEMPIDYMENI' 
AND VAf:.MCf FIGURES 
RELEAsEo 13.8.87 
Table 1. IV ccmpr ises 
ARBITRAGE OPFOR'ruNITIES g to ~ 
ARBITRAGE OPFOR'ruNITIES ~ to g 
ARBITRAGE OPFOR'ruNITIES I:M to i 
ARBITRAGE OPFOR'ruNITIES ~ to [M 
ARBITRAGE OPFOR'ruNITIES g to [M 
ARBITRAGE OPfOR'IUNITIES I:M to g 
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ARBITRAGE OPPOR'ruNITIES g to ~ 
Time one month two months three months six months twelve months 
10.30 -0.1466 -0.1954 -0.0838 -0.1415 -0.2581 
10.35 
-0.1275 -0.1761 -0.0643 -0.1215 -0.2371 
10.40 
-0.1275 -0.1761 -0.0643 -0.1215 -0.2371 
10.45 -0.1466 -0.1955 -0.0840 -0.1418 -0.2586 
10.50 -0.1466 -0.1954 -0.0838 -0.1415 -0.2581 
10.55 -0.1466 -0.1955 -0.0839 -0.1417 -0.2584 
11.00 -0.1466 -0.1954 -0.0837 -0.1414 -0.2578 
11.05 -0.1467 -0.1956 -0.0841 -0.1420 -0.2589 
11.10 -0.1274 -0.1760 -0.0641 -0.1211 -0.2362 
11.15 -0.1466 -0.1954 -0.0837 -0.1413 -0.2576 
11.20 -0.1517 -0.1954 -0.0838 -0.1415 -0.2581 
11.25 -0.1325 -0.1759 -0.0640 -0.1209 -0.2359 
11.30 -0.1517 -0.1954 -0.0838 -0.1415 -0.2581 
11.35 -0.1511 -0.1954 -0.0838 -0.1415 -0.2581 
11.40 -0.1518 -0.1956 -0.0841 -0.1420 -0.2589 
11.45 -0.1518 -0.1956 -0.0841 -0.1420 -0.2589 
11.50 -0.1518 -0.1956 -0.0841 -0.1420 -0.2589 
11.55 -0.1327 -0.1763 -0.0646 -0.1220 -0.2379 
12.00 -0.1518 -0.1956 -0.0841 -0.1420 -0.2589 
12.05 -0.1199 -0.1633 -0.0514 -0.1083 -0.2233 
12.10 -0.1518 -0.1957 -0.0843 -0.1424 -0.2597 
ARBITRAGE OPPOR'ruNITIES ~ to g 
Time one month two months three months six months twelve months 
10.30 -0.0928 -0.1171 -0.1273 -0.1185 -0.2357 
10.35 -0.0737 -0.0979 -0.1079 -0.0987 -0.2149 
10.40 -0.0737 -0.0979 -0.1079 -0.0987 -0.2149 
10.45 -0.0927 -0.1170 -0.1272 -0.1183 -0.2352 
10.50 -0.0928 -0.1171 -0.1273 -0.1185 -0.2357 
10.55 -0.0928 -0.1171 -0.1272 -0.1184 -0.2353 
11.00 -0.0928 -0.1172 -0.1274 -0.1187 -0.2360 
11.05 -0.0927 -0.1169 -0.1271 -0.1181 -0.2348 
11.10 -0.0738 -0.0981 -0.1082 -0.0992 -0.2158 
11.15 -0.0929 -0.1172 -0.1275 -0.1188 -0.2362 
11.20 -0.0928 -0.1171 -0.1273 -0.1185 -0.2357 
11.25 -0.0738 -0.0981 -0.1083 -0.0994 -0.2161 
11.30 -0.0928 -0.1171 -0.1273 -0.1185 -0.2357 
11.35 -0.0928 -0.1171 -0.1273 -0.1185 -0.2357 
11.40 -0.0927 -0.1169 -0.1271 -0.1181 -0.2348 
11.45 -0.0927 -0.1169 -0.1271 -0.1181 -0.2348 
11.50 -0.0927 -0.1169 -0.1271 -0.1181 -0.2348 
11.55 -0.0736 -0.0977 -0.1077 -0.0982 -0.2141 
12.00 -0.0927 -0.1169 -0.1271 -0.1181 -0.2348 
12.05 -0.0609 -0.0850 -0.0949 -0.0853 -0.2008 
12.10 -0.0926 -0.1167 -0.1268 -0.1176 -0.2340 
95 
ARBITRAGE OPFORTUNITIES r:M to I 
Time one month two months three months six months twel ve months 
10.30 
-0.1249 -0.0500 -0.0241 -0.1454 -0.2366 
10.35 
-0.1514 -0.0766 -0.0508 -0.1724 -0.2642 
10.40 
-0.1514 -0.0767 -0.0509 -0.1726 -0.2647 
10.45 
-0.1355 -0.0607 -0.0348 -0.1563 -0.2478 
10.50 
-0.1249 -0.0500 -0.0241 -0.1454 -0.2366 
10.55 
-0.1515 -0.0768 -0.0510 -0.1728 -0.2651 
11.00 
-0.1249 -0.0500 -0.0240 -0.1453 -0.2363 
11.05 -0.1355 -0.0607 -0.0348 -0.1562 -0.2476 
11.10 
-0.1514 -0.0766 -0.0508 -0.1724 -0.2642 
11.15 
-0.1514 -0.0766 -0.0507 -0.1722 -0.2638 
11.20 
-0.1355 -0.0606 -0.0346 -0.1560 -0.2471 
11.25 -0.1513 -0.0765 -0.0506 -0.1720 -0.2633 
11.30 
-0.1355 -0.0606 -0.0347 -0.1561 -0.2475 
11.35 -0.1249 -0.0500 -0.0241 -0.1454 -0.2366 
11.40 -0.1249 -0.0500 -0.0241 -0.1454 -0.2366 
11.45 -0.1355 -0.0607 -0.0348 -0.1562 -0.2476 
11.50 -0.1249 -0.0500 -0.0241 -0.1454 -0.2366 
11.55 
-0.1249 -0.0500 -0.0240 . -0.1454 -0.2364 
12.00 -0.1514 -0.0767 -0.0508 -0.1726 -0.2645 
12.05 -0.1514 -0.0766 -0.0508 -0.1724 -0.2642 
12.10 
-0.1832 -0.1087 -0.0830 -0.2052 -0.2981 
ARBITRAGE OPPORTUNITIES l to I:M 
Time one month two months three months six months twelve months 
10.30 -0.0429 -0.0612 -0.2975 -0.0613 -0.1263 
10.35 -0.0695 -0.0881 -0.3245 -0.0891 -0.1557 
10.40 -0.0695 -0.0880 -0.3244 -0.0888 -0.1551 
10.45 -0.0535 -0.0719 -0.3082 -0.0723 -0.1379 
10.50 -0.0429 -0.0612 -0.2975 -0.0613 -0.1263 
10.55 -0.0694 -0.0880 -0.3243 -0.0887 -0.1548 
11.00 -0.0429 -0.0613 -0.2975 -0.0615 -0.1267 
11.05 -0.0535 -0.0720 -0.3083 -0.0724 -0.1381 
11.10 -0.0695 -0.0881 -0.3245 -0.0891 -0.1557 
11.15 -0.0695 -0.0881 -0.3245 -0.0892 -0.1560 
11.20 -0.0535 -0.0720 -0.3084 -0.0726 -0.1386 
11.25 -0.0695 -0.0882 -0.3247 -0.0894 -0.1565 
11.30 -0.0535 -0.0720 -0.3083 -0.0725 -0.1382 
11.35 
-0.0429 -0.0612 -0.2975 -0.0613 -0.1263 
11.40 -0.0429 -0.0612 -0.2975 -0.0613 -0.1263 
11.45 -0.0535 -0.0720 -0.3083 -0.0724 -0.1381 
11.50 
-0.0429 -0.0612 -0.2975 -0.0613 -0.1263 
11.55 -0.0429 -0.0612 -0.2975 -0.0614 -0.1265 
12.00 -0.0695 -0.0880 -0.3244 -0.0889 -0.1553 
12.05 -0.0695 -0.0881 -0.3245 -0.0891 -0.1557 
12.10 
-0.1014 -0.1202 -0.3567 -0.1220 -0.1900 
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ARBITRAGE OPPOR'ItJNITIES g to IM 
Time one month two months three months six months twelve months 
10.30 -0.0956 -0.2360 -0.3519 -0.1403 -0.2595 
10.35 -0.1031 -0.2437 -0.3596 -0.1484 -0.2684 
10.40 -0.1031 -0.2436 -0.3595 -0.1482 -0.2679 
10.45 -0.1063 -0.2469 -0.3628 -0.1518 -0.2718 
10.50 -0.0956 -0.2360 -0.3519 -0.1403 -0.2595 
10.55 -0.1223 -0.2629 -0.3790 -0.1682 -0.2889 
11.00 -0.0956 -0.2360 -0.3519 -0.1403 -0.2595 
11.05 -0.1063 -0.2470 -0.3630 -0.1520 -0.2723 
11.10 -0.1031 -0.2435 -0.3594 -0.1480 -0.2676 
11.15 -0.1223 -0.2629 -0.3790 -0.1683 -0.2893 
11.20 -0.1114 -0.2469 -0.3629 -0.1518 -0.2720 
11.25 -0.1082 -0.2436 -0.3595 -0.1482 -0.2682 
11.30 -0.1114 -0.2468 -0.3628 -0.1516 -0.2717 
11.35 -0.1007 -0.2360 -0.3519 -0.1403 -0.2595 
11.40 -0.1008 -0.2362 -0.3521 -0.1408 -0.2603 
11.45 -0.1115 -0.2470 -0.3630 -0.1520 -0.2723 
11.50 -0.1008 -0.2362 -0.3521 -0.1408 -0.2603 
11.55 -0.0817 -0.2169 -0.3327 
-0.1208 -0.2394 
12.00 -0.1275 -0.2631 -0.3792 -0.1687 -0.2899 
12.05 -0.0955 -0.2308 -0.3467 -0.1352 -0.2546 
12.10 -0.1595 -0.2955 -0.4119 -0.2027 -0.3262 
ARBITRAGE OPRJRTUNITIES I:M to g 
Time one month two months three months six months twelve months 
10.30 -0.1240 -0.1458 -0.1194 -0.2007 -0.3439 
10.35 -0.1314 -0.1532 -0.1268 -0.2081 -0.3513 
10.40 -0.1314 -0.1533 -0.1270 -0.2083 -0.3519 
10.45 -0.1345 -0.1564 -0.1300 -0.2113 -0.3546 
10.50 -0.1240 -0.1458 -0.1194 -0.2007 -0.3439 
10.55 -0.1505 -0.1725 -0.1462 -0.2278 -0.3720 
11.00 -0.1240 -0.1459 -0.1195 -0.2007 -0.3439 
11.05 -0.1344 -0.1563 -0.1298 -0.2110 -0.3541 
11.10 -0.1315 -0.1534 -0.1271 
-0.2086 -0.3522 
11.15 -0.1505 -0.1725 -0.1462 -0.2278 -0.3716 
11.20 -0.1345 -0.1564 -0.1300 -0.2112 -0.3544 
11.25 -0.1314 -0.1534 -0.1270 -0.2084 -0.3516 
11.30 -0.1345 -0.1564 -0.1301 -0.2114 -0.3547 
11.35 -0.1240 -0.1458 -0.1194 -0.2007 -0.3439 
11.40 -0.1238 -0.1456 -0.1192 -0.2002 -0.3431 
11.45 -0.1344 -0.1563 -0.1298 -0.2110 -0.3541 
11.50 -0.1238 -0.1456 -0.1192 -0.2002 -0.3431 
11.55 -0.1048 -0.1265 -0.0999 -0.1806 -0.3228 
12.00 -0.1504 -0.1723 -0.1459 -0.2273 
-0.3710 
12.05 -0.1186 -0.1404 -0.1139 -0.1949 
-0.3376 
12.10 -0.1821 -0.2040 -0.1778 -0.2594 -0.4037 
97 
Table 1. V canprises 
ARBITRAGE OPFQRIUNITIES g to ~ 
ARBITRAGE OPFDR'IUNITIES ~ to g 
ARBITRAGE OPRJRTUNITIES CM to ~ 
ARBITRAGE OPRJRTUNITIES ~ to IJ.1 
ARBITRAGE OPFDR'IUNITIES g to IJ.1 
ARBITRAGE OPRJRTUNITIES CM to g 
us TRADE FIGt.JRES 
RELEASED 14.8.87 
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ARBITRAGE OProRruNITIES g to ~ 
Time ~ roonth two roonths three roonths six roonths twelve months 
13.05 -0.0625 -0.2110 -0.0909 -0.0524 -0.0457 
13.10 -0.0626 -0.2112 -0.0912 -0.0531 -0.0471 
13.15 -0.0626 -0.2112 -0.0912 -0.0531 -0.0471 
13.20 -0.0434 -0.1918 -0.0716 -0.0328 -0.0256 
13.25 -0.0434 -0.1918 -0.0717 -0.0330 -0.0259 
13.30 -0.0950 -0.2445 -0.1255 -0.0901 -0.0887 
13.35 -0.1909 -0.3420 -0.2246 -0.1939 -0.2013 
13.40 -0.0640 -0.2145 -0.0964 -0.0637 -0.0664 
13.45 -0.0959 -0.2365 -0.1293 -0.0981 -0.1036 
13.50 -0.0642 -0.2045 -0.0970 -0.0651 -0.0689 
13.55 -0.0642 -0.2045 -0.0970 -0.0651 -0.0689 
14.00 -0.0645 -0.2053 -0.0984 -0.0678 -0.0739 
14.05 -0.0647 -0.2056 -0.0988 -0.0687 -0.0755 
14.10 -0.0649 -0.2062 -0.0997 -0.0705 -0.0789 
14.15 -0.0649 -0.2062 -0.0997 -0.0705 -0.0789 
14.20 -0.0648 -0.2059 -0.0992 -0.0696 -0.0772 
14.25 -0.0648 -0.2059 -0.0992 -0.0696 -0.0772 
14.30 -0.0963 -0.2375 -0.1310 -0.1017 -0.1101 
14.35 -0.0595 -0.2057 -0.0833 -0.0375 -0.1617 
14.40 -0.0594 -0.2055 -0.0828 -0.0366 -0.1600 
14.45 -0.0595 -0.2057 -0.0833 -0.0375 -0.1617 
14.50 -0.0593 -0.2053 -0.0826 -0.0361 -0.1592 
14.55 -0.0594 -0.2055 -0.0828 -0.0366 -0.1600 
15.00 -0.0594 -0.2055 -0.0828 -0.0366 -0.1600 
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ARBITRAGE OPFOR'IUNITIES ~ to g 
Time one month two months three months six months twe 1 ve months 
13.05 -0.0989 -0.1021 -0.1208 -0.2373 -0.4854 
13.10 -0.0988 -0.1018 -0.1203 -0.2365 -0.4840 
13.15 -0.0988 -0.1018 -0.1203 -0.2365 -0.4840 
13.20 -0.0796 -0.0826 -0.1010 -0.2168 -0.4636 
13.25 -0.0796 -0.0825 -0.1009 -0.2166 -0.4632 
13.30 -0.1298 -0.1324 -0.1506 -0.2656 -0.5116 
13.35 -0.2240 -0.2267 -0.2448 -0.3598 -0.6068 
13.40 -0.0963 -0.0975 -0.1142 -0.2249 -0.4634 
13.45 -0.1277 -0.1393 -0.1456 -0.2564 -0.4954 
13.50 -0.0960 -0.1073 -0.1134 -0.2234 -0.4607 
13.55 -0.0960 -0.1073 -0.1134 -0.2234 -0.4607 
14.00 -0.0954 -0.1062 -0.1118 -0.2204 -0.4554 
14.05 -0.0952 -0.1058 -0.1112 -0.2194 -0.4536 
14.10 -0.0948 -0.1051 -0.1102 -0.2174 -0.4501 
14.15 -0.0948 -0.1051 -0.1102 -0.2174 -0.4501 
14.20 -0.0950 -0.1054 -0.1107 -0.2184 -0.4519 
14.25 -0.0950 -0.1054 -0.1107 -0.2184 -0.4519 
14.30 -0.1268 -0.1377 -0.1434 -0.2523 -0.4882 
14.35 -0.1003 -0.1056 -0.1266 -0.2501 -0.3277 
14.40 -0.1005 -0.1060 -0.1271 -0.2511 -0.3295 
14.45 -0.1003 -0.1056 -0.1266 -0.2501 -0.3277 
14.50 -0.1006 -0.1062 -0.1274 -0.2516 -0.3304 
14.55 -0.1005 -0.1060 -0.1271 -0.2511 -0.3295 
15.00 -0.1005 -0.1060 -0.1271 -0.2511 -0.3295 
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ARBITRAGE OPPOR'IUNITIES r:M to ~ 
Time one month two months three months six months twelve months 
13.05 -0.0572 -0.0597 -0.0492 -0.1160 -0.1265 
13.10 -0.0731 -0.0756 -0.0652 -0.1321 -0.1431 
13.15 -0.0466 -0.0488 -0.0383 -0.1047 -0.1143 
13.20 ... 0.0571 -0.0594 -0.0488 -0.1151 -0.1247 
13.25 -0.0465 -0.0488 -0.0382 -0.1044 -0.1138 
13.30 -0.1777 -0.1797 -0.1689 -0.2348 -0.2426 
13.35 -0.1560 -0.1611 -0.1534 -0.2278 -0.2574 
13.40 -0.0746 -0.0783 -0.0692 -0.1396 -0.1593 
13.45 -0.0757 -0.0701 -0.0723 -0.1455 -0.1723 
13.50 -0.1023 -0.0967 -0.0990 -0.1723 -0.1992 
13.55 -0.0492 -0.0437 -0.0461 -0.1195 -0.1471 
14.00 -0.1298 -0.1249 -0.1279 -0.2031 -0.2349 
14.05 -0.0764 -0.0714 -0.0742 -0.1491 -0.1801 
14.10 -0.1033 -0.0984 -0.1014 -0.1767 -0.2088 
14.15 -0.0768 -0.0721 -0.0753 -0.1511 -0.1845 
14.20 -0.1034 -0.0987 -0.1018 -0.1775 -0.2106 
14.25 -0.1033 -0.0984 -0.1014 -0.1767 -0.2088 
14.30 -0.0763 -0.0712 -0.0740 -0.1487 -0.1792 
14.35 -0.0715 -0.0719 -0.0596 -0.1199 -0.2644 
14.40 -0.1267 -0.1284 -0.1174 -0.1815 -0.3352 
14.45 -0.1265 -0.1281 -0.1169 -0.1807 -0.3334 
14.50 -0.0726 -0.0740 -0.0626 -0.1255 -0.2766 
14.55 -0.6617 -0.6652 -0.6559 -0.7261 -0.8914 
15.00 -0.0726 -0.0740 -0.0626 -0.1255 -0.2766 
) 
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ARBITRAGE OPPORTUNITIES ~ to OM 
Time one month two months three months six months twelve months 
13.05 -0.0485 -0.0729 -0.2935 -0.1131 -0.3043 
13.10 
-0.0645 -0.0889 -0.3097 -0.1297 -0.3218 
13.15 -0.0380 -0.0623 -0.2830 -0.1025 -0.2938 
13.20 -0.0487 -0.0731 -0.2939 -0.1139 -0.3061 
13.25 -0.0380 -0.0624 -0.2831 -0.1027 -0.2943 
13.30 -0.1709 -0.1970 -0.4192 -0.2442 -0.4481 
13.35 -0.1433 -0.1661 -0.3850 -0.2005 -0.3801 
13.40 -0.0636 -0.0869 -0.3064 -0.1228 -0.3060 
13.45 -0.0630 -0.0956 -0.3037 -0.1174 -0.2934 
13.50 -0.0898 -0.1228 -0.3311 -0.1457 -0.3237 
13.55 -0.0360 -0.0682 -0.2759 -0.0883 -0.2613 
14.00 -0.1163 -0.1489 -0.3568 -0.1704 -0.3456 
14.05 -0.0625 -0.0946 -0.3021 -0.1141 -0.2857 
14.10 -0.0894 -0.1216 -0.3292 -0.1417 -0.3144 
14.15 -0.0623 -0.0941 -0.3012 -0.1123 -0.2815 
14.20 -0.0893 -0.1214 -0.3289 -0.1410 -0.3128 
14.25 -0.0894 -0.1216 -0.3292 -0.1417 -0.3144 
14.30 -0.0626 -0.0947 -0.3023 -0.1145 -0.2866 
14.35 -0.0676 -0.0942 -0.3170 -0.1439 -0.1573 
14.40 -0.1208 -0.1468 -0.3688 -0.1939 -0.2022 
14.45 -0.1209 -0.1470 -0.3691 -0.1946 -0.2039 
14.50 -0.0669 -0.0926 -0.3145 -0.1387 -0.1454 
14.55 -0.6583 -0.6886 -0.9139 -0.7538 -0.7930 
15.00 -0.0669 -0.0926 -0.3145 -0.1387 -0.1454 
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ARBITRAGE OPPORIUNITIES g to [M 
Time one month two months three months six months twelve months 
13.05 -0.1007 -0.2632 -0.3550 -0.1036 -0.1867 
13.10 -0.1168 -0.2796 -0.3716 -0.1212 -0.2060 
13.15 -0.0902 -0.2529 -0.3447 -0.0937 -0.1773 
13.20 -0.0817 -0.2443 -0.3362 -0.0849 -0.1684 
13.25 -0.0711 -0.2336 -0.3254 -0.0738 -0.1566 
13.30 -0.2558 -0.4214 -0.5160 -0.2743 -0.3768 
13.35 -0.3239 -0.4878 -0.5803 -0.3336 -0.4196 
13.40 -0.1173 -0.2808 -0.3734 -0.1249 -0.2090 
13.45 -0.1485 -0.3115 -0.4035 -0.1537 -0.2332 
13.50 -0.1437 -0.3068 -0.3989 -0.1494 -0.2296 
13.55 -0.0898 -0.2521 -0.3434 -0.0912 -0.1658 
14.00 -0.1707 -0.3340 -0.4261 -0.1772 -0.2571 
14.05 -0.1169 -0.2797 -0.3715 -0.1210 -0.1974 
14.10 -0.1440 -0.3074 -0.3997 -0.1508 -0.2301 
14.15 -0.1169 -0.2797 -0.3715 -0.1210 -0.1964 
14.20 -0.1438 -0.3069 -0.3989 -0.1492 -0.2267 
14.25 -0.1439 -0.3071 -0.3992 -0.1499 -0.2285 
14.30 -0.1486 -0.3117 -0.4038 -0.1543 -0.2329 
14.35 -0.1168 -0.2794 -0.3710 -0.1200 -0.1948 
14.40 -0.1700 -0.3319 -0.4227 -0.1698 -0.2391 
14.45 -0.1702 -0.3324 -0.4235 -0.1714 -0.2425 
14.50 -0.1159 -0.2774 -0.3678 -0.1134 -0.1800 
14.55 -0.7085 -0.8761 -0.9716 -0.7373 -0.8440 
15.00 -0.1160 -0.2775 -0.3680 -0.1138 -0.1809 
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AREITRAGE OPFORTUNITIES OM to g 
Time one month two nonths three nonths six months twelve nonths 
13.05 -0.1455 -0.1405 -0.1381 -0.2883 -0.4357 
13.10 -0.1612 -0.1561 -0.1536 -0.3037 -0.4508 
13.15 -0.1347 -0.1294 -0.1267 -0.2762 -0.4222 
13.20 -0.1261 -0.1208 -0.1180 -0.2673 -0.4127 
13.25 -0.1155 -0.1101 -0.1073 -0.2564 -0.4015 
13.30 -0.2966 -0.2906 -0.2872 -0.4348 -0.5769 
13.35 -0.3688 -0.3656 -0.3651 -0.5206 -0.6838 
13.40 -0.1603 -0.1545 -0.1515 -0.2996 -0.4471 
13.45 -0.1927 -0.1879 -0.1858 -0.3366 -0.4910 
13.50 -0.1877 -0.1827 -0.1804 -0.3308 -0.4842 
13.55 -0.1346 -0.1297 -0.1276 -0.2781 -0.4323 
14.00 -0.2145 -0.2097 -0.2077 -0.3586 -0.5147 
14.05 -0.1610 -0.1559 -0.1536 -0.3037 -0.4583 
14.10 -0.1874 -0.1821 -0.1797 -0.3293 -0.4836 
14.15 -0.1609 -0.1559 -0.1536 -0.3037 -0.4593 
14.20 -0.1878 -0.1828 -0.1807 -0.3311 -0.4870 
14.25 -0.1876 -0.1825 -0.1802 -0.3303 -0.4853 
14.30 -0.1924 -0.1875 -0.1853 -0.3358 -0.4910 
14.35 -0.1612 -0.1563 -0.1542 -0.3048 -0.4610 
14.40 -0.2165 -0.2131 -0.2125 -0.3673 -0.5334 
14.45 -0.2161 -0.2124 -0.2115 -0.3655 -0.5299 
14.50 -0.1626 -0.1589 -0.1580 -0.3119 -0.4758 
14.55 -0.7510 -0.7494 -0.7505 -0.9109 -1.0885 
15.00 -0.1625 -0.1587 -0.1577 -0.3114 -0.4749 
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Table 1. VI comprises 
ARBITAAGE OPPOR'ruNITIES g to ~ 
ARBlTAAGE OPFOR'IUNITIES l to g 
ARBlTAAGE OPPOR'ruNITIES rM to ~ 
ARBlTAAGE OPFOR'IUNITIES ~ to [M 
ARBlTAAGE OPFOR'IUNITIES g to [M 
ARBlTAAGE OPFOR'IUNITIES rM to g 
OK REI'AIL SALES FIGURES RELEAsED 11.30 17.8.87 
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ARBITRAGE OPPORruNITIES g to ~ 
Time one month t~ months three months six months twelve months 
10.30 -0.0626 -0.2048 -0.0979 -0.1382 -0.3184 
10.35 -0.0307 -0.1726 -0.0655 -0.1050 -0.2837 
10.40 -0.0307 -0.1726 -0.0655 -0.1050 -0.2837 
10.45 -0.0627 -0.2049 -0.0980 -0.1384 -0.3187 
10.50 0.014r -0.1272 -0.0196 -0.0577 -0.2335 
10.55 -0.0626 -0.2047 -0.0978 -0.1380 -0.3179 
11.00 -0.0627 -0.2049 -0.0981 -0.1386 -0.3191 
11.05 -0.0627 -0.2049 -0.0980 -0.1384 -0.3187 
11.10 -0.0627 -0.2049 -0.0980 -0.1384 -0.3187 
11.15 -0.0306 -0.1725 -0.0652 -0.1046 -0.2829 
11.20 -0.0306 -0.1725 -0.0652 -0.1046 -0.2829 
11.25 -0.0306 -0.1725 -0.0652 -0.0738 -0.2829 
11.30 -0.0627 -0.2050 -0.0982 -0.1080 -0.3195 
11.35 -0.0627 -0.2050 -0.0982 -0.1080 -0.3195 
11.40 -0.0307 -0.1726 -0.0655 -0.0743 -0.2839 
11.45 -0.0307 -0.1791 -0.0590 -0.0203 -0.1623 
11.50 -0.0627 -0.2115 -0.0917 -0.0540 -0.1981 
12.00 -0.0435 -0.1920 -0.0720 -0.0336 -0.1763 
12.10 -0.0627 -0.2115 -0.0916 -0.0539 -0.1978 
... denotes a profitable arbitrage opportunity 
ARBITRAGE OF'roR'IUNITIES ~ to g 
Time one month t~ months three months six months twelve months 
10.30 -0.0987 -0.1081 -0.1137 -0.1526 -0.1772 
10.35 -0.0667 -0.0759 -0.0811 -0.1192 -0.1421 
10.40 -0.0667 -0.0759 -0.0811 -0.1192 -0.1421 
10.45 -0.0986 -0.1081 -0.1136 -0.1524 -0.1768 
10.50 -0.0221 -0.0310 -0.0360 -0.0733 -0.0945 
10.55 -0.0988 -0.1082 -0.1138 -0.1528 -0.1777 
11.00 -0.0986 -0.1080 -0.1135 -0.1522 -0.1765 
11.05 -0.0986 -0.1081 -0.1136 -0.1524 -0.1768 
11.10 -0.0986 -0.1081 -0.1136 -0.1524 -0.1768 
11.15 -0.0668 -0.0760 -0.0814 -0.1196 -0.1429 
11.20 -0.0668 -0.0760 -0.0814 -0.1196 
-0.1429 
11.25 -0.0668 -0.0760 -0.0814 -0.1500 
-0.1429 
11.30 -0.0985 -0.1079 -0.1133 -0.1822 -0.1760 
11.35 -0.0985 -0.1079 -0.1133 -0.1822 -0.1760 
11.40 -0.0667 -0.0758 -0.0811 -0.1494 
-0.1419 
11.45 -0.0667 -0.0694 -0.0876 -0.2027 -0.2607 
11.50 -0.0985 -0.1014 -0.1198 -0.2355 
-0.2947 
12.00 -0.0795 -0.0823 -0.1006 -0.2160 -0.2746 
12.10 -0.0986 -0.1015 -0.1199 -0.2357 -0.2950 
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ARBITRAGE OPPORruNITIES OM to ~ 
Time one month two months three months six months twelve months 
10.30 
-0.0572 -0.0703 -0.0492 -0.1542 -0.3644 
10.35 -0.0996 -0.1128 -0.0919 -0.1973 -0.4084 
10.40 -0.0572 -0.0703 -0.0492 -0.1542 -0.3644 
10.45 
-0.0467 -0.0598 -0.0387 -0.1436 -0.3538 
10.50 
-0.0572 -0.0703 -0.0492 -0.1542 -0.3644 
10.55 -0.0572 -0.0703 -0.0492 -0.1542 -0.3644 
11.00 
-0.0732 -0.0864 -0.0654 -0.1708 -0.3818 
11.05 -0.0732 -0.0864 -0.0654 -0.1708 -0.3818 
11.10 -0.0467 -0.0598 -0.0387 -0.1436 -0.3538 
11.15 -0.0467 -0.0597 -0.0386 -0.1435 -0.3536 
11.20 -0.0731 -0.0863 -0.0652 -0.1704 -0.3809 
11.25 -0.0573 -0.0704 -0.0493 -0.1544 -0.3648 
11.30 -0.0467 -0.0597 -0.0386 -0.1435 -0.3534 
11.35 -0.0733 -0.0866 -0.0656 -0.1712 -0.3827 
11.40 -0.0466 -0.0597 -0.0385 -0.1434 -0.3533 
11.45 -0.0731 -0.0756 -0.0652 -0.1321 -0.2845 
11.50 -0.0573 -0.0597 -0.0493 -0.1161 -0.2683 
12.00 -0.0732 -0.0757 -0.0654 -0.1325 -0.2853 
12.10 -0.0731 -0.0756 -0.0652 -0.1321 -0.2845 
ARBITRAGE OProR'IUNITIES ~ to DM 
Time one month two months three months six months twe 1 ve months 
10.30 -0.0485 -0.0621 -0.2935 -0.0743 -0.0174 
10.35 -0.0911 -0.1050 -0.3367 -0.1186 -0.0642 
10.40 -0.0485 -0.0621 -0.2935 -0.0743 -0.0174 
10.45 -0.0379 -0.0514 -0.2827 -0.0630 -0.0053 
10.50 -0.0485 -0.0621 -0.2935 -0.0743 -0.0174 
10.55 -0.0485 -0.0621 -0.2935 -0.0743 -0.0174 
11.00 -0.0645 -0.0781 -0.3096 -0.0905 -0.0341 
11.05 -0.0645 -0.0781 -0.3096 -0.0905 -0.0341 
11.10 -0.0379 -0.0514 -0.2827 -0.0630 -0.0053 
11.15 -0.0379 -0.0514 -0.2827 -0.0631 -0.0055 
11.20 -0.0645 -0.0782 -0.3097 -0.0909 -0.0349 
11.25 -0.0485 -0.0621 -0.2935 -0.0741 -0.0170 
11.30 -0.0379 -0.0514 -0.2828 -0.0632 -0.0057 
11.35 -0.0644 -0.0780 -0.3094 -0.0902 -0.0332 
11.40 -0.0379 -0.0514 -0.2828 -0.0633 -0.0059 
11.45 -0.0645 -0.0889 -0.3097 -0.1297 -0.1343 
11.50 -0.0485 -0.0728 -0.2935 -0.1129 -0.1165 
12.00 -0.0645 -0.0888 -0.3096 -0.1293 -0.1335 
12.10 -0.0645 -0.0889 -0.3097 -0.1297 -0.1343 
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ARBITRAGE OProRTUNITIES g to DM 
Time one month two months three months six months twelve months 
10.30 -0.1008 -0.2463 -0.3620 -0.1502 -0.0660 
10.35 -0.1115 -0.2572 -0.3731 -0.1619 -0.0652 
10.40 -0.0689 -0.2141 -0.3296 -0.1170 -0.0657 
10.45 -0.0902 -0.2355 -0.3512 -0.1390 -0.0661 
10.50 -0.0240 -0.1687 -0.2839 -0.0696 -0.0652 
10.55 -0.1008 -0.2462 -0.3619 -0.1499 -0.0660 
11.00 -0.1168 -0.2625 -0.3783 -0.1670 -0.0658 
11.05 -0.1168 -0.2624 -0.3782 -0.1668 -0.0658 
11.10 -0.0902 -0.2355 -0.3512 -0.1390 -0.0661 
11.15 -0.0582 -0.2032 -0.3185 -0.1052 -0.0658 
11.20 -0.0848 -0.2301 -0.3457 -0.1334 -0.0655 
11.25 -0.0688 -0.2139 -0.3293 -0.0855 -0.0657 
11.30 -0.0903 -0.2357 -0.3515 -0.1087 -0.0661 
11.35 -0.1168 -0.2625 -0.3783 -0.1361 -0.0658 
11.40 -0.0583 -0.2034 -0.3189 -0.0751 -0.0658 
11.45 -0.0849 -0.2476 -0.3395 -0.0884 -0.0634 
11.50 -0.1009 -0.2637 -0.3557 -0.1052 -0.0639 
12.00 -0.0976 -0.2603 -0.3522 -0.1014 -0.0635 
12.10 -0.1169 -0.2799 -0.3720 -0.1220 -0.0637 
ARBITRAGE OPPORl'UNITIES OM to g 
Time one month two months three months six months twelve months 
10.30 -0.1453 -0.1572 -0.1310 -0.2430 -0.4150 
10.35 -0.1557 -0.1675 -0.1413 -0.2531 -0.4250 
10.40 -0.1134 -0.1251 -0.0987 -0.2101 -0.3810 
10.45 -0.1347 -0.1465 -0.1204 -0.2322 -0.4040 
10.50 -0.0689 -0.0804 -0.0540 -0.1649 -0.3349 
10.55 -0.1453 -0.1573 -0.1312 -0.2433 -0.4155 
11.00 -0.1611 -0.1731 -0.1470 -0.2592 -0.4317 
11.05 -0.1612 -0.1732 -0.1471 -0.2593 -0.4320 
11.10 -0.1347 -0.1465 -0.1204 -0.2322 -0.4040 
11.15 -0.1029 -0.1147 -0.0884 -0.1999 -0.3710 
11.20 -0.1293 -0.1412 -0.1150 -0.2267 -0.3983 
11.25 -0.1135 -0.1253 -0.0991 -0.2406 -0.3822 
11.30 -0.1346 -0.1463 -0.1200 -0.2615 -0.4028 
11.35 -0.1612 -0.1731 -0.1471 -0.2892 -0.4321 
11.40 -0.1028 -0.1144 -0.0880 -0.2291 -0.3697 
11.45 -0.1292 -0.1239 -0.1211 -0.2703 -0.4161 
11.50 -0.1452 -0.1399 -0.1372 -0.2867 -0.4329 
12.00 -0.1421 -0.1368 -0.1342 -0.2839 -0.4305 
12.10 -0.1610 -0.1558 -0.1532 -0.3029 -0.4494 
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Table 1. VII canprises 
ARBITRAGE OPFOR'IUNITIES g to ~ 
ARBITRAGE OProR'roNITIES $ to E 
ARBITRAGE OPPOR'IUNITIES OM to - ~ 
ARBITRAGE OPPOR'IUNITIES ~ to rM 
ARBITRAGE OPFOR'IUNITIES g to rM 
ARBITRAGE OPFOR'IUNITIES DM to g 
OK M:m:Y SUPPLY FIGURES 
RELEASED 20.8.87 
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.MBITRAGE OPPOR'IUNITIES g to ~ 
Time one month two months three months six months twelve months 
10.40 -0.0612 -0.1997 -0.3101 -0.0938 -0.1678 
10.45 -0.0425 -0.1808 -0.2910 -0.0741 -0.1469 
10.50 -0.0609 -0.1990 -0.3090 -0.0916 -0.1636 
10.55 -0.0298 -0.1677 -0.2776 -0.0595 -0.1303 
11.00 -0.0424 -0.1806 -0.2908 -0.0736 -0.1460 
11.05 -0.0611 -0.1996 -0.3099 -0.0934 -0.1670 
11.10 -0.0611 -0.1995 -0.3097 -0.0931 -0.1665 
11.15 -0.0611 -0.1995 -0.3097 -0.0931 -0.1665 
11.20 -0.0611 -0.1996 -0.3099 -0.0934 -0.1670 
11.25 -0.0611 -0.1996 -0.3099 -0.0934 -0.1670 
11.30 -0.3104 -0.4511 -0.5630 -0.3536 -0.4405 
11.35 -0.0608 -0.1989 -0.3242 -0.1528 -0.1628 
11.40 -0.0469 -0.0458 -0.3196 -0.1311 -0.2001 
11.45 -0.0657 -0.0648 -0.3387 -0.1510 -0.2211 
11.50 -0.0657 -0.0648 -0.3541 -0.2434 -0.4677 
11.55 -0.0659 -0.0857 -0.3548 -0.2448 -0.4086 
12.00 -0.0661 -0.0862 -0.3555 -0.2461 -0.4111 
12.05 -0.0473 -0.0506 -0.3108 -0.0943 -0.1306 
12.10 -0.0473 -0.0504 -0.3106 -0.0629 -0.0680 
12.15 -0.0474 -0.0507 -0.3111 -0.0639 -0.0699 
12.20 -0.0473 -0.0506 -0.3108 -0.0634 -0.0690 
12.25 -0.0422 -0.0506 -0.2954 -0.0326 -0.0690 
12.30 -0.0422 -0.0505 -0.2953 -0.0323 -0.0684 
12.45 -0.0423 -0.0507 -0.2956 -0.0331 -0.0699 
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ARBITRAGE OPPORTUNITIES ~ to g 
Time one month two months three months six months twelve months 
10.40 -0.0914 -0.1094 -0.0867 -0.1922 -0.2844 
10.45 -0.0728 -0.0907 -0.0678 -0.1730 -0.2645 
10.50 -0.0919 -0.1103 -0.0880 -0.1947 -0.2888 
10.55 -0.0606 -0.0787 -0.0560 -0.1617 -0.2538 
11.00 -0.0729 -0.0909 -0.0681 -0.1735 -0.2654 
11.05 -0.0915 -0.1096 -0.0869 -0.1927 -0.2853 
11.10 -0.0916 -0.1097 -0.0871 -0.1930 -0.2858 
11.15 -0.0916 -0.1097 -0.0871 -0.1930 -0.2858 
11.20 -0.0915 -0.1096 -0.0869 -0.1927 -0.2853 
11.25 -0.0915 -0.1096 -0.0869 -0.1927 -0.2853 
11.30 -0.3406 -0.3607 -0.3400 -0.4519 -0.5571 
11.35 -0.0920 -0.1105 -0.0730 -0.1345 -0.2897 
11.40 -0.0737 -0.1027 -0.0398 -0.1172 -0.2131 
11.45 -0.0924 -0.1215 -0.0587 -0.1364 -0.2331 
11.50 -0.0924 -0.1215 -0.0434 -0.0454 -0.1130 
11.55 -0.0921 -0.1005 -0.0426 -0.0439 -0.0503 
12.00 -0.0918 -0.0999 -0.0419 -0.0424 -0.0477 
12.05 -0.1105 -0.1416 -0.0990 -0.1921 -0.3213 
12.10 -0.1106 -0.1418 -0.0992 -0.2230 -0.3822 
12.15 -0.1104 -0.1414 -0.0987 -0.2219 -0.3802 
12.20 -0.1105 -0.1416 -0.0990 -0.2225 -0.3812 
12.25 -0.1157 -0.1416 -0.1142 -0.2528 -0.3812 
12.30 -0.1157 -0.1417 -0.1144 -0.2531 -0.3818 
12.45 -0.1155 -0.1414 -0.1140 -0.2522 -0.3802 
111 
ARBITRAGE OPPORTUNITIES OM to ~ 
Time one month two months three months six months twelve months 
10.40 -0.0619 -0.0734 -0.2887 -0.1689 -0.2642 
10.45 -0.0783 -0.0898 -0.3051 -0.1854 -0.2808 
10.50 -0.0717 -0.0888 -0.3037 -0.1827 -0.2750 
10.55 -0.0776 -0.0887 -0.3035 -0.1822 -0.2741 
11.00 -0.0780 -0.0893 -0.3044 -0.1840 -0.2779 
11.05 -0.0509 -0.0622 -0.2774 -0.1571 -0.2515 
11.10 -0.0781 -0.0895 -0.3047 -0.1846 -0.2793 
11.15 -0.0781 -0.0896 -0.3048 -0.1847 -0.2795 
11.20 -0.0782 -0.0896 -0.3048 -0.1849 -0.2798 
11.25 -0.0509 -0.0622 -0.2774 -0.1571 -0.2515 
11.30 -0.0780 -0.0894 -0.3045 -0.1842 -0.2783 
11.35 -0.0617 -0.0729 -0.2880 -0.1675 -0.2613 
11.40 -0.0616 -0.0729 -0.2879 -0.1674 -0.2609 
11.45 -0.0778 -0.0889 -0.3038 -0.1828 -0.2754 
11.50 -0.0615 -0.0727 -0.2877 -0.1669 -0.2600 
11.55 -0.0671 -0.0784 -0.2934 -0.1729 -0.2666 
12.00 -0.0616 -0.0729 -0.2879 -0.1674 -0.2609 
12.05 -0.0506 -0.0618 -0.2768 -0.1560 -0.2490 
12.10 -0.0781 -0.0895 -0.3046 -0.1845 -0.2789 
12.15 -0.0781 -0.0895 -0.3046 -0.1845 -0.2789 
12.20 -0.0778 -0.0890 -0.3039 -0.1831 -0.2760 
12.25 -0.0779 -0.0891 -0.3042 -0.1836 -0.2770 
12.30 -0.0506 -0.0618 -0.2767 -0.1558 -0.2486 
12.45 -0.0781 -0.0895 -0.3046 -0.1845 -0.2789 
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ARBITRAGE OPPOR'IUNITIES ~ to OM 
Time one month two months three months six months twelve months 
10.40 -0.0466 -0.0620 -0.0539 -0.0571 -1.9011 
10.45 -0.0631 -0.0787 -0.0707 -0.0745 -1.9189 
10.50 -0.0635 -0.0794 -0.0719 -0.0770 -1.9215 
10.55 -0.0635 -0.0796 -0.0721 -0.0774 -1.9219 
11.00 -0.0633 -0.0790 -0.0713 -0.0757 -1.9202 
11.05 -0.0357 -0.0511 -0.0430 -0.0462 -1.8900 
11.10 -0.0632 -0.0789 -0.0710 -0.0751 -1.9196 
11.15 -0.0632 -0.0788 -0.0710 -0.0751 -1. 9195 
11.20 -0.0632 -0.0788 -0.0709 -0.0749 -1.9193 
11.25 -0.0357 -0.0511 -0.0430 -0.0462 -1.8900 
11.30 -0.0633 -0.0790 -0.0712 -0.0756 -1. 9200 
11.35 -0.0468 -0.0624 -0.0545 -0.0584 -1.9025 
11.40 -0.0468 -0.0624 -0.0546 -0.0586 -1. 9026 
11.45 -0.0634 -0.0794 -0.0718 -0.0768 -1.9213 
11.50 -0.0469 -0.0626 -0.0548 -0.0590 -1.9031 
11.55 -0.0523 -0.0680 -0.0601 -0.0643 -1.9085 
12.00 -0.0468 -0.0624 -0.0546 -0.0586 -1.9026 
12.05 -0.0359 -0.0515 -0.0435 -0.0473 -1.8912 
12.10 -0.0632 -0.0789 -0.0711 -0.0753 -1.9198 
12.15 -0.0632 -0.0789 -0.0711 -0.0753 -1.9198 
12.20 -0.0634 -0.0793 -0.0717 -0.0766 -1.9211 
12.25 -0.0633 -0.0792 -0.0715 -0.0762 -1.9206 
12.30 -0.0359 -0.0515 -0.0436 -0.0475 -1.8914 
12.45 -0.0632 -0.0789 -0.0711 -0.0753 -1.9198 
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ARBITRAGE OPPOR'IUNITIES g to [M 
Time one month two months three IOC>nths six IOC>nths twelve IOC>nths 
10.40 -0.0975 -0.2411 -0.1441 -0.0883 -1.9873 
10.45 -0.0953 -0.2389 -0.1419 -0.0862 -1.9848 
10.50 -0.1140 -0.2579 -0.1611 -0.1063 -2.0040 
10.55 -0.0830 -0.2267 -0.1299 -0.0746 -1.9717 
11.00 -0.0954 -0.2391 -0.1423 -0.0870 -1.9854 
11.05 -0.0865 -0.2300 -0.1329 -0.0769 -1. 9751 
11.10 -0.1140 -0.2578 -0.1610 -0.1059 -2.0049 
11.15 -0.1140 -0.2578 -0.1610 -0.1058 -2.0048 
11.20 -0.1140 -0.2578 -0.1610 -0.1059 -2.0051 
11.25 -0.0865 -0.2300 -0.1329 -0.0769 -1. 9751 
11.30 -0.3633 -0.5093 -0.4148 -0.3668 -2.2748 
11.35 -0.0973 -0.2406 -0.1588 -0.1486 -1. 9837 
11.40 -0.0834 -0.0876 -0.1542 -0.1271 -2.0216 
11.45 -0.1189 -0.1236 -0.1908 -0.1655 -2.0614 
11.50 -0.1023 -0.1067 -0.1890 -0.2399 -2.2893 
11.55 -0.1079 -0.1331 -0.1951 -0.2466 -2.2356 
12.00 -0.1026 -0.1280 -0.1901 -0.2421 -2.2321 
12.05 -0.0729 -0.0814 -0.1343 -0.0789 -1.9445 
12.10 -0.1002 -0.1088 -0.1619 -0.0760 -1.9113 
12.15 -0.1003 -0.1091 -0.1623 -0.0770 -1.9131 
12.20 -0.1004 -0.1093 -0.1627 -0.0777 -1. 9136 
12.25 -0.0953 -0.1092 -0.1471 -0.0465 -1. 9131 
12.30 -0.0677 -0.0813 -0.1188 -0.0171 -1.8825 
12.45 -0.0952 -0.1091 -0.1469 -0.0461 -1.9131 
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ARBITRAGE OProR'rtJNITIES OM to g 
Time one month two months three months six months twelve months 
10.40 -0.1426 -0.1615 -0.1577 -0.2965 -0.4184 
10.45 -0.1404 -0.1592 -0.1554 -0.2941 -0.4157 
10.50 -0.1590 -0.1778 -0.1740 -0.3127 -0.4335 
10.55 -0.1277 -0.1462 -0.1421 -0.2798 -0.3987 
11.00 -0.1403 -0.1589 -0.1550 -0.2933 -0.4137 
11.05 -0.1317 -0.1505 -0.1467 -0.2853 -0.4066 
11.10 -0.1590 -0.1779 -0.1741 -0.3131 -0.4348 
11.15 -0.1590 -0.1779 -0.1742 -0.3131 -0.4350 
11.20 -0.1590 -0.1779 -0.1741 -0.3130 -0.4349 
11.25 -0.1317 -0.1505 -0.1467 -0.2853 -0.4066 
11.30 -0.4072 -0.4273 -0.4248 -0.5674 -0.6962 
11.35 -0.1430 -0.1621 -0.1434 -0.2384 -0.4206 
11.40 -0.1248 -0.1543 -0.1105 -0.2212 -0.3462 
11.45 -0.1595 -0.1889 -0.1451 -0.2556 -0.3800 
11.50 -0.1433 -0.1728 -0.1138 -0.1501 -0.2484 
11.55 -0.1485 -0.1576 -0.1188 -0.1546 -0.1943 
12.00 -0.1428 -0.1515 -0.1125 -0.1476 -0.1861 
12.05 -0.1505 -0.1819 -0.1580 -0.2836 -0.4389 
12.10 -0.1780 -0.2097 -0.1861 -0.3424 -0.5276 
12.15 -0.1778 -0.2093 -0.1856 -0.3413 -0.5258 
12.20 -0.1776 -0.2091 -0.1851 -0.3405 -0.5238 
12.25 -0.1828 -0.2092 -0.2005 -0.3708 -0.5248 
12.30 -0.1556 -0.1820 -0.1733 -0.3434 -0.4970 
12.45 -0.1829 -0.2093 -0.2007 -0.3712 -0.5258 
115 
TABTE 1.VIII us EMP (;.UARTERLY FIGURES AND 
US a::NSUMER PRICE INDEX 
RELEASED 21.8.87 
Table 1. VIII cgnprises 
ARBITRAGE OPPORruNITIES g to ~ 
ARBITRAGE OPFORIUNITIES l to g 
ARBITRAGE OPFORIUNITIES OM to ~ 
ARBITRAGE OPFORIUNITIES I to CM 
ARBITRAGE OPFORIUNITIES g to CM 
ARBITRAGE OPFORIUNITIES DM to g 
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ARBITRAGE OPPOR'IUNITIES g to i 
Time one month two months three months six months twelve months 
12.30 -0.0627 -0.2006 -0.0593 0.0043- -0.0992 
12.35 -0.0626 -0.2005 -0.0592 0.0045- -0.0988 
12.40 -0.0627 -0.2006 -0.0593 0.0043- -0.0992 
12.45 -0.0627 -0.2007 -0.0595 0.0038- -0.1001 
12.50 -0.0628 -0.2009 -0.0598 -0.0277 -0.1014 
12.55 -0.0503 -0.1883 -0.0598 -0.0275 -0.0940 
13.00 -0.0503 -0.2008 -0.0598 -0.0275 -0.1010 
13.05 -0.0628 -0.2009 -0.0599 -0.0278 -0.1016 
13.10 -0.0317 -0.1696 -0.0282 0.0047- -0.0673 
13.15 -0.0628 -0.2008 -0.0598 -0.0275 -0.1010 
13.20 -0.0631 -0.2017 -0.0611 -0.0304 -0.1065 
13.25 -0.0632 -0.2018 -0.0613 -0.0309 -0.1074 
13.30 -0.1254 -0.2650 -0.1255 -0.0980 -0.1798 
13.35 -0.0636 -0.2029 -0.0632 -0.0348 -0.1146 
13.40 -0.0633 -0.2022 -0.0776 -0.0321 -0.1096 
13.45 -0.0448 -0.1836 -0.0590 -0.0132 -0.0901 
13.50 -0.0632 -0.2018 -0.0771 -0.0309 -0.1074 
13.55 -0.0322 -0.1706 -0.0456 0.0015- -0.0734 
14.00 -0.0322 -0.1707 -0.0458 0.0010- -0.0743 
14.05 -0.0632 -0.2020 -0.0773 -0.0314 -0.1083 
14.10 -0.0508 -0.1894 -0.0773 -0.0314 -0.1013 
14.15 -0.0633 -0.2021 -0.0775 -0.0319 -0.1022 
14.20 -0.0633 -0.2022 -0.0778 -0.0324 -0.1101 
14.25 -0.0635 -0.2025 -0.0782 -0.0333 -0.1119 
- denotes a profitable arbitrage opportunity 
117 
ARBITRAGE OPPORruNITIES I to g 
Time one month two months three months six months twel ve months 
12.30 -0.0897 -0.1083 -0.1480 -0.2886 -0.3512 
12.35 -0.0897 -0.1084 -0.1481 -0.2888 -0.3515 
12.40 -0.0897 -0.1083 -0.1480 -0.2886 -0.3512 
12.45 -0.0896 -0.1081 -0.1477 -0.2880 -0.3502 
12.50 -0.0895 -0.1079 -0.1473 -0.2570 -0.3489 
12.55 -0.0895 -0.1142 -0.1474 -0.2572 -0.3561 
13.00 -0.0895 -0.1079 -0.1474 -0.2572 -0.3493 
13.05 -0.0894 -0.1078 -0.1472 -0.2569 -0.3487 
13.10 -0.0584 -0.0765 -0.1157 -0.2246 -0.3148 
13.15 -0.0895 -0.1079 -0.1474 -0.2572 -0.3493 
13.20 -0.0889 -0.1068 -0.1458 -0.2540 -0.3436 
13.25 -0.0888 -0.1067 -0.1455 -0.2535 -0.3426 
13.30 -0.1502 -0.1682 -0.2071 -0.3154 . -0.4058 
13.35 -0.0880 -0.1052 -0.1434 -0.2493 -0.3351 
13.40 -0.0886 -0.1062 -0.1292 -0.2522 -0.3404 
13.45 -0.0699 -0.0873 -0.1101 -0.2323 -0.3191 
13.50 -0.0888 -0.1067 -0.1299 -0.2535 -0.3426 
13.55 -0.0578 -0.0754 -0.0984 -0.2212 -0.3086 
14.00 -0.0577 -0.0752 -0.0981 -0.2206 -0.3077 
14.05 -0.0887 -0.1065 -0.1296 -0.2530 -0.3417 
14.10 -0.0887 -0.1127 -0.1296 -0.2530 -0.3485 
14.15 -0.0886 -0.1063 -0.1294 -0.2524 -0.3475 
14.20 -0.0885 -0.1061 -0.1291 -0.2519 -0.3398 
14.25 -0.0883 -0.1057 -0.1285 -0.2509 -0.3379 
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ARBITRAGE OProRI'UNITIES OM to I 
Time one month t~ months three months six months twelve months 
12.30 -0.0518 -0.0641 -0.0789 -0.1626 -0.2633 
12.35 -0.0518 -0.0641 -0.0788 -0.1625 -0.2630 
12.40 -0.0793 -0.0917 -0.1065 -0.1906 -0.2920 
12.45 -0.0628 -0.0751 -0.0898 -0.1736 -0.2743 
12.50 -0.0628 -0.0751 -0.0898 -0.1736 -0.2743 
12.55 -0.0793 -0.0917 -0.1065 -0.1906 -0.3097 
13.00 -0.0794 -0.0919 -0.1068 -0.1912 -0.2934 
13.05 -0.0640 -0.0764 -0.0912 -0.1754 -0.2769 
13.10 -0.0629 -0.0754 -0.0903 -0.1745 -0.2763 
13.15 -0.0795 -0.0921 -0.1072 -0.1919 -0.2947 
13.20 -0.0520 -0.0645 -0.0795 -0.1638 -0.2658 
13.25 -0.0630 -0.0755 -0.0905 -0.1750 -0.2772 
13.30 -0.1353 -0.1488 -0.1647 -0.2521 -0.3611 
13.35 -0.1349 -0.1481 -0.1637 -0.2502 -0.3571 
13.40 -0.0799 -0.0929 -0.1237 -0.1940 -0.2992 
13.45 -0.0803 -0.0935 -0.1247 -0.1958 -0.3031 
13.50 -0.0801 -0.0933 -0.1243 -0.1952 -0.3017 
13.55 -0.0635 -0.0766 -0.1075 -0.1778 -0.2834 
14.00 -0.0802 -0.0933 -0.1244 -0.1953 -0.3021 
14.05 -0.0803 -0.0937 -0.1249 -0.1963 -0.3040 
14.10 -0.0803 -0.0935 -0.1247 -0.1958 -0.3208 
14.15 -0.0528 -0.0659 -0.0970 -0.1677 -0.2743 
14.20 -0.0805 -0.0939 -0.1253 -0.1970 -0.3056 
14.25 -0.0807 -0.0943 -0.1258 -0.1981 -0.3079 
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ARBITRAGE OPFOR'ruNITIES l to CM 
Time one month two months three months six months twelve months 
12.30 -0.0350 -0.0494 -0.0559 -0.0409 -1.8845 
12.35 -0.0350 -0.0495 -0.0560 -0.0411 -1.8847 
12.40 -0.0625 -0.0772 -0.0839 -0.0696 -1.9138 
12.45 -0.0460 -0.0606 -0.0672 -0.0526 -1.8964 
12.50 -0.0460 -0.0606 -0.0672 -0.0526 -1.8964 
12.55 -0.0790 -0.0883 -0.0951 -0.1041 -1.9667 
13.00 -0.0624 -0.0770 -0.0836 -0.0690 -1.9661 
13.05 -0.0470 -0.0615 -0.0680 -0.0531 -1.9499 
13.10 -0.0459 -0.0603 -0.0668 -0.0517 -1.9484 
13.15 -0.0624 -0.0768 -0.0833 -0.0684 -1.9655 
13.20 -0.0348 -0.0491 -0.0554 -0.0398 -1.9362 
13.25 -0.0458 -0.0602 -0.0666 -0.0513 -1.9480 
13.30 -0.1171 -0.1313 -0.1376 -0.1220 -2.0202 
13.35 -0.1172 -0.1318 -0.1383 -0.1236 -2.0219 
13.40 -0.0621 -0.0762 -0.0668 -0.0664 -1.9635 
13.45 -0.0619 -0.0757 -0.0660 -0.0647 -1.9618 
13.50 -0.0620 -0.0759 -0.0663 -0.0653 -1.9624 
13.55 -0.0455 -0.0594 -0.0497 -0.0486 -1.9452 
14.00 -0.0619 -0.0759 -0.0662 -0.0652 -1.9622 
14.05 -0.0618 -0.0756 -0.0658 -0.0643 -1.9614 
14.10 -0.0785 -0.0869 -0.0772 -0.0993 -1.9618 
14.15 -0.0343 -0.0479 -0.0379 -0.0360 -1.9324 
14.20 -0.0617 -0.0754 -0.0655 -0.0636 -1.9607 
14.25 -0.0616 -0.0751 -0.0650 -0.0626 -1.9596 
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ARBITRAGE OPPORTUNITIES g to OM 
Time one month two months three months six months twelve months 
12.30 -0.0873 -0.2293 -0.0841 0.026r -1.9057 
12.35 -0.0873 -0.2293 -0.0841 0.026r -1.9056 
12.40 -0.1148 -0.2572 -0.1123 -0.0029 -1.9358 
12.45 -0.0984 -0.2407 -0.0957 0.0139· -1.9189 
12.50 -0.0985 -0.2409 -0.0961 -0.0176 -1.9201 
12.55 -0.1191 -0.2560 -0.1241 -0.0697 -1.9850 
13.00 -0.1024 -0.2573 -0.1125 -0.0341 -1.9913 
13.05 -0.0995 -0.2418 -0.0969 -0.0183 -1.9752 
13.10 -0.0673 -0.2093 -0.0641 0.0157· -1. 9400 
13.15 -0.1148 -0.2571 -0.1122 -0.0335 -1.9907 
13.20 -0.0876 -0.2301 -0.0854 -0.0074 -1.9660 
13.25 -0.0987 -0.2414 -0.0969 -0.0195 -1.9790 
13.30 -0.2322 -0.3759 -0.2325 -0.1583 -2.1243 
13.35 -0.1706 -0.3144 -0.1710 -0.0968 -2.0620 
13.40 -0.1151 -0.2578 -0.1134 -0.0361 -1.9970 
13.45 -0.0964 -0.2387 -0.0939 -0.0154 -1.9761 
13.50 -0.1148 -0.2571 -0.1123 -0.0338 -1.9938 
13.55 -0.0673 -0.2093 -0.0641 0.0156· -1.9427 
14.00 -0.0839 -0.2260 -0.0810 -0.0018 -1.9611 
14.05 -0.1147 -0.2570 -0.1121 -0.0332 -1.9936 
14.10 -0.1190 -0.2557 -0.1236 -0.0688 -1.9872 
14.15 -0.0872 -0.2293 -0.0842 -0.0050 -1.9579 
14.20 -0.1148 -0.2570 -0.1122 -0.0335 -1. 9947 
14.25 -0.1147 -0.2570 -0.1122 -0.0334 -1.9954 
... denotes a profitable arbitrage opportunity 
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ARBITRAGE OPRJR'IUNITIES DM to g 
Time one month two months three months six months twelve months 
12.30 -0.1309 -0.1407 -0.1946 -0.3852 -0.4821 
12.35 -0.1309 -0.1407 -0.1946 -0.3852 -0.4821 
12.40 -0.1583 -0.1682 -0.2222 -0.4131 -0.5107 
12.45 -0.1417 -0.1514 -0.2053 -0.3956 -0.4922 
12.50 -0.1416 -0.1512 -0.2049 -0.3650 -0.4909 
12.55 -0.1581 -0.1741 -0.2217 -0.3822 -0.5331 
13.00 -0.1582 -0.1681 -0.2220 -0.3828 -0.5102 
13.05 -0.1428 -0.1525 -0.2063 -0.3667 -0.4932 
13.10 -0.1108 -0.1204 -0.1740 -0.3340 -0.4599 
13.15 -0.1583 -0.1683 -0.2223 -0.3834 -0.5116 
13.20 -0.1303 -0.1396 -0.1931 -0.3523 -0.4773 
13.25 -0.1412 -0.1505 -0.2038 -0.3629 -0.4877 
13.30 -0.2746 -0.2848 -0.3390 -0.5009 -0.6325 
13.35 -0.2122 -0.2215 -0.2748 -0.4339 -0.5602 
13.40 -0.1578 -0.1673 -0.2209 -0.3807 -0.5074 
13.45 -0.1395 -0.1492 -0.2028 -0.3629 -0.4907 
13.50 -0.1583 -0.1682 -0.2222 -0.3831 -0.5122 
13.55 -0.1108 -0.1204 -0.1740 -0.3340 -0.4610 
14.00 -0.1273 -0.1370 -0.1907 -0.3509 -0.4788 
14.05 -0.1584 -0.1684 -0.2225 -0.3837 -0.5136 
14.10 -0.1583 -0.1744 -0.2222 -0.3832 -0.5368 
14.15 -0.1307 -0.1405 -0.1943 -0.3547 -0.4896 
14.20 -0.1583 -0.1683 -0.2223 -0.3833 -0.5133 
14.25 -0.1583 -0.1683 -0.2223 -0.3834 -0.5138 
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us F'E:RSOOAL IN:J:loIE and ~ 
EXPENDI'IURE FIGURES 
RELEASED 24.8.87 
ARBITRAGE OPRJR'IUNITIES g to ~ 
ARBITRAGE OPPORlUNITIES i to g 
ARBITRAGE OPRJR'IUNITIES tJ.! to ~ 
ARBITRAGE OPRlR'IUNITIES i to I:M 
ARBITRAGE OPPORlUNITIES g to rM 
ARBITRAGE OPPORlUNITIES tJ.! to g 
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ARBITRAGE OPPORTUNITIES g to l 
Time one month two months three months six months twel ve months 
11.00 -0.0500 -0.2089 -0.2829 -0.0653 -0.1264 
11.05 -0.0501 -0.2090 -0.2832 -0.0658 -0.1273 
11.10 -0.0314 -0.1901 -0.2640 -0.0459 -0.1058 
14.30 -0.0195 -0.1785 -0.2528 -0.0358 -0.0975 
14.35 -0.0504 -0.2096 -0.2842 -0.0679 -0.1312 
14.40 -0.0504 -0.2096 -0.2842 -0.0679 -0.1312 
14.45 -0.0319 -0.1911 -0.2656 -0.0491 -0.1118 
14.50 -0.0504 -0.2097 -0.2842 -0.0681 -0.1316 
14.55 -0.0195 -0.1785 -0.2529 -0.0359 -0.0977 
15.00 -0.0504 -0.2098 -0.2845 -0.0686 -0.1325 
15.05 -0.0506 -0.2101 -0.2849 -0.0696 -0.1343 
15.10 -0.0322 -0.1917 -0.2666 -0.0512 -0.1158 
15.15 -0.0198 -0.1792 -0.2541 -0.0384 -0.1022 
15.20 -0.0323 -0.1920 -0.2670 -0.0522 -0.1176 
15.25 -0.0509 -0.2107 -0.2859 -0.0718 -0.1384 
15.30 -0.0200 -0.1796 -0.2547 -0.0396 -0.1046 
15.35 -0.0509 -0.2108 -0.2862 -0.0723 -0.1393 
15.40 -0.0324 -0.1920 -0.2672 -0.0525 -0.1181 
15.45 -0.0324 -0.1921 -0.2673 -0.0527 -0.1185 
15.50 -0.0509 -0.2108 -0.2862 -0.0723 -0.1393 
15.55 -0.0199 -0.1793 -0.2542 -0.0387 -0.1028 
16.00 -0.0260 -0.1855 -0.2604 -0.0450 -0.1094 
ARBITRAGE OFroR'IUNITIES i to g 
Time one month two months three months six months twelve months 
11.00 -0.1068 -0.0994 -0.1128 -0.2193 -0.3238 
11.05 -0.1067 -0.0992 -0.1125 -0.2188 -0.3228 
11.10 -0.0883 -0.0807 -0.0939 -0.2000 -0.3036 
14.30 -0.0753 -0.0672 -0.0798 -0.1841 -0.2847 
14.35 -0.1063 -0.0984 -0.1113 -0.2165 -0.3187 
14.40 -0.1063 -0.0984 -0.1113 -0.2165 -0.3187 
14.45 -0.0876 -0.0796 -0.0922 -0.1966 -0.2975 
14.50 -0.1062 -0.0984 -0.1112 -0.2163 -0.3184 
14.55 -0.0753 -0.0672 -0.0798 -0.1840 -0.2845 
15.00 -0.1061 -0.0982 -0.1109 -0.2157 -0.3174 
15.05 -0.1059 -0.0978 -0.1104 -0.2147 -0.3156 
15.10 -0.0872 -0.0788 -0.0910 -0.1943 -0.2934 
15.15 -0.0748 -0.0663 -0.0785 -0.1815 -0.2799 
15.20 -0.0870 -0.0784 -0.0905 -0.1933 -0.2915 
15.25 -0.1054 -0.0970 -0.1092 -0.2123 -0.3113 
1:5.30 -0.0746 -0.0659 -0.0778 
-0.1801 -0.2775 
15.35 -0.1053 -0.0968 -0.1089 -0.2118 -0.3103 
15.40 -0.0869 -0.0783 -0.0904 -0.1930 -0.2910 
15.45 -0.0869 -0.0783 -0.0903 -0.1928 
-0.2906 
15.50 -0.1053 -0.0968 -0.1089 
-0.2118 -0.3103 
15.55 -0.0748 -0.0662 -0.0783 -0.1812 
-0.2793 
16.00 -0.0810 -0.0725 -0.0847 -0.1877 
-0.2863 
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ARBI'rnAGE OPPOR'IUNITIES OM to i 
Time one month two months three months six months twelve months 
11.00 -0.0524 -0.0429 -0.2815 -0.1413 -0.1966 
11.05 -0.0688 -0.0594 -0.2980 -0.1580 -0.2136 
11.10 -0.0689 -0.0595 -0.2982 -0.1582 -0.2142 
14.30 -0.0861 -0.0713 -0.3166 -0.1785 -0.2389 
14.35 -0.0585 -0.0496 -0.2888 -0.1503 -0.2099 
14.40 -0.0585 -0.0496 -0.2888 -0.1503 -0.2099 
14.45 -0.0586 -0.0497 -0.2890 -0.1508 -0.2109 
14.50 -0.0696 -0.0608 -0.3001 -0.1619 -0.2222 
14.55 -0.0697 -0.0610 -0.3004 -0.1626 -0.2237 
15.00 -0.0587 -0.0499 -0.2893 -0.1512 -0.2118 
15.05 -0.0864 -0.0779 -0.3175 -0.1803 -0.2428 
15.10 -0.0701 -0.0618 -0.3016 -0.1648 -0.2285 
15.15 -0.0866 -0.0783 -0.3181 -0.1814 -0.2451 
15.20 -0.0592 -0.0508 -0.2906 -0.1538 -0.2176 
15.25 -0.0592 -0.0508 -0.2907 -0.1540 -0.2179 
15.30 -0.0870 -0.0788 -0.3189 -0.1830 -0.2486 
15.35 -0.0592 -0.0509 -0.2908 -0.1542 -0.2183 
15.40 -0.0867 -0.0784 -0.3182 -0.1816 -0.2457 
15.45 -0.0590 -0.0506 -0.2903 -0.1532 -0.2162 
15.50 -0.0866 -0.0782 -0.3180 -0.1812 -0.2447 
15.55 -0.0865 -0.0781 -0.3177 -0.1808 -0.2437 
16.00 -0.0589 -0.0502 -0.2898 -0.1523 -0.2141 
ARBITRAGE OPF'OR'IUNITIES ~ to OM 
Time one month two months three months six months twelve months 
11.00 -0.0236 -0.0599 -0.0282 -0.0572 -0.1599 
11.05 -0.0402 -0.0766 -0.0451 -0.0745 -0.1784 
11.10 -0.0401 -0.0765 -0.0449 -0.0743 -0.1778 
14.30 -0.0563 -0.0923 -0.0602 -0.0883 -0.1886 
14.35 -0.0286 -0.0644 -0.0321 -0.0596 -0.1585 
14.40 -0.0452 -0.0644 -0.0321 -0.0596 -0.1585 
14.45 -0.0286 -0.0643 -0.0319 -0.0592 -0.1575 
14.50 -0.0396 -0.0755 -0.0432 -0.0708 -0.1699 
14.55 -0.0396 -0.0753 -0.0429 -0.0701 -0.1684 
15.00 -0.0285 -0.0642 -0.0317 -0.0587 -0.1566 
15.05 -0.0561 -0.0918 -0.0594 -0.0866 -0.1848 
15.10 -0.0393 -0.0747 -0.0419 -0.0680 -0.1637 
15.15 -0.0559 -0.0915 -0.0589 -0.0856 -0.1826 
15.20 -0.0281 -0.0634 -0.0305 -0.0562 -0.1509 
15.25 -0.0281 -0.0633 -0.0304 -0.0560 -0.1505 
15.30 -0.0557 -0.0911 -0.0582 -0.0842 -0.1792 
15.35 -0.0281 -0.0633 -0.0303 -0.0559 -0.1501 
15.40 -0.0559 -0.0914 -0.0588 -0.0854 -0.1820 
15.45 -0.0282 -0.0636 -0.0308 -0.0568 -0.1522 
15.50 -0.0726 -0.0916 -0.0590 -0.0858 -0.1830 
15.55 -0.0560 -0.0917 -0.0592 -0.0862 
-0.1839 
16.00 -0.0283 -0.0639 -0.0312 -0.0577 
-0.1543 
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ARBITRAGE OPFOR'IUNITIES g to LM 
Time one month two months three months six months twe 1 ve months 
11.00 -0.0632 -0.2481 -0.0910 -0.0599 -0.1623 
11.05 -0.0799 -0.2650 -0.1082 -0.0780 -0.1821 
11.10 -0.0612 -0.2461 -0.0889 -0.0578 -0.1601 
14.30 -0.0654 -0.2503 -0.0931 -0.0620 -0.1628 
14.35 -0.0686 -0.2534 -0.0962 -0.0650 -0.1656 
14.40 -0.0852 -0.2534 -0.0962 -0.0650 -0.1656 
14.45 -0.0501 -0.2347 -0.0774 -0.0457 -0.1452 
14.50 -0.0797 -0.2646 -0.1075 -0.0766 -0.1777 
14.55 -0.0487 -0.2332 -0.0757 -0.0436 -0.1423 
15.00 -0.0686 -0.2533 -0.0961 -0.0648 -0.1649 
15.05 -0.0963 -0.2813 -0.1244 -0.0941 -0.1957 
15.10 -0.0611 -0.2457 -0.0884 -0.0569 -0.1555 
15.15 -0.0655 -0.2502 -0.0930 -0.0619 -0.1614 
15.20 -0.0501 -0.2347 -0.0774 -0.0458 -0.1441 
15.25 -0.0686 -0.2534 -0.0962 -0.0652 -0.1645 
15.30 -0.0654 -0.2502 -0.0929 -0.0616 -0.1602 
15.35 -0.0686 -0.2535 -0.0964 -0.0655 -0.1650 
15.40 -0.0779 -0.2630 -0.1060 -0.0757 -0.1766 
15.45 -0.0502 -0.2350 -0.0779 -0.0469 -0.1464 
15.50 -0.1132 -0.2819 -0.1253 -0.0959 -0.1988 
15.55 -0.0656 -0.2505 -0.0934 -0.0627 -0.1632 
16.00 -0.0440 -0.2287 -0.0715 -0.0401 -0.1394 
ARBITRAGE OPPOR'IUNITIES OM to g 
Time one month two months three months six months twe 1 ve months 
11.00 -0.1485 -0.1210 -0.1764 -0.2957 -0.3891 
11.05 -0.1648 -0.1374 -0.1926 -0.3118 -0.0041. 
11.10 -0.1465 -0.1190 -0.1744 -0.2936 -0.0039 
14.30 -0.1508 -0.1234 -0.1788 -0.2983 -0.0039 
14.35 -0.1541 -0.1268 -0.1823 -0.3019 -0.0040 
14.40 -0.1541 -0.1268 -0.1823 -0.3019 -0.0040 
14.45 -0.1356 -0.1081 
-0.1635 -0.2828 -0.0038 
14.50 -0.1651 -0.1379 -0.1934 -0.3133 -0.0041 
14.55 -0.1344 -0.1071 -0.1626 -0.2823 -0.0038 
15.00 -0.1541 -0.1268 
-0.1823 -0.3021 -0.0040 
15.05 -0.1816 -0.1545 
-0.2101 -0.3301 -0.0043 
15.10 -0.1467 -0.1194 -0.1749 -0.2946 -0.0039 
15.15 -0.1509 -0.1235 -0.1790 -0.2985 -0.0039 
15.20 -0.1355 -0.1081 -0.1634 -0.2826 -0.0038 
15.25 -0.1539 -0.1266 -0.1820 -0.3015 -0.0040 
15.30 -0.1509 -0.1237 -0.1792 
-0.2988 -0.0040 
15.35 -0.1538 -0.1265 -0.1819 
-0.3012 -0.0040 
15.40 -0.1630 -0.1356 
-0.1909 -0.3101 -0.0041 
15.45 -0.1353 -0.1077 
-0.1629 -0.2815 -0.0038 
15.50 -0.1812 -0.1538 
-0.2091 -0.3281 -0.0042 
15.55 -0.1507 -0.1232 
-0.1785 -0.2976 -0.0039 
16.00 -0.1292 -0.1016 
-0.1568 -0.2755 -0.0037 
126 
us IXJRABLE CDJIE ORDERS FIGURES 
RELEASED 25.8.87 
Table 1.x canprises 
ARBITRAGE OPFGR'ItlNITIES g to ~ 
ARBITRAGE OPFQR'ItlNITIES i to g 
ARBITRAGE OProR'ItlNITIES rH to ~ 
ARBITRAGE OPFGR'ItlNITIES I to [M 
ARBITRAGE OPFGR'ItlNITIES g to [M 
ARBITRAGE OPFGR'ItlNITIES rH to g 
127 
ARBITRAGE OPPOR'ruNITIES g to ~ 
Time one month t~ months three months six months twelve months 
13.00 -0.0185 -0.0242 -0.1893 -0.0451 -0.0160 
13.05 -0.0496 -0.0555 -0.2208 -0.0775 -0.0500 
13.10 -0.0186 -0.0243 -0.1894 -0.0454 -0.0165 
13.15 -0.0496 -0.0556 -0.2211 -0.0781 -0.0511 
13.20 -0.0497 -0.0557 -0.2212 -0.0783 -0.0515 
13.25 -0.0186 -0.0244 -0.1896 -0.0457 -0.0171 
13.30 -0.0499 -0.0561 -0.2219 -0.0798 -0.0543 
13.35 -0.0499 -0.0561 -0.2219 -0.0798 -0.0543 
13.40 -0.0188 -0.0246 -0.1900 -0.0466 -0.0188 
13.45 -0.0493 -0.0550 -0.2200 -0.0758 -0.0468 
13.50 -0.0493 -0.0548 -0.2198 -0.0753 -0.0459 
13.55 -0.0494 -0.0551 -0.2203 -0.0763 -0.0478 
14.00 -0.0307 -0.0362 -0.2011 -0.0563 -0.0264 
14.05 -0.0307 -0.0361 -0.2009 -0.0560 -0.0258 
ARBITRAGE OPPOR'ruNITIES i to g 
Time one month t~ months three months six months twelve months 
13.00 -0.0766 -0.0984 -0.1087 -0.1754 -0.3645 
13.05 -0.1076 -0.1297 -0.1403 -0.2078 -0.3985 
13.10 -0.0765 -0.0983 -0.1086 -0.1751 -0.3640 
13.15 -0.1074 -0.1295 -0.1400 -0.2071 -0.3974 
13.20 -0.1074 -0.1294 -0.1398 -0.2069 -0.3970 
13.25 -0.0764 -0.0982 -0.1084 -0.1748 -0.3634 
13.30 -0.1071 -0.1288 -0.1390 -0.2053 -0.3941 
13.35 -0.1071 -0.1288 -0.1390 -0.2053 -0.3941 
13.40 -0.0763 -0.0979 -0.1079 -0.1738 -0.3617 
13.45 -0.1079 -0.1303 -0.1412 -0.2096 -0.4018 
13.50 -0.1080 -0.1305 -0.1415 -0.2101 -0.4028 
13.55 -0.1078 -0.1301 -0.1410 -0.2091 -0.4009 
14.00 -0.0893 -0.1115 -0.1223 -0.1902 -0.3814 
14.05 -0.0894 -0.1116 -0.1224 -0.1905 -0.3820 
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ARBITRAGE OPFDRI'UNITIES OM to ~ 
Time one month two months three months six months twelve months 
13.00 -0.0528 -0.0493 -0.0813 -0.1494 -0.2079 
13.05 -0.0529 -0.0494 -0.0815 -0.1498 -0.2088 
13.10 -0.0529 -0.0494 -0.0815 -0.1498 -0.2088 
13.15 -0.0805 -0.0772 -0.1094 -0.1783 -0.2384 
13.20 -0.0806 -0.0773 -0.1096 -0.1785 -0.2389 
13.25 -0.0364 -0.0329 -0.0650 -0.1333 -0.1922 
13.30 -0.0810 -0.0781 -0.1107 -0.1808 -0.2437 
13.35 -0.0534 -0.0503 -0.0829 -0.1525 -0.2147 
13.40 -0.0808 -0.0777 -0.1103 -0.1799 -0.2418 
13.45 -0.0802 -0.0767 -0.1086 -0.1768 -0.2351 
13.50 -0.0802 -0.0767 -0.1086 -0.1768 -0.2351 
13.55 -0.0803 -0.0769 -0.1090 -0.1775 -0.2366 
14.00 -0.0637 -0.0600 -0.0919 -0.1597 -0.2174 
14.05 -0.0526 -0.0489 -0.0807 -0.1483 -0.2056 
ARBITRAGE OPFDRI'UNITIES i to OM 
Time one month two months three months six months twe 1 ve months 
13.00 -0.0343 -0.0647 -0.0538 -0.0605 -0.1605 
13.05 -0.0342 -0.0646 -0.0536 -0.0601 -0.1596 
13.10 -0.0342 -0.0646 -0.0536 -0.0601 -0.1596 
13.15 -0.0619 -0.0924 -0.0816 -0.0885 -0.1892 
13.20 -0.0618 -0.0923 -0.0815 -0.0883 -0.1886 
13.25 -0.0176 -0.0477 -0.0366 -0.0425 -0.1407 
13.30 -0.0616 -0.0917 -0.0805 -0.0862 -0.1839 
13.35 -0.0339 -0.0638 -0.0523 -0.0575 -0.1537 
13.40 -0.0617 -0.0919 -0.0809 -0.0870 -0.1858 
13.45 -0.0620 -0.0928 -0.0822 -0.0899 -0.1924 
13.50 -0.0620 -0.0928 -0.0822 -0.0899 -0.1924 
13.55 -0.0619 -0.0926 -0.0819 -0.0893 -0.1909 
14.00 -0.0455 -0.0761 -0.0655 -0.0729 -0.1746 
14.05 -0.0344 -0.0650 -0.0543 -0.0615 -0.1628 
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ARBITRAGE OPFGR'ruNITIES g to [M 
Time one month two months three months six months twelve months 
13.00 -0.0425 -0.0683 -0.2120 -0.0431 -0.0525 
13.05 -0.0734 -0.0994 -0.2434 -0.0750 -0.0855 
13.10 -0.0424 -0.0682 -0.2120 -0.0429 -0.0521 
13.15 -0.1012 -0.1275 -0.2718 -0.1045 -0.1170 
13.20 -0.1012 -0.1275 -0.2718 -0.1045 -0.1168 
13.25 -0.0258 -0.0514 -0.1950 -0.0254 -0.0332 
13.30 -0.1011 -0.1273 -0.2715 -0.1039 -0.1148 
13.35 -0.0733 -0.0993 -0.2432 -0.0747 -0.0838 
13.40 -0.0701 -0.0961 -0.2400 -0.0716 -0.0812 
13.45 -0.1011 -0.1272 -0.2714 -0.1036 -0.1160 
13.50 -0.1010 -0.1271 -0.2712 -0.1031 -0.1151 
13.55 -0.1010 -0.1272 -0.2713 -0.1035 -0.1154 
14.00 -0.0658 -0.0917 -0.2356 -0.0669 -0.0774 
14.05 -0.0547 -0.0805 -0.2242 -0.0550 -0.0647 
ARBITRAGE OPFGR'IUNITIES DM to g 
Time one month two months three months six months twelve months 
13.00 -0.1188 -0.1264 -0.1581 -0.2605 -0.4397 
13.05 -0.1498 -0.1577 -0.1896 -0.2929 -0.4736 
13.10 -0.1188 -0.1264 -0.1582 -0.2607 -0.4401 
13.15 -0.1772 -0.1852 -0.2172 -0.3206 -0.5019 
13.20 -0.1772 -0.1852 -0.2172 -0.3207 -0.5021 
13.25 -0.1022 -0.1099 -0.1415 -0.2438 -0.4230 
13.30 -0.1774 -0.1854 -0.2176 -0.3213 -0.5041 
13.35 -0.1498 -0.1577 -0.1898 -0.2931 -0.4752 
13.40 -0.1465 -0.1543 -0.1863 -0.2894 -0.4708 
13.45 -0.1774 -0.1855 -0.2177 -0.3216 -0.5030 
13.50 -0.1775 -0.1857 -0.2180 -0.3221 -0.5039 
13.55 -0.1775 -0.1856 -0.2178 -0.3217 -0.5036 
14.00 -0.1423 -0.1502 -0.1822 -0.2854 -0.4655 
14.05 -0.1313 -0.1392 -0.1712 -0.2744 -0.4543 
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OK cx::NSUMER CREDIT FIGURES 
RELEASED 11.30 1.9.87 
Table 1.XI ccmprises 
ARBITRAGE OPFORIUNITIES g to ~ 
ARBITRAGE OPFORruNITIES ~ to g 
ARBITRAGE OPFORIUNITIES I:M to ~ 
ARBITRAGE OPFORIUNITIES I to D1 
ARBITRAGE OPFOR'IUNITIES g to D1 
ARBITRAGE OPFOR'IUNITIES D.f to g 
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ARBITRAGE OPK>RTONITIES g to i 
Time one month two months three months six months twelve months 
11.00 -0.0114 -0.0323 -0.2615 -0.0690 -0.2168 
11.05 -0.0114 -0.0323 -0.2615 -0.0690 -0.2168 
11.10 
-0.0115 -0.0324 -0.2617 -0.0694 -0.2174 
11.15 -0.0436 -0.0649 -0.2944 -0.1031 -0.2529 
11.20 -0.0114 -0.0323 -0.2616 -0.0691 -0.2169 
11.25 -0.0436 -0.0649 -0.2944 -0.1031 -0.2529 
11.30 -0.0243 -0.0453 -0.2746 -0.0824 -0.2308 
11.35 -0.0438 -0.0654 -0.2952 -0.1046 -0.2557 
11.40 
-0.0439 -0.0655 -0.2954 -0.1050 -0.2563 
11.50 -0.0437 -0.0650 -0.2947 -0.1036 -0.2538 
12.00 -0.0436 -0.0648 -0.2943 -0.1027 -0.2523 
ARBITRAGE OPK>RI'UNITIES i to g 
11.00 -0.0864 -0.0932 -0.0875 -0.1553 -0.2441 
11.05 -0.0864 -0.0932 -0.0875 -0.1553 -0.2441 
11.10 -0.0863 -0.0931 -0.0873 -0.1549 -0.2433 
11.15 -0.1184 -0.1254 -0.1199 -0.1882 -0.2781 
11.20 -0.0863 -0.0932 -0.0875 -0.1552 -0.2439 
11.25 -0.1184 -0.1254 -0.1199 -0.1882 -0.2781 
11.30 -0.0992 -0.1062 -0.1006 -0.1687 -0.2581 
11.35 -0.1180 -0.1248 -0.1190 -0.1865 -0.2752 
11.40 -0.1179 -0.1247 -0.1187 -0.1861 -0.2745 
11.50 -0.1183 -0.1252 -0.1196 -0.1877 -0.2772 
12.00 -0.1184 -0.1256 -0.1201 -0.1886 -0.2789 
ARBITRAGE OPFORruNITIES Ilof to i 
11.00 -0.0687 -0.0561 -0.2844 -0.1092 -0.2337 
11.05 -0.0687 -0.0561 -0.2844 -0.1092 -0.2337 
11.10 -0.0581 -0.0455 -0.2738 -0.0985 -0.2229 
11.15 -0.0581 -0.0455 -0.2738 -0.0986 -0.2231 
11.20 -0.0580 -0.0454 -0.2737 -0.0984 -0.2227 
11.25 -0.0581 -0.0455 -0.2738 -0.0986 -0.2231 
11.30 -0.0846 -0.0720 -0.3004 -0.1254 -0.2502 
11.35 -0.0846 -0.0720 -0.3004 -0.1254 -0.2502 
11.40 -0.0846 -0.0722 -0.3006 -0.1258 -0.2512 
11.50 -0.0845 -0.0719 -0.3001 -0.1250 -0.2493 
12.00 -0.0580 -0.0453 -0.2735 -0.0980 -0.2218 
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ARBITRAGE OPFOR'IUNITIES i to I:M 
11.00 -0.0372 -0.0766 -0.0609 -0.1201 -0.1525 
11.05 -0.0372 -0.0766 -0.0609 -0.1201 -0.1525 
11.10 -0.0266 -0.0658 -0.0500 -0.1089 -0.1406 
11.15 -0.0266 -0.0658 -0.0500 -0.1089 -0.1404 
11.20 -0.0266 -0.0659 -0.0501 -0.1090 -0.1408 
11.25 -0.0266 -0.0658 -0.0500 -0.1089 -0.1404 
11.30 -0.0532 -0.0927 -0.0772 -0.1368 -0.1701 
11.35 -0.0532 -0.0927 -0.0772 -0.1368 -0.1701 
11.40 -0.0532 -0.0926 -0.0770 -0.1364 -0.1692 
11.50 -0.0533 -0.0928 -0.0773 -0.1372 -0.1711 
12.00 -0.0266 -0.0660 -0.0503 -0.1094 -0.1417 
ARBITRAGE OPRJR'IUNITIES g to r:M 
11.00 -0.0383 -0.0884 -0.3529 -0.1275 -0.2450 
11.05 -0.0383 -0.0884 -0.3529 -0.1275 -0.2450 
11.10 -0.0276 -0.0777 -0.3423 -0.1165 -0.2334 
11.15 -0.0598 -0.1101 -0.3749 -0.1501 -0.2687 
11.20 -0.0276 -0.0776 -0.3421 -0.1163 -0.2331 
11.25 -0.0598 -0.1101 -0.3749 -0.1501 -0.2687 
11.30 -0.0672 -0.1175 -0.3823 -0.1578 -0.2771 
11.35 -0.0867 -0.1376 -0.4028 -0.1800 -0.3019 
11.40 -0.0867 -0.1376 -0.4029 -0.1800 -0.3016 
11.50 -0.0866 -0.1374 -0.4024 -0.1793 -0.3010 
12.00 -0.0598 -0.1101 -0.3749 -0.1503 -0.2694 
ARBITRAGE OPRJR'IUNITIES r:M to g 
11.00 -0.1444 -0.1281 -0.1542 -0.2007 -0.3489 
11.05 -0.1444 -0.1281 -0.1542 -0.2007 -0.3489 
11.10 -0.1337 -0.1174 -0.1434 -0.1896 -0.3374 
11.15 -0.1657 -0.1495 -0.1757 -0.2224 -0.3713 
11.20 -0.1338 -0.1174 -0.1435 -0.1898 -0.3377 
11.25 -0.1657 -0.1495 -0.1757 -0.2224 -0.3713 
11.30 -0.1731 -0.1569 -0.1832 -0.2300 -0.3790 
11.35 -0.1918 -0.1754 -0.2014 -0.2476 -0.3955 
11.40 -0.1918 -0.1754 -0.2014 -0.2476 -0.3958 
11.50 -0.1920 -0.1757 -0.2018 -0.2483 -0.3966 
12.00 -0.1657 -0.1495 -0.1756 -0.2223 -0.3707 
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FOREIGN E:XCHAN:;E MARKEr 
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2. 1 Intro:iuct icn 
As we discussed in ESSAY I, efficiency can be defined as a 
condi tion which I fully reflects I all relevant information. Researchers 
into the efficiency of foreign exchange markets under uncertainty 
however, have tended to test a joint null hypothesis. Firstly, in 
accordance with the Fama (1970) definition of an efficient market, it is 
assumed that agents I behaviour in foreign exchange markets should 
conform to the rational expec:tations hypothesis, where the markets 
subjective expectation is equivalent to the true mathematical 
expec:tation given the available information set. For variable X this 
means 
~(XIQt-1) • E(XIQt-1) (2.1 ) 
where Qt-1 is the information set at t-1, ~(o 10 ) is the market's 
subjective expectation and E( 01 0) is the true mathematical expec:tation. 
The second leg of the joint null hypothesis is that agents in such 
markets are risk-neutral and therefore do not have to be compensated for 
accepting fair betS.(1) Under such assumptions, ie rational 
expec:tations and risk neutrality, it is easy to show that the forward 
rate should act as an optimal predictor of the future spot rate. If it 
is assumed that agents at time t set the K-perio:i forward exchange rate 
for maturity in perio:i t+k equal to the expec:ted future spot rate, 
(1) For example, if, on the toss of a coin, E1 was to be offered if the 
toss resulted in heads being upperroc:st and zero if tails were upperroc:st, 
then there is a 0.5 probability of winning E1. A risk-neutral player 
would be willing to pay 50 pence to enter this bet, as on average no 
loss would be incurred. A risk-averse player however, would on1 y be 
willing to pay an entry fee of less than 50 pence, thus having to be 
risk-compensated by an amount in accordance with his degree of risk-
aversity. 
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ie 
.. k 
St+k • f t (2.2) 
-where St+k is the logarithm of the expected future spot rate (domestic 
le: 
price of foreign money) for k pericds ahead, f t is the logarithm of the 
forward rate at time t for k pericds ahead, and assuming speculators are 
risk neutral, no transaction costs exist and the market is competitive, 
equation (2.2) will hold continuously. 
If in addition agents are rational 
(2.3) 
where Et(· I·) is the conditional mathematical expectations operator at 
time t and S2t is the information set at time t upon which expectations 
are conditioned, the market is said to be efficient. The actual value 
of the spot exchange rate will only deviate frcxn its expected value by 
innovations occurring in the prcx::ess between t and t+k, the expected 
value of the innovations being zero given information at time t. 
Combining equations (2.2) and (2.3), we have 
where Ut+k is a white noise k step ahead forecast ing error term 
k 
orthogonal to ft. The spot rate at t+k is therefore equal to the 
(2.4) 
corresponding forward rate at time t plus a randcxn forecasting error, 
where E(UtTklS2t) • o. Under such conditions the market is 
speculatively efficient Bilson (1981), thus emphasizing the point that 
we have two hypotheses in equation (2.4). Hence, while equation (2.4) 
is testable it is clearly a test of a joint hypothesis - rational 
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expectations and risk neutrality. 
Alternatively we can write 
k 
St+k • a + 13ft + (t+k (2.5) 
where under risk neutrality and rational expectations, a • 0, 13 • 1 , 
and Et((t+k) • O. Hence the forward rate at time t for t+k, assuming 
speculative efficiency, is an optimal predictor of the future spot rate 
at t+k • 
There now exists a substantial body of literature which tests this 
joint null hypothesis - rational expectations and risk neutrality - for 
the forward foreign exchange markets, both for the 1920s experience with 
float ing exchange rates and for the more recent experience of the 1970s 
and 1980s. Speculative efficiency appears to be strongly rejected for 
the recent experience of floating exchange rates, (eg Hansen and 
Hodrick, 1980, Hakkio, 1981), while the evidence for the 1920s until 
recently has been rather more mixed, (eg Frenkel 1977, 1978, 1980, 
Hansen and Hodrick, 1980). In two recent papers however MacDonald and 
Taylor, (1988a, 1988b), have decisively rejected the efficient markets 
hypothesis for the 1920s float. These resul ts imply that the market is 
either inefficient or agents are risk-averse, or indeed neither rational 
expectations nor risk neutrality are valid assumptions. 
Research has generally taken one of two directions at this point. 
Scrne authors have utilized survey data on exchange rate expectations to 
try and test each leg of the joint hypothesis individually. The 
results of such analysis are again mixed with sane authors rejecting 
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both rationality and risk neutrality (eg Frankel and Froot 1986, 1987, 
MacDonald and Torrance, 1988), while others were able only to reject 
risk neutrality (eg Taylor, 1988b). This evidence however has been 
confined only to the recent experience with floating exchange rates, 
since survey data are not available for the 1920s period. 
The second I ine of research has tended to al:sorb the assumption of 
rational expectations into the maintained hypothesis (ie rational 
expectations is assumed to hold \.IIlder Ho and H1 ) and to attempt to model 
the risk premium directly. Again such an analysis has been confined to 
the 1970s and 1980s experience with floating exchange rates and, as with 
the evidence on rationality, has tended to produce mixed results. For 
example, Frankel (1982b), Hansen and Hodrick. (1983)' Hodrick and 
Srivastava (1984) and Domowitz and Hakkio (1985), fo\.lIld only weak 
suPIX'rt for a time varying risk premium, while Wolff (1987), and Taylor 
(1988c), met with considerably more success in modelling foreign 
exchange risk premia. 
The purpose of this study is to examine alternative models of 
foreign exchange risk premia for a number of currencies using 1920s 
data. Such an exercise can be justified in that it will add to the 
extant evidence on this issue by researching a time period which, as we 
argue below, would seem to be exactly suited to the empirical analysis 
of foreign exchange risk. Further, while speculative efficiency is a 
central assumption in asset type models of exchange rate determination, 
models differ in their behavioural assumptions \.IIlder uncertainty. 
Mcx:1ell ing risk premia may thus help us discriminate between models. 
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In the first instance, the methodology of Dc.mowitz and Hakkio 
(1985) is applied by attempting to model the risk premium as a function 
of the conditional variance of the forecast error. Secondly the 
methodology of ~lff (1987) and Taylor (1988c) is applied by modelling 
the risk premium as a latent variable with a time series representation 
of its CHl. 
The remainder of this essay is set out as follows: section 2.2 
reviews the extensive literature on forward market efficiency; sections 
2.3 and 2.4 discuss the econometric models used in this study; section 
2.5 describes the Kalman filtering technique; section 2.6 describes the 
data and its historical background; sections 2.7 and 2.8 discuss the 
testing procedures and reports the empirical result of the study while 
section 2.9 concludes. 
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2.2 Speculative Efficiency ~ Extant Evidence 
'There is a general consensus that forward exchange rates have 
1i ttle or any p:Mer as forecasts of future spot exchange rates. 
There is less agreement on whether forward rates contain t ime-
varying premiums'. 
Fama, 1984, p 319. 
Fama (1984) captures the direction of recent empirical work on forward 
market efficiency by highlighting the empirical observation that forward 
rates and the corresponding future spot rates diverge and that the 
source of the divergence is inconclusive. In this section of the essay 
we therefore summarize and discuss both the extensive empirical 
li terature on speculative eff ic iency, and more recent research which 
attempts to isolate the source of observed deviations from speculative 
efficiency. 
Tests of speculative efficiency have generally focused on the 
information set available to market traders. The justification for 
such an approach arises from the consideration that data are collected 
at discrete intervals and, if the market is efficient, arbitrage will 
have occurred within this period thus alla-ling the analysis of the 
effects of the information on the asset in question without the need 
directl y to consider the arbi trage process (MacDonald and Tay I or , 
1989b) • Further, by focusing on the information set available to 
market traders we can define efficiency more accurately by considering 
the amount of information available to market agents. For example, 
Fama (1970) describes efficiency in three forms: In its weakest form 
efficiency holds when prices 'fully reflect' all available information 
on past market prices, semi-strong efficiency increases the information 
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set to include all publicly available information and strong efficiency 
increases the information set further to include all privately available 
information. In this essay we are concerned only with weak and semi-
strong efficiency tests. 
Early tests of efficiency of the forward foreign exchange market 
were weak form tests, which analysed the forecast errors, ie St-ft - 1, in 
terns of tests of significance arxi serial correlation. I.evich (1979), 
summarized the evidence of the empirical studies of the 1970s by noting 
that in the majority of these early studies the mean error tended to b:! 
small and insignificantly different from zero, and the forecast errors 
were serially uncorrelated. Such weak tests would suggest the forward 
exchange market is efficient. 
The majority of single equation tests of speculative efficiency for 
both the 1920s and 1970s have however generally taken one of two forns. 
Firstly, error orthogonality tests, eg 
n 
(St - f t - 1) • ao + a1 ~ (St-ft - 1)t-1-1 + Ut 
1-0 
(2.6) 
where St is the logarithm of the spot exchange rate at time t, f t - 1 is 
the logarithm of the forward rate lagged by one period and Ut is a 
random error term at time t. This weak test of speculative efficiency 
implies that the constant, a.:" and all other coefficients should b:! 
equal to zero and Ut b:! whi te noise. Hansen and Hodr ick (1980) def ine 
semi-strong error orthogonality tests as tests which include lagged 
forecast errors from other exchange markets in the informat ion set. 
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Secondly, tests of efficiency have utilized regression analysis by 
ecanometrically estimating 
k 
St+k • a + Bft + Ut+k (2.7) 
or 
k 
(St+k - St) • a + B(ft - St) + £t+k (2.8) 
k 
where St+k is the logarithm of the spot rate at time t+k, f t is the 
forward rate at time t for k periods ahead, (St+k - St) is the rate of 
k 
depreciation of the spot rate from t to t+k , (ft - St) is the forward 
premium at time t for t+k , Ut+k is the k step ahead forecast error. 
If agents are rational and risk neutral, a • 0 , B • 1 • 
Hansen and Hodr ick (1980), 
'examine the hypothesis that the expected rate of return to 
speculation in the forward exchange market is zero ••• ' p 829. 
Using the semi-strong form of orthogonality tests, estimating a 
regression of forecasting errors for seven currencies on lagged values 
of the own forecast error and six other lagged forecast errors. They 
estimate 
i i 7 j j i 
(St+13 - f t ) • ai + ~ b ij (S1 - f t - 13 ) + Ut j-1 
for i • 1, ••• 7 currencies. 
(2.9) 
Hansen and Hodr ick use week I y data on the spot rate and month I y 
data on forward rates (thus overlapping data) for the recent experience 
with floating exchange rates for seven currencies: the Canadian dollar, 
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German Mark, French franc, OK pol.ll'ld, Swiss franc, Japanese yen and the 
Italian lira, all against the US dollar. The period under study is 
from April 1975 to January 1979. The authors dealt with the 
methodological problem of overlapping contracts issue (2) by mcxiifying 
the estimation of the asymptotic covariance matrix to take accoW1t of 
the serial correlation present (3). With consistent standard errors 
they were able to increase the sample size of the data (198 
observations) and thus increase the asymptotic power of the tests. The 
authors, by testing the hypothesis that the ai , b ij terms in equation 
(2.9) are zero, were unable to accept the null hypothesis that the 
forecast error is uncorrelated with past forecast errors for three 
currencies: Swiss franc, Canadian dollar, and the German mark all 
against the US dollar. Hansen and Hodrick also present evidence on 
speculative efficiency for the 1920s float for the German mark from 
January 1922 to September. 1923, the French franc from January 1922 to 
March 1926 and the US dollar from January 1922 to April 1926, all 
against the OK pound. They use weekly spot and one month forward rates 
for the aforesaid sample periods to test the orthogonality properties 
(2) '!be problem of serial correlation of the error term arises because 
the number of ol::servations are more frequent than the maturity length. 
The error term k periods ahead will therefore subsume all errors from t 
to t+k thus will not be independent of past forecast errors but will 
follCM an MA(n-1) process. 
(3) As serial correlation is present, the covariance matrix, E(ee') does 
not have zeros as the off-diagonal elements, thus the errors are no 
longer distributed u~(0,o2I), but u~(O,g). 02(X'X)-1 cannot nCM be 
used to estimate (X'X)-1xgx(X'X)-', ie the VAR(b). Hansen and Hodrick 
estimate g, where g-E(ee'), in order to obtain a consistent estimate of 
the asymptotic covariance matrix. 
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of the forecast errors, but were unable to accept speculative efficiency 
for the mark at 1 percent level of significance. For the French franc 
the null was rejected at 2 percent level of significance. No evidence 
was found against the null for the US dollar against the UK pound. 
It can be argued however that in the case of the French franc and 
t5 dollar the sample period used in the analysis contains one year in 
which the exchange rate was fixed (the sample period was August 1923 -
July 1926). MacDonald and Taylor (1988b) suggest that 
'such fixity may impart a bias into the results, particularly if 
there was sane question as to the credibility of the new 
arrangements' • 
MacDonald and Taylor, 1988b, p 5 
thus the values of the disturbance term would not then be independent of 
the value of the regressors, OLS estimates being both biased and 
inconsistent. MacDonald and Taylor (1988b) highlight a further problem 
with the Hansen Hodrick methodology in that they arbitrarily constrain 
the lag structure to second order. Thus failure to reject the null 
hypothesis for the US dollar does not prevent the forecast errors being 
correlated with a more distant comp:ment of the information set. 
CWnby and Obsfeld (1984) also conduct a semi-strong form test of 
the thirteen week forecast error on a constant, am forecast error at 
time t and forward forecast errors at time t for another four 
currencies. '!hey use weekly spot data and three month forward rates 
for the UK pound, German mark, Swiss franc, canadian dollar and the 
Japanese yen, all against the US dollar. The time period under 
consideration is from January 1976 to June 1981, and they test the 
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hypothesis that the forecast error is uncorrelated with any information 
dated t or earlier. While the equations were estimated by OLS, the 
standard errors were calculated using a heteroscedastic - consistent 
technique thereby allowing for the possibility of heterosc:edastic 
residuals. Rejection at 5 percent level of significance occurred in 
all cases except that of the German mark against the US dollar. 
Haache and Townend (1981) however, find that while they could 
reject the orthogonality property for the sterling effective exchange 
rate during the period June 1976 to February 1980, they could not reject 
the hypothesis implied by equation (2.7) that a • 0 , and B • 1 • 
Similarly, Davidson (1985) analysing data from February 1973 to December 
1980, found the regression coefficients in equation (2.7) to be close to 
their theoretical value, but also found that prediction could be 
improved by lagged information. 
Tests of equation (2.7) were also conducted by Frenkel (1977, 1978 
and 1980) for the French franc-UK pound, US dollar-UK pound, and French 
franc-US dollar for the period February 1921 to August 1925, and for the 
German mark-UK pound, from February 1921 to August 1923. Frenkel 
estimates by OIS, using monthly data and forward rates with one month 
maturity, therefore circumventing the problem of overlapping data. In 
all the currencies studied by Frenkel, the null hypothesis a • 0, B • 1, 
could not be rejected, the errors were serially uncorrelated and 
orthogonal to the information set. Prediction was not improved by the 
addition of lagged information, the coefficient estimates being 
insignificantly different from zero. 
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MacD:ma.ld (1983) reinforces Fren.kel's results, estimating equation 
(2.7) by 2SURE techniques, for the French franc-UK pound, US dollar-UK 
pound and French franc-US dollar, for the pericxi February 1921 to May 
1925. He thus accounts for the fact that the error term across 
equations may be correlated, either because of the contemporaneous 
nature of news and/or error terms may be related between currencies via 
arbitraqe. 
Tests of equation (2.7) however can be criticized in that evidence 
exists that spot and forward rates exhibit non-stationary behaviour (eq 
MacDonald and Taylor, 1989a), thus the estimation of a linear regression 
roodel such as equation (2.7) may be questionable, as standard inference 
techniques require that the variables are stationary. Subtracting St 
from both sides of equation (2. 7) ~uld however induce stationary, 
therefore estimating equation (2.8) may be considered a more robust 
estimating equation. Frenkel (1980) when regressing the rate of 
depreciation on the forward premia, equation (2.8), finds his evidence 
less supportive of the speculative efficiency hypothesis. Baillie, 
Lippens and ~ (1983) test equation (2.7) in differences, to 
account for non-statiooarity, roodelling spot and forward exchange rates 
as an unrestricted bivariate autoreqression (see ESSAY IV of this thesis 
for a description of bivariate vector autoreqression methodology). 
They use weekly data for the pericxi June 1973 to April 1980, for six 
currencies, in terms of their value against the US dollar. While the 
authors reject the null hypothesis for all currencies (OK, Germany, 
Italy, France, Canada, SWitzerland), their methodology is criticized by 
MacDonald and Taylor (1988b) as being unsuitable. Such a criticism is 
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fOl.mded on the Engle and Granger (1987) demonstration that if the spot 
rate and forward rate are cointegrated, then no invertible moving 
average representation exists for ds and d f (thus no finite BVAR 
system exists). 
MacDonald and Taylor (1989a) overcome this problem by utilizing the 
cointegration of St and f t by including in the BVAR representation the 
forward premium and change in the exchange rate. Thus the system will 
be well behaved and allows the impcsition of all the restrictions 
impl ied by the BVAR model, ie 
k 
E(St+k - St) - E(ft - St) • 0 
The authors decisively reject speculative efficiency. Thus the 
evidence on the forward rate as an optimal predictor of the spot rate 
suggests that expected future spot rates and current forward rates may 
diverge, although the period under consideration and the methodolo;y 
employed in testing the joint hypothesis may be important factors when 
analysing the issue. 
'!here is therefore considerable agreement over the rejection of 
speculative efficiency, but researchers remain divided on the source of 
the rejection. In response to this challenge, more recent research on 
forward market efficiency has attempted to drive a wedge between the 
forward rate and future spot rate by testing each leg of the null 
hypothesis separately. Taylor (1988b), by utilizing survey data, tests 
for risk neutrality and rational expectations individually for the 
dollar-sterling and effective sterling exchange rates, for the period 
November 1979 to July 1985. The author 'apportions the blame' for bias 
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in the forward premium between non-rational expectations and risk 
aversion by demonstrating that the coefficient on the forward premium in 
(2.8), ie B in 
(et+1 - et) - a + B(ft - et) + Ut +1 
can be separated into its components. 
'!hus. 
B-1 - ~ - ~ (2.10) 
where RE and RN represent rational expectations and risk neutrality. 
~ under the assumption of rational expectations wil1 be identical1y 
equal to zero. Similarly regardless of how expectations are formed. 
under risk neutrality the expected rate of depreciation wil1 be equal to 
the forward premium - thus ~ under risk neutrality will be identically 
equal to zero. As survey data can be thought of as a measurement of 
agents' point expectations, then the forecast errors and the rate of 
depreciation are observable thus the BRE and ~ regression coefficients 
can be constructed and tested for stat ist ical signi f icance. 
Taylor (1988b) was unable to reject the rationality of expectations and 
concluded that it is 
'probably risk aversion rather than non-rational expectations which 
is to blame for the observed non-optimali ty of the forward rate as 
a spot rate predictor'. 
Taylor. 1988b. p 10. 
Wi th simi lar methodology Ma.cD:lnald and Torrance (1989) in a direct 
test of the uncovered interest parity condition. reject both rational 
expectations and risk neutrality for German mark-US dollar, Japanese 
yen-US dollar. swiss franc-US dol1ar and US dollar-OK pound exchange 
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rates, for the period August 1984 to April 1987. Their results 
indicate that the reason for rejection of speculative efficiency is due 
to failure of ooth legs of the joint null hypothesis of rational 
expectation and risk neutrality. 
Frankel and Froot (1987) also use survey data to measure exchange 
rate expectations, the series considered ranging from January 1976 to 
December 1985. Using SURE and OIS estimating teclmiques they test the 
unbiasedness hypothesis for the French franc, German mark, Swiss franc, 
Japanese yen and UK polmd, all against the US dollar. The authors 
conclude that while tests of the 1970s data series fail to find any 
unconditional bias, in the 1980s the US dollar consistently sold at a 
discount in the forward exchange market, al though it was not unt i 1 1985 
that the expected depreciation of the US dollar began. After February 
1985 however, the dollar depreciated more quickly than that expected by 
investors. Frankel and Froot however do not reject rational 
expectations outright, suggesting that investors could even be rational 
if the true model was taking time to evolve. 1he evidence therefore is 
mixed. 
'Theoretically and empirically, the separation of the joint 
hypothesis is proving to be a much more difficult problem than was 
its now accepted empirical rejection'. 
Boothe and Longworth, 1986, p 136. 
We argue elsewhere however that it is difficult to justify that market 
expectations are not rational (eg ESSAY' IV of this thesis) and if we 
consider that no survey data exists for 1920s period (the period under 
consideration in this study) there is arguably sane justification for 
incorporating the assumption of rational expectations into our 
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maintained hypothesis. Thus we follaol what Boothe and Longworth (1986) 
term 
'an important article of faith for many economists'. 
Boothe and Longworth, 1986, p 138. 
and assume that agents in foreign exchange markets are end~ with 
rational expectations but they may not be risk-neutral. 
Under such conditions market participants will, on average, have an 
unbiased expectation of the future spot rate, but will not force the 
forward rate into full equality with their point expectation because of 
the risk involved in taking an open forward position. Thus the forward 
rate can be thought of as differing from the expected future spot rate 
by an amount representing the perceived riskiness of the contract - ie a 
risk premium, Pt say : 
k 
f t • E(St+kl~) + Pt (2.11) 
Thus the analogue of equation (2.8) allaoling for risk aversion is 
le 
(St+k - St) • a + B(ft - St) + Pt + €t+k (2.12) 
where the restriction a • 0, .B • 1 N:ruld again be expected to hold if 
agents were endowed with rational expectation. 
The question then arises of heM to mcxiel the premium term Pt 
empirically. Boothe and Longworth (1986), group mcx:lels of risk premia 
into two categories: mcx:lels which incorporate outside assets (eg 
government bonds) to explain the existence of risk premia and those that 
do not. The presence of outside assets arises from the consideration 
that the risk of an asset comes from its contribution to the variance of 
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an investor's overall portfolio. Hence according to basic financial 
theory, if a currency's returns covary negatively with returns from the 
overall portfolio, investors will include that particular asset in their 
portfolio in order to achieve an overall reduction in portfolio risk, 
and a negative risk premiwn will exist. Boothe and wngworth (1986) 
note that empirical work focusing on models requiring outside assets 
'all fail to find evidence of a portfolio-balance risk premiwn'. 
Boothe and Langworth, 1986, p 136. 
The authors also summarize the empirical tests for risk premia which 
are based on models which do not require outside assets noting that only 
a few models of this type exist and that tests give little evidence for 
the existence of risk premia, (eg see ~itz and Hakkio, 1985). They 
conclude that no concrete conclusions can be drawn from the literature 
on risk premia, there being no 
' ••• outright rejection of the risk premiwn, we have simply little 
empirical evidence in its favour'. 
Boothe and Langworth, 1986, ~ 138. 
In this essay we shall pursue alternatives which are based on 
models of the latter type, ie those which do not require the existence 
of outside assets. The models are outl ined in the following two 
sections. 
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2.3 The Generalized ARQi in MEAN Premium Model 
Engle (1982) introduced a class of heteroscedastic models which he 
terns autoregressive conditionally heteroscedastic (ARCH). These take 
the general form 
Yt - S'Xt + Ut 
2 2 ~ 2 2 
ht - 10 + l: 'iiUt-i 
1-1 
(2.13) 
(2.14) 
(2.15) 
ie, the conditional error variance is a function of past squared errors. 
Engle, Lilien and Robins (1987) suggest modelling risk premia in the 
term structure of interest rates by introducing the concU tional standard 
deviation into the conditional means - replacing equation (2.13) with 
equation (2.16) 
(2.16) 
This was also the approach applied to the foreign exchange market during 
the period (1973 to 1982) with limited success, by Domowitz and 
Hakkio (1985). In this context, the empirical model takes the form: (4) 
(St+1 - St) - a + S(ft - St} + aht+1 + £t+1 
2 
£eo+1 1S2t - N(O,ht +1 ) 
2 2 n 2 2 
ht+1 - "{o+ l:'{i£t+1-1 
i-1 
Thus, the risk premium is hypothesized to be a function of the 
conditional standard deviation of the forecast error - the less 
(2.17) 
(2.18) 
(2.19) 
(4) The parameters of the conditional variance equation (equation 
2.19), are written as squares in order to emphasize the fact that they 
must be positive. 
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confidence with which forecasts are made, the greater the risk premium. 
Some, albeit weak, theoretical justification for the ARCli-in-MEAN 
premium model is given by I:lornowitz and Hakkio (1985). Starting with 
the Lucas (1982) risk premium model, they show that the risk premilun 
should, under certain assumptions, be a function of the conditional 
variance of the exogeneous variables and that the forecast errors should 
be heteroscedastic. The ARCli-in-MEAN model is then offered as a 
convenient and parsimonious representation of the theoretical model in a 
simi lar spirit to that in which ARlMA models are often advanced. 
A problem in estimating ARCli-in-MEAN models lies in determining the 
optimal lag length in equation (2.19) - ie n. In practice, Engle 
(1982), Engle, Lilien and Robins (1987) and Domowitz and Hakkio (1985) 
chose this somewhat arbitrarily, imposing linearly declining weights in 
order to limit the dimensions of the parameter space. 
Bollerslev (1986) introduces a generalized class of ARCH (GARCli) 
models which are at once parsimonious and also impose a smoother time 
profile on the estimated conditional variances. 
In the present context this amounts to replacing equation (2.19) 
with 
2 222 2 2 
ht+1 • 10 + 11.t + 12he (2.20) 
ie the conditional variance is a function not only of last periods' 
forecast error but also of last periods' conditional variance. 
Clearly, given 1121 <1 , equation (2.20) can be expressed as a function 
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of an infinite number of lagged forecast errors with geometrically 
declining weights. Although a smoothly decaying lag pattern is 
imposed, this seems intuitively plausible in the present context -
agents place less and less weight on distant errors when forming 
expectations of future forecast variances. Also, the mcdel allows the 
data to choose the rate of decay of the lag coefficients. In this 
essay 1920s data is used to estimate GARCH-in-MEAN mcdels described by 
equations (2.17) (2.18) and (2.20). Fstimating and testing procedures 
for the GARCH-in-MEAN mcdel are described below in section 2.8. 
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2.4 The DYMIMIC Premitun Model 
t-hlff (1984) and Taylor (1988c) provide estimates of time-varying 
risk premia for the recent float using a signal extraction approach. 
lbis involves viewing the risk premitun as a signal which must be 
extracted from a noisy environment. Thus the difference between the 
realized ~t rate and last periods forward rate can be viewed as the 
Stun of the risk premitun and a rational forecast error: 
(2.21) 
The next step is to specify a dynamic roodel for Pt which might be for 
example an ARMAX roodel of the general form 
9 LPt • o(L)ut + 1'~ (2.22) 
where .0(L) and o(L) are scalar polynomials in the lag operator L , Ut is 
a whi te noise disturbance and Et is a vector of exoqeneous inputs. 
lbe roodel, equations (2.21) and (2.22) falls within a general class 
of dynamic latent variable roodels termed DYNAMIC MULTIPLE INDICATOR 
MULTIPIE-CAUSE (DYMIMIC) by Engle and Watson (1981). Taylor (1988c) 
includes domestic and foreign equity variables in ~ and postulates an 
AR ( 1) process for Pt: 
d r 
Pt • .0Pt-1 + ~10t + ~20t + Ut (2.23) 
where Ot and Ot denote domestic and foreign equity yield volatility 
respectively. 
Wolff (1987), hCMever fits pure time series roodels for risk premia. 
This can be justified so long as exoqeneous inputs in equation (2.22) 
(the elements of Bt) are assumed stationary and admit a Weld moving 
average representation. 
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Appropriate time series mcx:iels for the premia terms can be 
identified as follows: Firstly, note that fran equation (2.21) the one 
step ahead forward rate forecast error is equal to the risk premium plus 
a white noise forecast error. '!he first step is to identify, using 
standard Box-Jenkins (1976) techniques, an appropriate time series 
(ARMA) mcx:iel for the forward rate forecast error. Various theorems 
showing the results of adding white noise to an ARMA process (eg see 
Granger and Morris 1986) can then be applied to identify an ARMA mcx:iel 
for Pt. 
In this study we follow Wolff (1987) in estimating pure time series 
mcx:iels for foreign exchange risk premia, thereby excluding exogeneous 
inputs in explaining Pt. It should be noted therefore that the results 
will have less econanic content than those of Taylor (1988c). 
Once an appropriate time series mcx:iel for Pt has been identified, 
maximum likelihood estimates can be obtained by applying Kalman 
filtering techniques to the system and utilizing the prediction form of 
the likelihood function. '!his procedure will be described in the next 
section of this essay. 
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2.5 The Kalman Filter 
The Kalman f i Iter is a recursive set of equat ions which allCM an 
estimator to be updated once new information becanes available. Such a 
technique can be utilized to yield maximum likelihocd. estimates of the 
DYMIMIC premium mcx:lel as follas. 
Consider the follCMing 'state space form' (S) 
where Yt is a vector of observations, X t is an unol:served 'state 
(2.24) 
(2.25) 
(2.26) 
vector', and the parameters Y, T , R, 0 1 and 0 2 are knCMn. The 
u v 
measurement equation (2.24) shCMs hCM the vector of ol:servations is 
systematically related to the unol:served state vector in a noisy 
environment. The transition equation (2.25) describes the dynamic 
evolution of the state vector. The Kalman filter recursions can be 
applied to any state space form of the kind equations (2.24) - (2.26), 
ani essentially works in three distinct phases. Given information (ie 
observations of the elements of y) and initial values at time t-1, the 
prediction equations of the filter provide optimal estimates of the 
state vector Xt (and of the associated covariance matrix) at t-1 by 
minimum mean square linear estimator (Mt-SLE), the problem being to 
minimize the mean square error (MSE) of the pred:ction error. As Xt is 
------------------------------------------------------------------------
(S) A form of mcx:lel where attention is focused on a set of 'm state 
variables' which change over time. (See eq Harvey, 1981). 
157 
stochastic this suggests that the MMSLE of the state variable Xt at t-1, 
say at , is given by: 
(2.27) 
lhe covariance matrix of the estimation error, 02Pt/t_1, can also be 
obtained directly as 
where Q • 0 2 
v 
Hence 
where 
Pt/t-1 - TPt -1 T' + RQR' 
the error made in predicting Yt at t-1, nt , is 
• 
nt • 'Y teXt - at /t-1) + £t 
Since (xt - at /t-1) and (t have zero expectation, E(nt ) - 0 , 
thus 
2 I 
Var(nt ) - E(nt) • E['Yt(xt -at / t -1)(Xt - at/t-1), "1tl 
2 I 
+ E((t2)+2E['Yt(xt - at/t-1)£t] 
As the expectation of the cross product term is zero, 
, 
Var(nt) - 02 'YtPt / t -1 'Y t + 0 2 ... • 02ft 
t 
(2.28) 
(2.29) 
(2.30) 
(2.31) 
(2.32) 
(2.33) 
Equations (2.27) and (2.30) are therefore the prediction equations for 
the state vector and its oovariance u~trix and equation (2.31) is the 
associated prediction error. 
Given information at time t, the updating equations incorporate the 
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new information in Yt with the information already available in the 
MMSLE at t-1 (ie at/t-1) , thus combining prior and sample information. 
The new information in Yt is contained in the prediction error of the 
MMSLE and this prediction error is used to update the estimate (at / t -1), 
via the 'Kalman gain'. 
The state updating equation is : 
(2.34) 
where the prediction error is the term in brackets, thus contains all 
the new information in Yt and can be used to update at /t-1 via 
Pt/t-,Yt/ft , which is the 'Kalman gain', where 
, 
f t - 'Y tPt / t - 1 t + Ut (2.34a) 
As each step in the Kalman filter utilized all current and past 
information, the optimal full sample information is only available in 
the final period, therefore Or (where T denotes the final period) is the 
cnly estimator which utilizes all information. Hence the smoothing 
equations begin in this final period by initiating the Kalman filter in 
reverse. We are therefore predicting and updating using all available 
information, providing optimal full sample information estimates of the 
state vector sequence. 
Therefore we initiate the smoothing recursions at Or and PT and 
work in reverse. The smoothing equations may be written: 
• at/T • at + Pt (at+1/T - Tt + 1at ) (2.35) 
• • Pt/T • Pt + Pt(Pt+,/T - Pt+,/t)Pt ' (2.36) 
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Where at/or and Pt/or denote the smoothed estimator and its covariance 
matrix at time t, and 
• .-1 
Pt - Pt Tt +1Pt+1/t , t • T - 1 , ••• , 1 (2.37) 
Since the Kalman filter prcduces optimal one step ahead forecast errors 
and error variances conditional on any given parameter it can be used to 
obtain the prediction error fom of the likelihood function which can 
then be maximized with respect to any unknown parameters of the mcdel to 
yield maximum likelihocxi estimates. Harvey (1981) shows that the 
likelihood function obtained from the prediction error decomposition 
takes the fom ( 6 ) : 
or or 2 
log L(y) - -T log 2~ - T log 0 2 -+ ~ log f t - 10-2 ~ nt/ft (2.39) 2 2 t-1 t-1 
Estimating and testing procedures for the DYMIMIC premium mc:del 
utilizing the Kalman filter are described below in section 2.9. 
------------------------------------------------------------------------
(6) This section follows Harvey (1981) in the specification of 
prediction, up:1ating and smoothing algorithrrs. 
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2.6 The Data and its Historical Background 
In this study month 1 y data on spot and one month forward exchange 
rates between US dollar-OK pound, French franc-OK pound, and French 
franc-US dollar (the latter constituted assuming a triangular arbitrage 
condition) for the period January 1921 to May 1925, as well as for the 
Reiciunark-sterling and Reiclunark-US dollar (computed assuming triangular 
arbitrage) for the period January 1921 to May 1924, are utilized. The 
Reiclunark-US dollar and Reiclunark-sterling are also estimated for the 
GARCli-in-MEAN process fran January 1921 to March 1923, thus truncating 
the sample to exclude a period when the mark was experiencing a very 
rapid depreciation - in effect sampling out the period of rapid German 
hyperinflation against two major currencies. 
The data are fran Einzig (1937), taking the observations for spot 
and forward rates recorded nearest the end of each month as that month's 
observation thus circumventing the problem of overlapping data. The 
data were originally taken by Einzig fran the weekly newsletter of the 
Icn:ion branch of the Anglo-Portuguese Colonial and OVerseas Bank during 
this period. 
One of the major features of the international capital markets 
during the 19205 was the high degree of risk attached to holding 
international assets. This was particularly applicable to French and 
German assets. Throughout m:st of our sample period, France ran a 
large government budget deficit which was financed by a rising national 
debt and by printing money. This to some extent reflected the French 
expectations that 'le Boche paiera' ('Germany will pay') in the form of 
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war reparations. Under the Treaty of Versailles, reparations had been 
agreed to, but their amount and timing were subject to continuous re-
negotiation during this period - thereby introducing a high degree of 
uncertainty into the public finances both of Germany and of the 
countries owed reparation by her. The collapse of the mark in 1923 and 
the relief from reparations afforded Germany under Dawes plan of 1924 
led to a depreciation of the franc and a spurt in French inflation. 
!he question then arose of heM much the public debt would be paid off by 
France and heM much would be implicitly defaulted on through 
depreciation of the franc. The period from 1924 was marked by a high 
degree of political uncertainty as a rapid succession of governments 
took office, until Poinc:are formed his goverrunent in 1926 and, following 
a succession of measures aimed at fiscal restraint, subsequently managed 
to stabi lize both the franc and the price level. In Germany, as well 
as the uncertainty induced by the unreal ist ic claims on her resources 
made at Versailles and after, the period under consideration culminated 
in hyperinflation. 
In the OK, major questions throughout this period were concerned 
with whether, when and heM the authorities would attempt to return 
sterling to the pre-war parity of $4.86. Political risk premia may 
also have been attached to sterling following the election, in December 
1924, of a Labour goverrunent. The period was also marked by rising 
unemployment, important industrial disputes and concern over the size of 
the national debt. 
Given this degree of international financial uncertainty, it is 
hardly surprising that the 'speculative efficiency' hypothesis has been 
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rejected for the foreign exchange markets under consideration for this 
period (MacDonald and Taylor, 1988b). Given that in the 1920s there 
were fewer financial instruments, therefore less opportunity for 
diversification, this essay pursues the possibility that, to the extent 
that holding forward foreign exchange is non-diversifiable, financial 
ltl'lCertainty may have resulted in agents demanding a time-varying risk 
premium in order to canpensate them for holding the forward foreign 
currency in question. 
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2.7 Testing for ~ Time Varying Risk Premium 
In this section we report some simple tests for time-varying risk 
prerni a, due to Farna. (1984) but where the standard errors were calculated 
using a heteroscedastic-consistent technique. SUch a technique 
involves estimating an average of the expected value of the n different 
variances in the canputation of the covariance matrix and replacing the 
2 2 
diagonal elements 0, by E«( 1). Such a computation requires only the 
regressors and the estimated least squares residuals as, since the 
variances and co-variances may change with each observation, the best 
estimates are just the squares and cross products of the individual 
equation residuals, which can be obtained using any consistent 
estimator, rather than the averages of these quantities across the whole 
sample (eg see White, 1980). 
Consider regression equation (2.8) again: 
k 
(St.k - St) • a + B(ft - St) + (t.k (2.8) 
and. derive the follCMing equation by subtracting St from both sides of 
equation (2.11) 
k 
(ft - St) • E(St+kl2t) - St + Pt (2.39) 
'!he regression coefficient B in (2.8) is given by 
k 
oov[(ft-St , St+k-St)] 
a • --------------------- (2.40) 
k 
Var(ft-St) 
Using equation (2.39), Farna. (1984) shows that equation (2.40) can be 
written: 
Var[E(St+kl2t)-St] + Cbv[pt,E(St+kl2t)-St] 
B • ------------------------------------------- (2.41) 
Var(Pt) + Var[E(St+kIQt)-St] + 2Cbv[Pt,E(St+kl2t)-St] 
From equation (2.41) (conditional on the maintained hyp::>thesis of 
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rational expectations) B will be equal unity if, and only if, Pt is 
constant. If Pt is time varying then B will differ from unity. 
The results of estimating regression equation (2.8) for one period 
ahead, eq: 
"1 
(St+1 - St) • a + B(ft - St) + Et+1 (2.8a) 
by OIS, are reported on Table 2.1. The test statistic employed was t Z 
where t Z• (B-1 )1, with two degrees of freedom. With the exception of 
SE(B) 
the franc-dollar and franc sterling, the hypothesis that B-1 is easily 
rejected. For franc-dollar and franc-sterling moreover, the point 
estimates of B are not all that close to unity, and it is only the very 
large estimated (heteroscedastic-consistent) standard errors which lead 
to non-rejection of the maintained hypothesis. 
Similarly the results for the truncated sample period, which are 
reported in Table 2.IA, for the Reichmark-sterlinq and Reichmark-dollar 
decisively reject the hypothesis that B-1. 
OVerall therefore, and conditional on the maintained hypothesis of 
rational expectations, it would seem that modelling risk premia for 
these data would be frui tful. 
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2.8 Test Pro:::edure and Results for the GARCH-in-MEAN Premium Model 
What follows contains a description of the test pro:::edures used and 
the results of tests for ARCH effects in the forward rate forecast 
errors. We also describe the test pro:::edure and the results of maximum 
likelihood estimates of the GARCH-in-MEAN premium model when applied to 
the 1920s data. 
Tables 2.IIA and 2.IIB report the results of tests for ARCH effects 
in the OIS residuals for equation (2.8) for both the full sample period 
for all currencies and the truncated sample period for the Reichmark-
sterling and Reichmark-dollar. 
The Lagrange multiplier test pro:::edure suggested by Engle (1982) 
was used to test for residual ARCH effects. Equation (2.8) was 
estimated by OIS and the fitted squared residuals regressed on a 
constant and twelve lagged values of the dependent variable. The TRIB 
was then tested as X. 2 • 
12 
Significant ARCH effects for the full sample period were detected 
for all exchange rates and periods estimated. They were of twelfth 
order (or greater) for dollar-sterling, of eleventh order for franc-
dollar, of tenth order for franc-sterling and of eighth order for 
Reichmark-sterling and Reichmark-dollar. In the truncated sample for 
Reichmark-sterling the ARCH effect was of the seventh order and for 
Reichmark-dollar of twelfth order (or greater). 
These results suggest at least two things. Firstly, they suggest 
that modelling the risk premium as an ARCH-in-MEAN model might be 
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successful. Secondly, they suggest that the ARClI process is likely to 
be of high order and therefore that a low order GARCli-in-MEAN mcx:iel 
might provide a more parsimonious representation. 
Tables 2.lll and 2.lllA contain the unrestricted maximum likelihood 
estimates of the GARCH-in-MEAN premium mcx:iel: 
2 
6t+1/~ --- N(O,ht ... 1 ) 
2 222 2 2 
ht+1 - 10 + 11 .. t + 12ht 
(2.42) 
(2.43) 
(2.44) 
for the full sample period and truncated sample period respectively. 
Although this mcx:iel is highly non-linear, it can be estimated by 
utilizing Schweppe's (1965) result that the likelihood function can be 
written entirely in terms of the one step ahead prediction errors and 
their conditional variances. 
Denote the vector of parameters by A.: 
i... (a , B , e , "to , "(1 ,12)' 
'Ihen ignoring the constant, the log-likelihood function for the 
system equations (2.42), (2.43) and (2.44) is : 
T 2 2 2 
log L fA) - -+ ~ (lnht + (tlht) (2.45) 
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starting values for the maximum Likelihood estimation were set as 
follows: 
a - 0 
13 - 1 
e - 0·1 
"fo • standard error of the OLS regression of equation (2.8) 
The results for the full sample are reported in Table 2.111. For 
dollar-sterling the results are reasonably supportive of the postulated 
model. The estimated risk premium coefficient, e , is significantly 
different from zero and at least one of the GARCH slope coefficients, 
12 , is also significant, ie the hypothesis that B is equal to unity 
cannot now be rejected, in contrast to the results reported in 
Table 2.1. Table 2.111 also reports results of a Wald test for the 
- 2 - 2 
GARCH slope coefficients to sum to unity, '11 + "f 2 • 1. 
Engle (1987) terms models in which restrictions of this kind hold, 
'integrated in variance' • The motivation for considering this concept 
is as follows. SUppose the restrictions hold, then we can wri te the 
one-step ahead prediction variance as 
2 222 2 2 
hh1 - "fo +1,.t + (1- '11 )ht (2.46) 
and by recursive sul:stitution, the conditional variance a further n 
steps ahead is given by: 
222 
E(hh1 ... nl~) - n 10 + ht ... 1 (2.47) 
In the case where the GARCH intercept term is zero, equation (2.47) 
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implies that the conditional variance any steps ahead is always the same 
as the conditional variance one step ahead. If, however the GARCH 
intercept is non zero, the conditional variance grows larger and larger 
- reflecting less and less confidence in the conditional forecast the 
greater the number of steps ahead considered. For the dollar-sterling 
estimates reported in Table 2.III, the' integration in variance' 
restrictions cannot be rejected and the GARCH intercept term is 
significantly different from zero. Intuitively therefore, for dollar-
sterling, the conditional variance appears to be an increasing function 
of the number of steps ahead considered. 
The results for both franc-sterling and franc-dollar are 
disappointing: in neither case are the estimated risk premium 
coefficient or the estimated GARCH slope coefficient significantly 
different from zero. The estimates for the full sample involving the 
Reichmark are, however more supportive of the GARCH-in-MEAN premhun 
mcdel. The results for the Reiclunark-dollar and Reiclunark-sterling are 
in fact qualitatively identical and quantitatively similar. In each 
case, a negative and significant risk premium is estimated and although 
the joint restrictions a-O , B-1 are in each case rejected, this is 
because of significant intercept terms - the estimates of B are in each 
case close to and insignificantly different from unity. If following 
Ihnowitz and Hakkio (1985) we interpret the risk premium as 
Pt • a + 6ht + 1 (2.48) 
then the Reiclunark results are particularly encouraging. Not only are 
the estimates of a and a in each case are strongly significantly 
different from zero, but they are of opposite signs. Since ht-+-1 can 
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only ever be positive, this allows the risk premium to change sign over 
time. For both Reichmark-sterling and Reichmark-dollar the estimate of 
12 is insignificantly different from zero - thereby indicating that a 
first order ARCH rocxiel would have been adequate. The estimates of 11 
are close to and insignificantly different from unity and the test for 
'integration in variance' is easily passed. Together with the strongly 
significant estimated conditional variance intercepts, this again 
implies increasing forecasting uncertainty as the number of periods 
ahead considered is increased. 
For the Reichmark-sterling and Reichmark-dollar estimates reported 
in Table 2.IIIA for the truncated sample, the joint restrictions a-O, 
13-1 cannot be rejected for Re ichmark-ster1 ing but is rejected in the 
Reichmark-dollar estimates. 'Integration in variance' cannot be 
rejected for either estimate and as the conditional variance intercepts 
are significant this again implies increasing forecasting uncertainty. 
Both estimates of 12 are insignificantly different from zero, indicating 
a first order ARCH rocxiel would have been adequate. The risk premium 
~er in both estimates is insignificantly different from zero. 
Ccmparing the two Reichmark samples suggests that the risk premium while 
insignificant in the truncated sample grew in importance as the sample 
period was increased. 
Overall therefore, the results of applying the GARCH-in-MEAN 
premium rocxiel to the 1920s data are sanewhat mixed. For the franc-
sterling and franc-dollar, results unsupportive of the rocxiel were 
reported. Although the results for dollar-sterling were slightly more 
supportive, a number of the coefficents are poorly determined and, in 
170 
particular, it is not clear how to interpret the fact that the estimate 
of 11 is insignificantly different from zero. Following Krasker (1980) 
however, if participants in forward markets in the 1920s perceived a 
small probabil i ty, in each pericxi, of a large change in fundamentals 
(peso problem) (7), then variables determining the rate of depreciation 
will be non-independent and will have skewed distributions. Standard t 
tests, which assume an approximation by the normal distribution, may 
therefore be invalid. The results for the Reichmark-sterling and 
Reichmark-dollar for the full sample period are, however strongly 
supportive of the model - in fact of a first order ARCH-in-MEAN premium 
model. The results for the truncated sample are again difficult to 
interpret although the forecasting errors seem to follow a simple first 
order ARCH process. 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
(7) The term 'peso problem' is derived from the early 1970s, when the 
Mexican peso was consistently traded at a forward discount on the 
expectation of a devaluation which actually occurred in .1976. 
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2.9 Test Prccedure and Results for the DYMIMIC Premium Model 
This section contains the test prccedure for and the results of the 
DYMIMIC premium model applied to the 1920s data. The first step in 
estimating the pure time series DYMIMIC premium model is to identify a 
time series (ARMA) model for the non-risk adjusted forward rate forecast 
error, (St+1-ft ). This was done for each of the exchange rates under 
consideration for the full sample period, using standard Eox-Jenkins 
techniques - ie by visual examination of the autccorrelations and 
partial autocorrelation functions for each of the series. For dollar-
sterling, this suggested an MA(2) model, while for each of the other 
exchange rates ie franc-sterling, Reichmark-sterling, franc-dollar and 
Reichmark-dollar, an ARMA(1,1) model was identified. The adequacy of 
each model was then tested by estimating each model using standard 
maximum likelihoc:d techniques; the results are reported in Table 2.IV. 
In each case the fitted model appears to characterize the forward rate 
forecast error series adequately in that the estimated coefficients are 
generally well determined and significantly different from zero and the 
Ljung-Eox statistics do not indicate the presence of residual series 
correlation. 
Since from equation (2.21) the forward rate forecast error is 
hypothesized to be the sum of the risk premium and the rational 
expectat ion forecast error, we can infer from Table 2. IV, appropriate 
time series models for the risk premium series. This is done using 
time ser i es SUI'IUTla t ion theorems (eg Granger and M::>rr is, 1976 , 
Ansley et aI, 1977) which show that the sum of a moving average process 
of any order and a white noise process yields a moving average process, 
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whilst the sum of an AR( 1) process and a white noise process yields an 
ARMA(1,1) process. Thus the results, reported in Table 2.IV, imply an 
MA(2) model for the dollar-sterling risk premium and an AR( 1) process 
for the other risk premia. 
The Kalman filter, as described in section 2.5, can now be utilized 
to yield the maximum likelihood estimates of the DYMIMIC premium model. 
Firstly the premium models must be cast into 'state space form'. 
Consider the MA(2) risk premium model suggested above for dollar-
sterling. 
This takes the form: 
which can be written in state space form as 
(St.1 - f t ) • (1 0 0) [~J + Et.1 
[Pt ] ~o ~'~21 r-' J m V  • 000 Vt-1 + Vt Vt -1 010 Vt -2 
(2.49) 
(2.50) 
(2.51) 
(2.52) 
The AR( 1) premium model is very straightforward as it is already in 
state space form: 
Pt· ~tPt-1 + Vt 
(2.53) 
(2.54) 
It remains to specify the starting values for the Kalman filter. This 
was done by setting the initial state vector and its covariance matrix 
equal to their unconditionally expected values. since equations 2.50 
and 2.54 contain no constant term, this implies that the E(pt)-O. The 
matrix 02Pt is simply the unconditional covariance matrix of Pt, 
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E(pt) which in the AR(1) case is (1_~2) and in the MA(2) case, 
2 2 
( 1 +1t 1 + 1tz). 
Table 2.V reports maximum likelihood estimates of the DYMIMIC 
premium model. They are disappointing. Only in the case of dollar-
sterling are the estimated risk coefficient parameters significantly 
different from zero. The lagrange multiplier statistics reported in 
Table 2.V reveal however, that even for dollar sterling the risk-
adjusted forecast error, .t ... 1 , sti 11 shows significant signs of ARCli 
behaviour. OVerall, therefore, there is little evidence that the 
DYMIMIC model adequately characterizes attitudes towards risk in the 
foreign exchange markets of the 1920s. 
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2.10 Conclusicn 
Starting from the observation that the speculative efficiency 
hypothesis has IlCM been decisively rejected for the interwar foreign 
exchange market, the aim of this essay was to examine al ternat i ve 
empirical !rodels of foreign exchange risk premia for this period. The 
utility of such an exercise lies in the belief that, were we able to 
find plausible and well fitting econometric premia !rodels for this 
period, this would tend to suggest that it is the failure of the 
assumption of risk neutrality, rather than rationality, which has led to 
the overall rejection of the speculative efficiency hypothesis. Using 
1920s data, we therefore provided estimates of two econometric models 
which have recent 1 y been proposed in this context - the GARCH- in-MEAN 
and DYMIMIC premium !rodels. 
Overall, the results of our estimations were disappointing. No 
satisfactory estimates of the DYMIMIC premium !rodel were obtained for 
any of the exchange rates examined. The GARCH- in-MEAN est imat ions 
yielded satisfactory results only for full sample Reichmark-sterling and 
Reichmark-ciollar, for each of which an integrated ARCH ( 1) premium model 
appeared to fit reasonably well. 
OUr empirical results may be interpreted in a number of ways. 
Firstly, it may be that the 'correct' risk premium !rodel may belong 
neither to the ARCH nor the DYMIMIC families. An alternative 
explanation for the rejection of speculative efficiency for this period 
may be that the uncertainty concerning the long-run 'fundamentals' of 
the international system meant that agents found it impossible to locate 
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the true rational expectations equilibria until the uncertainty was 
effectively ended by the return of sterling to the Gold standard in 1925 
and of the franc in 1926. Thus the presence of foreign exchange market 
b.Jbbles may be a major factor in the rejection of the speculative 
hypothesis. Rejection could also have been caused by agents' 
perceiving a non-zero probability of a shift in market fundamentals, eg 
a return to the Gold Standard, and this low probabi 1 i ty event 
influencing the actions of agents. It also may be the case that 
speculative efficiency has been rejected not because of the risk-
aversion of foreign exchange market participants, but because their 
behaviour did not conform to the rational expectations hypothesis. 
Finally as the above results suggest we are unable to assert that agents 
taking 'open' positions are risk averse, we have difficulty in 
discriminating between models of exchange rate determination solely on 
such a criterion. 
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TABIE 2.1 TESTIN3 FOR TIME VARYIN3 RISK PREMIUM-
1 
(St+, - St)· a + S(ft - St) + Et+1 
- -
Olrrency a S SEE R2 Q t2(S-1) 
Dollar- 0.006 -2.973 0.0198 0.008 24.692 3.895 
sterlinq (0.002) (2.012) (0.260) (0.048) 
Franc- 0.011 -0.185 0.0722 -0.019 22.189 0.043 
sterlinq (0.009) (5.659) (0.388) (0.834) 
Reichmark- 0.232 0.401 0.4737 0.092 15.011 4.337 
sterlinq (0.072) (0.287) (0.450) (0.037) 
Franc- -0.006 -2.024 0.0750 -0.013 1.992 0.782 
dollar (0.010) (3.419) (0.805) (0.376) 
Reichmark- 0.226 0.405 0.4748 0.093 14.287 4.277 
dollar (0.072) (0.287) (0.503) (0.038) 
-
- R2 denotes the adjusted coefficient of determination; SEE the standard error of 
the equation; Q denotes the Ljung-Bax statistic at 21 autooorrelatians except for 
exchange rates involving the Reichmark which are evaluated. at 15 autooorrelatians 
(marginal significance levels in parenthesis); t2 is the squared. t statistic for a 
test of the slope coefficient against a value of lUlity (marginal significan:::e level 
2 
in parenthesis using 112 distriootion), figures in parenthesis belai coefficient 
estimates denote estimated. standard errors calculated. using White's proced.ure for 
dealing with pcssibly hetercscedastic residuals. Estimation is for the period 
January 1921 to May 1925 for sterling-dollar, franc-dollar and franc-sterling and 
for January 1921 to May 1924 for the Reichmark-sterling and Reiclunark-dollar, bv 
OIS. 
-" ':0 
TJ\BIE 2. lA TESTIN3 F'CE TIME VARYIN3 RISK PREMIlJMe.b 
1 
(St.1 - St) - a + S(ft - St) + Et+1 
- -
CUrren:::y a S SEE R2 0(13) 
Reichmark- 0.228 0.040 0.422 -0.040 10.300 
sterling (0.074) (0.183) (0.669) 
Reichmark- 0.221 0.039 0.4217 -0.040 10.053 
dollar (0.075) (0.181 ) (0.689) 
• See note to Table 2.1. 
b Estimation is for the period January 1921 to March 1923, by OIS. 
t2(S-1) 
27.350 
(0.000) 
28.014 
(0.000) 
.... 
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TABlE 2. II TESTltU FOR AlDi Efl'n:lS-
1 
(St., - St)· a + S(ft - St) + Et+1 
2 n 2 
ht· "( 0+ 1: 'Y l E t-l i-1, ••• 12 
£-1 
.ARCH(1) .AIOI(2) .ARCH(3) AlDi(4) .ARCH(5) .AIOI(6) .ARCE(7) ARli(8) .ARCH(9) ARli(10) .AIOI( 11) AlDi(12) 
CUrrency L.M. L.M. L.M. L.M. L.M. L.M. L.M. L.M. L.M. L.M. L.M. 
Dollar- 14.940 19.420 19.129 18.538 19.628 22.343 22.199 28.152 26.376 26.074 24.897 24.387 
sterling (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001 ) (0.001) (0.002) (0.000) (0.001) (0.003) (0.009) (0.018) 
Franc- 12.097 16.278 17.878 17.965 18.693 18.556 18.878 18.546 18.555 18.565 18.653 18.674 
sterling (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.004) (0.008) (0.017) (0.029) (0.046) (0.067) (0.096) 
Reichmark- 12.747 12.486 12.497 14.542 17.731 17.179 16.950 16.625 16.226 15.604 15.612 15.340 
sterling (O.OOO) (0.001) (0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.008) (0.017) (0.034) (O.062) (0.011) (O.156) (0.223) 
Franc- 13.194 18.083 19.517 19.307 19.992 19.613 19.652 19.128 19.080 19.504 20.164 20.577 
dollar (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.003) (O.006) (0.014 (0.024) (O.034) (0.043) (0.056) 
Reichmark- 12.661 12.418 12.396 14.349 17.076 16.614 16.511 16.364 16.000 15.368 15.471 15.030 
dollar (O.OOO) (0.002) (0.006) (0.006) (0.004) (0.010) (0.020) (0.037) (0.066) (0.119) (0.161 ) (0.239) 
_.. --- ... _--
- ---- - - --- ----- --- - -- ------- ----- --- - - --
.. L.M. is the Lagrange Multiplier test under the null hypothesis of no .ARCH disturbances in the residuals; figures in 
parenthesis below the Lagrange Multiplier statistic denote marginal signi f icance levels using the X 1> distribution; See 
note to Table 2.1 for estimation periods. 
.... 
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TABIE 2.IIA 
, 
(St.1 - St) - a + S(ft - St) + EtT1 
2 n 2 
ht - "'{ 0+ 1:"'( 1 E t -1 i-1, ••• 12 
1-1 
AR:li(1) ARCH(2) MCH(3) AR:li(4) ARCli(5) 
currency L.M. L.M. L.M. L.M. L.M. 
Reichmark- 6.881 6.771 7.323 6.990 10.581 
sterling (0.008) (0.033) (0.062) (0.136) (0.060) 
Reichmark- 6.690 6.564 7.026 6.745 10.199 
dollar (0.009) (0.037) (0.071) (0.149) (0.069) 
--- -----
-_._-_.-
- --- --
- See note to Table 2. I 
b Estimation is for pericxi January 1921 to March 1923. 
ARCli(6) ARal(7) AlQI(8) AlOl(9) AlQI(10) ARal(11 ) ARal(12) 
L.M. L.N. L.M. L.M. L.N. L.M. 
10.163 10.764 13.661 13.174 13.215 13.891 13.504 
(0.117) (0.149) (0.091) (0.154) (0.211) (0.239) (0.333) 
9.822 10.171 13.251 12.721 12.833 13.571 13.501 
(0.132) (0.179) (0.103) (0.175) (0.233) (0.257) (0.338) 
.... 
00 
.... 
T]4ffiE 2. I II MAXI~ LIKELIHXJD ESTIMATES OF THE GMDi- in-ME1\N PREMIUM KXJEL& 
, 
(St~1 - St) - a + S(ft - St) + eht~1+Et+1 
2 
Et+1 1~~N(0,ht+1) 
2 222 2 2 
ht+1 - 'Y 0 + 'Y ,Et + 'Y A 
Exchange ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ". 2 2 
Rate a S e Yo "{, "(2 W(a-0,S-1) LR(a-0,S-1) W('Y1+'Y~-1 ) 
D:>llar- -0.001 -2.665 0.571 0.013 -0.004 0.749 2.352 1.273 2.146 
sterling (0.014) (3.314) (0.271) (4.9E-3) (0.222) (0.206) (0.308) (0.529) (0.142) 
Franc- 0.014 -1.593 -0.043 0.074 0.493 -0.001 1.932 1.438 8.488 
sterling (0.132) (5.418) (1.653) (0.124 ) (0.261) (0.200) (0.380) (0.487) (0.000) 
Reiclunark- 0.270 1.235 -0.335 -0.158 1.282 0.001 31.358 10.634 0.194 
sterling (0.048) (0.161) (0.106 ) (0.047) (0.259) (0.250) (0.000) (0.005) (0.659) 
Franc- 0.016 -3.590 -0.137 0.080 0.368 -0.011 3.341 2.737 27.674 
cbllar (0.213) (4.680) (2.584) (0.011) (0.228) (0.323) (0.188) (0.254) (0.000) 
Reichmark- 0.271 1.232 -0.384 -0.151 1.267 0.287 31.891 10.670 0.916 
dollar (0.048) (0.165) (0.122) (0.041) (0.245) (28.700) (0.000) (0.005) (0.338) 
-- -- - ---- --
---- - ---- --- -- --------~ 
- ------- - --
.. W(·) are Wald test statistics for the restictions given in parentheses, LR(·) are likelihood ratio statistics 
each is an asymptotically central chi-square variate under the null, with degrees of freedan equal to the number of 
restrictions; figures in parentheses belCM coefficient estimates are estimated standard errors, those belCM test 
statistics are marginal significance levels; see note to Table 2.1 for estimation periods. 
.... 
(I) 
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TABr.E 2.IIIA MAXIMUM LlKELlfDD ESTIMATES OF THE GMO:I-in-MEAN ~IUM MJDELab 
1 
CUrrency 
Reichmark-
sterling 
Reichmark-
dollar 
(St+1 - St) - a + S(ft - St) + Bht+1+Et+1 
2 
Et+11~~N(0,ht+1) 
2 _ 2 2 2 ·2 2 
ht+1 - ."to + "t1Et + "t2ht 
- - - -
a a e "to 
0.118 0.471 0.067 -0.184 
(0.122) (0.273) (0.402) (0.079) 
0.145 0.354 -0.020 0.191 
(0.088) (0.114) (0.183 ) (0.049) 
._-
-----
& See note to Table 2.111 
-
"t1 
1.079 
(0.326) 
1.248 
(0.306) 
b Estimation is for the period January 1921 to March 1923. 
-
W(a-0,a-1) 
"t2 
0.342 6.342 
(0.411) (0.043) 
0.001 33.501 
(0.614) (0.000) 
2 2 
IR(a-0,a-1) W("t 1+"{2-1) 
5.232 0.182 
(0.073) (0.668) 
6.702 0.519 
(0.030) (0.470) 
.... 
CO 
I:..) 
TABLE 2. IV FITI'ED TIME SERIES K>DELS FUR 
N:N-RISK AOOtBI'ED FCmI::AST ERRORS-
(St+,-ft ) - ~(St-ft-') + Et + e,Et _, + e 2 Et - 2 
CUrrency Fitted 
r.txiel 
" 
e, e2 Q 
J:bl1ar- MA(2) - -0.419 -0.501 15.532 
sterling (0.121 ) (0.119) (0.625) 
Franc- ARMA(1,1 ) 0.821 0.972 - 18.670 
sterling (0.091) (0,030) (0.412) 
Reichmark- ARMA(1,1) -0.560 -0.941 - 14.104 
sterling (0.171 ) (0.067) (0.366) 
Franc- ARMA(1,1) 0.545 0.739 
-
10.036 
d;)l1ar (0.351) (0.280) (0.930) 
Reichmark- ARMA(1,1) -0.608 -0.938 - 12.993 
dollar (0.183) (0.089 (0.448) 
---~ --.---~ 
--
--
- - --------- -
Impl ied Time Series 
r.txiel for Premium 
MA(2) 
AR(1 ) 
AR(1 ) 
AR(l ) 
AR(1 ) 
- Q denotes the LjUllCJ-Box statistic applied to the risk-adjusted forecast error, Et , at 21 
autocorrelations, except for exchange rates involving the Reichmark which are evaluated at 15 
autocorrelations; figures in parenthesis denote marginal significance levels for the LjUllCJ-BaK 
statistics and asymptotic standard errors for the coefficient estimates: See Table 2.1 for 
estimaticm pericxis. 
~ 
(0 
~ 
TAmE 2. V MAXIKJM LIKELIlIXD ESTIMATE:) OF '!HE 
DYMINIC PREMIUM MJIEL-
(St+1-ft ) - Pt + Et+1 
Pt - ~-1 + Vt + ~1Vt-1 + ~2Vt-2 
D.lrrency Fitted Time 
- -
Ser ies M:xie I }.l ~1 
I:bllar- MA(2) - 1.013 
sterling (0.413) 
Franc- AR(1 ) -0.034 -
sterling (0.130) 
Reiclunark- AR(1 ) 0.107 -
sterling (0.128) 
Franc- AR(1 ) -0.175 
-
c:bllar (0.106) 
Reichmark- AR(1 ) 0.096 -
dollar (0.122) 
-
~2 
1.962 
(0.476) 
-
-
-
-
AlDl( 1) AlDl(6) AlDl(12) 
Q IJ( IJ( IM 
28.936 16.007 25.241 18.088 
(0.115) (0.000) (0.3E-3) (0.113) 
17.318 4.507 6.069 13.320 
(0.691) (0.033) (0.415) (0.346) 
13.667 10.785 13.403 14.949 
(0.550) (0.1E-2) (0.037) (0.244) 
11.993 2.287 2.376 17.678 
(0.939) (0.130) (0.881) (0.125) 
12.821 10.870 12.761 14.312 
(0.618) (0.9E-3 (0.046) (0.281) 
- Q denotes the Ljung-Box statistic applied to the risk-adjusted forecast error, Et , at 21 
autocorrelations, except for exchange rates involving the Reiclunark which are evaluated at 15 
autocorrelations: figures in parenthesis denote marginal significance levels for the Ljunq-Bax 
statistics and asymptotic standard errors for the coefficient estimates; See Table 2.1 for 
estimaticn periocls. 
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3.1 Introduction 
'!he origins of the purchasing paoler parity view of the 
international econany can be traced to the floating pound of the English 
'Bank Restriction Period' of 1797 to 1827. During this period the 
financial turbulence associated with the French Wars of 1793-1815 had 
resulted in disarray of the English monetary system and consequently, 
suspension of the gold convertibility of Bank of England notes. 
Wheatley, the early nineteenth century economist, argued that exchange 
rate fluctuations were exclusively due to domestic price changes, 
therefore the Bank of England, via credit policy, could control prices 
and by implication, exchange rates (eg see Viner, 1937). Thus the 
'Bullionist Controversy', which was concerned with the principles 
underlying the operation of the English monetary system, can be 
recognized as the seedbed of the concept of purchasing p:lWer parity as 
we know it today. It is generally accepted however that Gustav Cassel 
was first to arrange the concept into an organized framework. As early 
as 1916 Cassel had expressed the notion of a 'theoretical rate of 
exchange' (Cassel, 1916, p64) in terms of indices of prices, and by the 
early 1920s the purchasing paoler parity theorem had become operational 
in the sense that the concept could be used as a measure for calculat ing 
the equilibrium rate of exchange. Indeed the motivation for the 
development of the concept was its use as a foundation for the 
reconstruction of the world economy after the Great War of 1914-1918 and 
the expected return to the Gold Standard. Put in its simplest terms 
the purchasing ~r parity doctrine suggests that the value of 
currencies can be determined by what they buy. Hence in equilibrium 
the exchange rate should be such that we are able to buy an ident ical 
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bundle of COIlUOCXiities in any country for the same amount of currency. 
We would argue, however, that purchasing power parity is 
essentially a rnicroeconanic phenomenon which can be expressed as a 
theory of arbi trage. For example, if the price of a good in country A 
is greater than the price of the identical gcx:xi in country B divided by 
the foreign price of a unit of danestic currency, cal~ity arbitrage 
will take place until all profitable opportunities are exploited, ie 
until, 
B 
A PJ. 
PJ. • -- for all i • 1, ... n (3.1) 
S 
A B 
where Pi is the price of good i in country A, Pi is the price of good 
i in country BandS is the spot exchange rate, defined as the foreign 
price of danestic currency. Such a belief is appropriately referred to 
as the' law of one price', and can be thought of as being an equality 
that holds when economic agents involved in international cornrnodity 
arbitrage are efficient in exploiting all known profitable 
opportunities. In practice however, even if we asswne efficient 
arbitrage, equation (3.1) will not hold exactly. The existence of-
transaction costs will create a 'neutral band' within which arbitrage 
5-Olld be unprofitable. The doctrine also assumes there are no 
artificial restrictions on trading, eg tariff and non tariff barriers, 
and that arbitrageurs have perfect information. Commodity arbitrage 
can therefore be thought of as the mechanism by which convergence to the 
purchasing power parity condition is attained. 
The vehicle via which such arbi trage takes place depends upon 
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whether the exchange rate in evidence is fixed or flexible. If the 
exchange rate is fixed, then the price of good i will rise in country B 
and fall in country A as a result of the effect of commodity arbitrage 
on the forces of demand and supply for the good. Such movements will 
continue until the law of one price holds. Conversely, if the exchange 
rate is flexible then the pressure to convert the currency of country A 
into the currency of country B will result in country A's currency 
depreciating (S falls). 'Ihus the exchange rate regime determines how 
the adjustment to the law of one price takes place. '!his study will be 
concerned with purchasing power parity where the legal arrangements in 
force allow exchange rates to be flexible. 
Although purchasing parity as a theory of exchange rate 
determination has its roots in the distant past, it has not however 
beccrne obsolete with the passage of time. As discussed in the 
introduction to this thesis, purchasing power parity remains a 
cornerstone in the analysis of exchange rate determination in its role 
as the major equilibrium condition in asset-type models of exchange rate 
determination. While scme models acknowledge that prices are 'sticky', 
it is assumed that eff icient CCXtGtooi ty arbi trage wi 11 ensure that in the 
long-run, prices will be equated via a conunon currency. 
Many empirical studies exist which attempt to test variants of 
purchasing power parity (relative and al:::solute) and it is generally 
accepted that substantial short-run deviations from purchasing power 
parity occur (eg Frenkel, 1981, Kravis et aI, 1975). More recently 
however there has been debate amongst economists as to the extent to 
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which such deviations from the equilibrium condition can be considered 
transitory (eg see Taylor, 1988d). SUch implications are far reaching. 
If purchasing power par i ty holds in the long-run, then the fundamental 
value of a currency, and by implication the demand for that currency, 
will be determined by a currency's domestic purchasing power. The 
exchange rate is assigned the task of balancing the current account of 
the balance of payments. However if long-run purchasing power parity 
is rejected, then the implication is that there is no tendency for the 
current account to balance. Taylor (1988d) notes that the imbalance 
'represents a continually shifting pattern of international 
wealth with some countries growing increasingly rich and others 
becoming increasingly impoverished' 
Taylor, 1988d, p 4. 
Such a conclusion arises from the consideration that imbalances on 
the current account represent changes in a country's net wealth since 
they are the obverse of flCMS through the capital account of the balance 
of payments. Thus from the viewpoint of national income and 
expenditure, if a country is in persistent current account deficit, this 
is ident icall y equal to an excess of nat ional expendi ture over nat ional 
income. As hcme investors will only add to their stock of external 
assets if the exchange rate is expected to depreciate (requiring a 
persistent current account surplus), persistent deficit will lead to a 
reduction in the net external assets amed by the country's residents. 
This implies that a country can only add to its external net assets to 
the extent that it has an equivalent persistent current account surplus. 
Such an analysis highl ights the importance of long-run purchasing power 
par i ty part icular 1 y for a small, very open, economy as the Uni ted 
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Kingdom, where internationally traded goods play an important part in 
the domest ic economy. 
!he objective of this essay is to provide further tests of 
purchasing power parity by analysis of the law of one price using 
disaggregated data. By doing so we circumvent the data problems 
referred to by Aizenmann (1984) who argues that whi le the law of one 
price may hold for individual goods, it may not do so in aggregate 
because of differences in national consumption patterns. Changes in 
relative prices would therefore result in observed deviations from 
purchasing power parity. Hence the use of aggregate data may result in 
reject ing purchasing power parity when it is in fact true (ie the true 
significance levels of statistical tests may be much larger than the 
naninal levels). As disaggregated data is most likely to obey the law 
of one price, the power of a test under the null hypothesis that law of 
one price does not hold, is high. Moreover, by testing the law of one 
price we are investigating the central tenet of purchasing power parity 
in the form of the microeconamic foundations of what is a macroeconomic 
postulate. 
'!his study will use disaggregated data for thirty-five industries 
to test the long-run law of one price between the US and UK, during the 
latter half of the 1970s. This period is particularly difficult to 
analyse because of the effects of supply shocks on the UK economy. 'Ihe 
period under consideration, (1975-1980), saw North Sea oil coming on 
stream, a large increase in the OPEX: oil price and the onset of a tight 
nonetary policy, all of which had their effect on the exchange rate. 
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Because of the 'noise' in the data, and the need to abstract from this 
noisy envirorunent, we use a recently developed econometric technique 
developed by Granger (1986) and Engle and Granger (1987). Essentially 
the methodology focuses on long-run relationships, studying the 
cointegration of economic variables by analysing the time series 
properties of the data to determine whether deviations from the law of 
one price exhibit mean reverting behaviour. 
The remainder of this essay will be set out as follows: section 3.2 
discusses the relationship between the law of one price and purchasing 
power parity in both their absolute and relative forms highlighting some 
issues in measurement; sect ion 3.3 consists of a survey of the methods 
employed in testing purchasing power parity, section 3.4 describes 
cointegration, its application to purchasing power parity and the test 
procedure used in this study; section 3.5 describes the data; 3.6 
reports the empirical evidence while section 3.7 concludes. 
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3.2 The Purchasing Power Parity Theorem 
In its absolute form the purchasing power parity condition states: 
• 
s - Pi - Pi i - 1 ••• n (3.2) 
where s is the logarithm of the spot exchange rate (foreign price of 
cianestic currency), Pi is the logarithm of the price of gcxx1 i and an 
asterisk denotes a foreign variable. Therefore, when a.l:solute 
purchasing power parity holds, domestic prices are identical to foreign 
currency prices adjusted for the exchange rate. When all prices in 
equation (3.2) are summed, using identical weights for each country's 
price level and assuming no trading imperfections exist, absolute 
purchasing power parity holds, ie 
n .. n 
S • ~ alPi - ~ alPt (3.3) 
i-1 i-1 
'lI< 
where the set of weights, llii - llii. Arbitrage will ensure that 
domestic and foreign prices are equalized, at least in the long-run, in 
a common currency. The central notion behind such arbitrage being that 
deviation from parity, with flexible exchange rates, will represent 
profitable arbitrage opportunities which will force the exchange rate 
towards its purchasing power parity value where the spot exchange rate 
is equated with the ratio of domestic to foreign prices. 
Relative as opposed to absolute purchasing power parity requires 
that the exchange rate and prices are expressed in ra.tes of change, ie 
... 
s - Pi - Pi (3.4) 
where· represents rate of change. 
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Equation (3.4) states that the percentage change in domestic prices 
will be offset by an equal opposite percentage change of the spot 
exchange rate. In practice, the exchange rate and prices are measured 
relative to some base period when absolute purchasing p:jWer parity was 
thought to hold. Therefore summing all prices in equation (3.4) we 
obtain 
n • j n j 
St.b • ~ 01Pt.b - ~ 01Pt.b (3.5) 
j-1 :1-1 
where St. b is the logar i thm of the spot exchange rate in per iod t 
relative to its value in the base period b, Pt.b is the logarithm of the 
price index based in period b. An asterisk denotes a foreign variable. 
Equation (3.5) states that if relative prices change in the 
danestic economy between the base period b, and time t, the exchange 
rate wi 11 change in the opposite direction by an equal percentage rate. 
There are of course many issues involved in the calculation of the 
purchasing power parity condition, not least of which is the price index 
issue. As suggested above, in order to prevent introducing bias into 
the calculations of purchasing power parity, the price indices of the 
countries under consideration should ideally be canpiled using identical 
weights. However, if we consider that countries may have different 
speeds of adjustment to external stimuli, due to differences in 
industrial structure, then in aggregate data this wi 11 be reflected in 
price indices being constructed with different weights. For example, 
if we consider a set of weights, say in equation (3.6) below, where 
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n .. no 
s· ~ SLPl - ~ 01Pl (3.6) 
1-1 >.-1 
but where ~1 t'DlL, we find 
n * no n • 
s· ~ SLPl - ~ 01Pl + ~ (01 - Sl)P] (3.7) 
1-1 1-1 1-1 
or 
.". 
s-p -p+u (3.8) 
Where the disturbance term, u, represents the net effect of differential 
adjustment speeds between countries over time and will be correlated 
with the nominal exchange rate, resulting in an error-in-equation model. 
'!he use of disaggregated data bypasses this problem, as typically 
similar industries will exhibit similar behavioural patterns-over time 
(Webster 1987). We return to this issue below in section 3.5, where we 
discuss the data used in this study. Addi t ionall y, an index based on 
only traded goods is often argued to be no more than a tautology even 
although the weights used in its compilation are identical. Keynes 
(1930) for example, argues that it is close to a truism to calculate 
purchasing power parity fran an index heavily weighted with traded 
goods. 'Ibe price of an identical good in the trading partners country 
must be the same when the domestic currency price of the good is 
converted into foreign currency price by the exchange rate prevailing at 
that time. Keynes notes that as trade weighted indices do contain sane 
non-traded goods, and that weighting systems are not identical 
'there has been just that degree of discrepancy in the 
'verifications' to make the theory seem prima facie interesting' 
Keynes, 1930, p 73-74. 
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Problems also arise with the use of a price index which has a more 
general weighting of traded and non-traded goods. Balassa (1964) for 
example, argues that in a relatively high incane economy, productivity 
will also be higher and that this will be concentrated in the domestic 
traded goods sector of the economy. Hence there will be a divergence 
of the price ratio of non-traded to traded goods between economies, the 
ratio being greater in the domestic high income economy than that in the 
foreign lower income economy. If the exchange rate is calculated from 
general price indices this will result in the value of the domestic 
currency being lower than its long-run equilibrium value as determined 
by relative domestic prices of traded goods. Even if productivity 
growth is unbiased, if the income elasticity for non-traded goods is 
greater than one, then the relative price of non-traded goods will 
increase with income. Thus bias can be introduced from the demand as 
well as the supply side when calculating purchasing power parity. 
(Genberg, 1978, and Hallwood and MacDonald, 1986). 
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3.3 Methodological Survey 
Whi le many studies exist to test the val idi ty of purchasing power 
parity (eg see Officer, 1976, pp 33-51, for a survey), MacDonald and 
Taylor (1989b) in their survey of evidence on international parity 
conditions, emphasize the differing approaches used in empirical work to 
test purchasing power parity. SUch a philosophy is particularly 
relevant for this study for two reasons. Firstly, as there is a 
massive literature on the empirical validity of purchasing power parity 
to which one section of this thesis would be unable to do justice, such 
an emphasis ensures a parsimonious representation of existing empirical 
evidence. Secondly, the innovation in this study is the use of 
industrial data which is analysed using a recently developed econometric 
technique - cointegration - thus a review of approaches used to date can 
perhaps be useful as it highl ights the nature of the exist ing work on 
purchasing power parity. We shall follow MacDonald and Taylor in 
considering a fourway classification of the approaches used in empirical 
studies. 
Firstly, purchasing power parity has been viewed as a theory of 
arbi trage, using disaggregated data. lsard (1977) tests the law of one 
price at the most disaqqregated level possible for OS, German and 
Japanese manufacturing prices for the period 1970-1975, concluding that 
the law of one price fails to hold. He suggests that the relative 
price effects of exchange rate changes 
'cannot be shrugged off as transitory' 
lsard, 1977, p 942. 
Isard concludes that goods exhibit behaviour more akin to differentiated 
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products rather than near perfect substitutes, exchange rate changes 
resulting in relative price changes between the countries concerned. 
Kravis and Lipsey (1978) provide further evidence refuting the law 
of one price. Using indices of US price ccxnpetitiveness relative to 
Germany (as measured by the ratio of German export price indicies to US 
export price indicies) from 1964-1973, they found for the six industries 
in the sample, that there were substantial shifts in German/US relative 
export prices and that these relative price changes were persistent. 
Brenton and Parikh (1987) test the law of one price in both the short-
run and long-run, at various levels of aggregation, for UK imports from 
six West European countries for the years 1961-1982 (reclassified where 
required). The authors refuted the law of one price at the most 
disaggregated level when using price data but found a long-run 
proportional relationship when using unit value trade data at the 
aggregate 2-digit and 3-digit levels of the Standard International Trade 
Classification. The apparent anomaly in the results was explained by 
the reflect ion in the uni t value indices of quality and other non-pr ice 
characteristics as well as prices themselves. Thus the long-run 
proportionality of price, (as measured by unit value indices) is argued 
by Brenton and Parikh to indicate random movements in prices around a 
slody moving 'quality' effect. Such evidence on the ccmnodity 
arbitrage notion of purchasing power parity would suggest that 
international ccxnpetition and high product substitutability are 
conditions necessary to attain the law of one price even under perfect 
international arbitrage. 
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Wel:ster (1987) tests relative purchasing pcMer parity as a theory 
of internat ional arbi trage in manufactured goods between the OK and US 
from 1975 to 1980. The Webster methodology involves specifying dynamic 
adjustment equations for each industry in the sample of the form: 
A .. A A 
Pjt • aj ~ Bjt-. Pjt-.+ ~Ajt-. et-.+ ~ 8jt-.Tjt-.+Ujt (3.9) 
.. -0 _-0 ... -0 
where Tj is the change (ad valorem) in the OK import tariff for the jth 
industry. Ujt the disturbance term, p. is the proportionate change in US 
prices and e is the exchange rate. Estimation was from a general to 
specific model following the methodology of Hendry (1983). By testing 
the joint restrictions 
A A 
~ ~ pj/c) pj .t-. • and l:a pj~et_ .. • 1 (3.10) 
.. -0 a.-o 
he finds that the data are consistent with relative purchasing power 
parity at 90 percent confidence level for only one industry. If raised 
to 99 percent confidence level then relative purchasing pcMer parity 
cannot be rejected in only five industries. The evidence gives little 
support for relative purchasing power parity. 
Secondly, if the real exchange rate is defined as 
(3.11) 
where Ct is the logarithm of the real exchange rate, St is the spot 
exchange rate and Pt. relative prices, then according to al:solute 
purchasing pcMer parity, the real exchange rate Ct should be independent 
of the nominal exchange rate. MacDanald and Taylor (1989b) present 
evidence of the movements in nominal and real exchange rates between the 
UK-US and Germany-US country pairs from the mid 1970s to mid 1980s. 
The evidence indicates that during this period nominal and real exchange 
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rates moved together. This supports evidence presented by others 
(eg see lX:>rnbusch and Krugman, 1978), indicating that the exchange rate 
may be driven by factors other than prices, eg interest rates and real 
national income. If prices are inflexible hCMever we would expect to 
see an interdependence between real and nominal exchange rates. 
Thirdly, purchasing power parity has been tested by regression 
analysis. Frenkel (1978) tests absolute purchasing power parity by 
forming 
(3.12) 
where St, Pt and Pt denote the exchange rate and domestic and foreign 
price indices, and tests the relative version of purchasing power parity 
by estimating 
.. ,. 
St-a - b '&Pt + b'&pt + V t 
.. 
where if purchasing power parity holds a-a, b-b-1. 
(3.13) 
For the interwar experience of floating exchange rates (1921-1925) 
for US-UK, France-UK currencies, using wholesale, material and food 
price indices, he was unable to reject purchasing power parity in both 
its absolute and relative forms, ie equations (3.12) and (3.13). 
Both Frenkel (1981) and Krugman (1978) however find the evidence 
from such regressions less supportive of purchasing power parity for the 
recent float, deviations from purchasing power parity being large and 
persistent. 
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MacDonald and Taylor (1989b) however, criticise the use of 
equations (3.12) and (3.13) as failing 
'to capture the interrelationships between bilateral foreign 
exchange rates, which have been such a feature of the recent and 
interwar periods' 
MacDonald and Taylor, 1989b, p 28. 
They argue that such equations do not capture the serial 
correlation present across countries. Hakkio (1984) however estimates 
equation (3.12) for the period July 1973 to December 1982 by non linear 
three stage least squares to account for across country serial 
correlation. Using the CPI and OK, Canadian, French and Japanese 
currencies against the dollar, Hakkio reports an estimate of the 
coefficient b that is statistically significant and close to unity. 
All of the first order autocorrelation coefficients however are also 
close to unity, indicating that unit roots may be present in the real 
exchange rate series. This would deny the time-invariant expectations 
of the real exchange rate in that there ~ld be no tendency for the 
exchange rate to return to an equil ibrium value. lsard (1987) notes 
that 
'it seems impossible to devise a statistical test that could verify 
the hypothesis of time-invariant expectations about the long-run 
level of the real exchange rate. 
lsard, 1987, p 5 
This brings us to the fourth way of testing purchasing power parity 
which entails the examination of the time series properties of the real 
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exchange rate (ie deviations from purchasing power parity). Such a 
rnetho::1ology involves characterizing real exchange rates by testing for 
random walk behaviour. Adler and Lehmann (1983) derive a 'martingale 
model of purchasing power parity deviations' where martingale behaviour 
of real exchange rates indicates, 
'a stochastic process in which successive increments are 
lUlpredictable' • 
Adler and Lehmann, 1983, p 1472. 
The Adler and Lehmann lOOdel is derived as follows: 
it - the nominal rate of interest from t to t+1 
-r t - expected value of the real interest rate from t to t+1, based on 
information at t-1 
-1tt - expected inflation rate from t to t+1, based on the information 
at t-1 
1tt - actual inflation rate 
-St •. expected percentage rate in the exchange rate from t to t+1, 
based on information at t-1 
St - actual exchange rate change from t to t+1 
I t - 1 - information available at end of time t-1 
* • denotes a foreign currency 
Consider the Fisher equations for home COlUltry households 
i-re + It- (3.14) 
(3.15) 
and for foreign country households 
(3.16) 
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(3.17) 
and assuming the di fference between ex-ante interest rates is 
constant ( 1 ) 
(3.18) 
If either bond can be traded internationally, then given equation (3.18) 
and using equation (3.14) and (3.16), we get 
• -. • 
'Itt • 'Itt + St + const ant (3.19) 
If we further suppose agents in both bond markets and foreign exchange 
markets formulate their expectations rationally, then 
• -
where E(.tIIt-1) • 0 and E(.tIIt-,) • 0 
and 
.. 
where 
E(Utllt-,) • 0 
-. 
- (3.20) 
(3.21) 
Equations (3.20) and (3.21) allow us to transfer equation (3.19) into: 
.. .. 
(3.22) 
.. 
where (et - et + utII t - 1 ) • 0 , or 
... 
(3.23) 
(1) Adler and I.ehmann (1983) argue that such an assumption is a 
reasonable approximation to the empirical regularity that innovations in 
real interest rates have smaller variances than innovations to inflation 
rates. 
202 
where Yt in equation (3.23) is the percentage change in the real 
exchange rate - the purchasing power parity innovation. 
Given the conditional expected value of Yt • 0 (given the 
information at t-1), then, 
n. 
Yt· ~ b 1Yt-1+ v t 1-' 
(3.24) 
and the sum of the b's should be insignificantly different from zero, ie 
(3.25) 
Thus while the traditional long-run purchasing power parity 
hypothesis predicts serial correlation in the innovations to the real 
exchange rate, the martingale model predicts that innovations to the 
real exchange rate wi 11 be random thus unpredictable, with no tendency 
for the deviations from purchasing power parity to be mean reverting. 
Adler and Lehmann (1983) using monthly and annual data for periods of 
both fixed and flexible exchange rates for a variety of countries 
"dem:mstrated that 
'deviations from purchasing power parity reveal a remarkably and 
possibly startling consistency with martingale behaviour' 
Adler and U3hmann, 1983, p 1471. 
'Ihus the key difference between the traditional view and the 
martingale model is that with the latter purchasing power parity is 
expected to hold ex-ante, ie 
- .. -
& St • &Pt ... , - & Pt ... , (3.26) 
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where the expected change in the exchange rate (foreign price of 
domestic money) reflects the expected change in the inflation 
differential between foreign and domestic countries - deviations from 
equation (3.26) exhibiting stationary behaviour. (2) 
Recent work by Engle and Granger (1987) on the cointegration of 
economic variables is ideally suited to testing such a hypothesis and 
has been used by Taylor and M::Mahon (1988) to present evidence of long-
run purchasing power parity during the 1920s float. Their results are 
generally supportive of purchasing power parity as a long-run 
equilibrium condition between major currencies during this period, with 
the exception of the dollar-sterling exchange rate. They explain this 
anomaly in terms of dominance of speculatative behaviour during the 
period immediately preceding Britain's return to the Gold Standard. 
Cointegration and its application to purchasing power parity will 
be discussed belCH. 
------------------------------------------------------------------------
(2) There is a considerable amount of empirical evidence in favour of 
ex-ante purchasing power parity, ie that the change in the real exchange 
rate follows a random walk. Frenkel (1981), Darby (1980), Mishkin 
(1984) and MacDanald (1985a, 1985b), find evidence in favour of the 
concept. 
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3.4 Cointegration and Purchasing Power Parity 
Principle of Cointegratic:n 
The idea underlying cointegration is the specification of models 
that attempt to capture the belief rooted in econanic theory that in the 
long run certain pairs of variables should not diverge fran each other 
by too great an extent. (Granger, 1986). Thus cointegration can re 
thought of as representing the practical application of the principle of 
a long-run relationship where there is a tendency to recover equilibrium 
after a disturbance (Engle and Granger, 1987). 
The principle of cointegration has as its key element the concept 
of covariance stationarity. If we consider a covariance stationary 
time series, X1 , X2 X3 ••• XT , the series will have a mean and the 
series will tend to fluctuate around the mean, crossing that value 
frequently, with few extensive excursions. Autocorrelations will 
decline rapidly as the lag increases. Thus, on average over time: 
( i ) each observat ion has the same mean: 
t-1. .. T 
(ii) each observation has the same variance: 
t-1 .•• T 
(ii i) the covariance between any two elements in the series is a 
function only of their distance apart, s: 
2 
OJV E[ (xt-x) (xt -_ -xl] - 0_ t rs and t, s-1 ••. T 
where E in (i), (ii) and (iiil is the expectations operator. 
Thus the time series Xt will have inherent mean reverting 
205 
(3.27a) 
(3.27b) 
(3.27c) 
properties, the generating process being such that the mean, variance 
and covariance of the series Xt are independent of time. 
non-stationary series has no tendency for mean reversion. 
COnversel y a 
Figure 3.1 displays the characteristics of a stationary series, 
figure 3.2 the characteristics of a borderline non-stationary series, 
and figure 3.3, a non-stationary series. 
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FIGURE 3.1 
x 
FIGURE 3.2 
x 
FIGURE 3.3 
t 
STATIONARY SERIES 
t 
aJRDERLINE ~-STATIONARY SERIES 
~-STATIONARY SERIES 
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If we consider an (n+1 }th order autoregression model, M(n), 
(3.28) 
the process generating Xt is said to be non-stationary if the sum of the 
coefficients on Xt-n is greater than one, ie if 
n 
~ 13 1 > 1 
i-1 
(3.29) 
the model will be explosive, the past being more important than the 
present. The process generating Xt will be borderline non-stationary 
if 
n 
~ 13 1 • 1 (3.30) 
i-1 
the process having a unit root, thus the past having the same weight as 
the present. The process generating Xt will be stationary if 
n (3.31) 
1-1 
the present being more important than the past, thus the long-run value 
of Xt will settle down to the mean value of the process ie, 
130 
x • (3.32) 
where in the long-run Xt - Xt 
Dickey and Fuller (1981) provide a test for stationarity of the 
series by considering the (n+1)th order autoregressive representation of 
Xt in equation (3.28) which can be reparameterized as 
8Xt • 130 + (n~1131 - 1) Xt -1 
i-1 
( ~+~) 8Xt -1 
1-2 i' 
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-( ~+~) 
1-3 
"-which is of the form 
... n 
~Xt • 10 + 11Xt-1 + ~ "i1 t\Xt-n + Vt 
1-1 
... 
where .1Xt • (Xt -Xt-1) and "i1 • (1-l:B,), 
... 
using as the test statistic the coefficient on Xt -1 , ie "(1 • 
... 
(3.33) 
Therefore, if 11 • 0 , this is equivalent to l:B1 - 1. Thus we require 
the coefficient on Xt -1 to be negative and significantly different from 
zero in order to preclude a unit root. The test statistic does not 
however have a t-distribution but is related to likelihood ratio test 
(eg see Dickey and Fuller, 1981 who also provide tables of 
significance) • 
If a series becomes stationary after differencing d times, the 
series is said to be integrated to the order d, (I(d». Thus following 
Engle and Granger (1987) a series which is I(O) is itself stationary. 
A necessary but not sufficient condition for cointegration is that 
t~ ser ies are integrated of the same order. If 
(3.34) 
and if Xt-I(O) and Yt-I(1), then the two series have different 
temporal properties, thus the value of B is likely to be zero. If Xt 
and Yt are both I(1), a situation frequently found in macroeconomics, 
then generally the linear combination of these series will also be I(1). 
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If the linear combination of the series is I (0) however, then there must 
exist some scalar or cointegrating factor, which acts as a constraint on 
the long-run components of the two series. Xt and Yt will therefore 
have a special relationship which ensures the two series do not tend to 
drift apart without bound - ie they are cointegrated. 
With respect to the law of one price, this 'special relationship' 
can be expressed as 
(3.35) 
where St is the logarithm of the nominal exchange rate and Pt is the 
logarithm of relative prices 
where 
(3.36) 
and gt measures the extent to which St and Pt have deviated from long-
run equilibrium. If however, prices and exchange rates are not related 
in any absolute sense, but in a relative sense, where it is the 
percentage change in relative prices and exchange rates that are 
equal ised in the long-run, ie 
at • 5 + Pt (3.37) 
where 6 is a constant, representing structural differences between 
economies - tariffs, non-tariff barriers and market imperfections, it 
follows that deviations from absolute parity, gt, will be observed with 
measurement error. If we give this empirical content, we find 
gt - 5 + f t (3.38) 
where f t is the non-systematic measurement error. If we assume f t is 
stationary, ie I(O), gt should also be I(O) (eg see Taylor and McMahon, 
1988). This suggests that long-run proportionality between exchange 
rates and relative prices may not be a one to one relationship, hence 
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the long-run relationship expressed by equation (3.35) should be 
satisfied for any value of B, not only B-1. 
To summarize, long-run equilibrium economic relationships are 
C'OItfX)Sed of impulses felt long ago plus changes in these impulses over 
time, the latter obscuring long-run information which the data may hold. 
Iile way of abstracting from short-run deviations and to test for long-
run equilibrium relationships is to test the observed deviations for 
stationarity. Unless deviations tend to settle down, long-run 
relationships, such as that suggested by the law of one price, wi 11 be 
hard to justify. If the variables under examination are non-
stationary, having the same temporal properties, but there exists a 
linear combination where the deviations are stationary, the two series 
are said to be cointeqrated and a long-run equilibrium relationship 
exists. 
Test Procedures 
In this study we are concerned with the case where' d - 1, ie the 
series in question contains a single unit root. The test procedure was 
executed as follars: 
Firstly, the series St and series Pt for each industry in the sample 
were tested to see if they were integrated to the same order, ie both 
1(1). Thus following Dickey and Fuller (1981), the following 
regressions were formed: 
n 
~St - a + B1St-1 + ~ Bl ~St-l + Vt 
1-1 
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(3.39) 
n 
~Pt • 'Y + A1Pt-1 + 1: At L\Pt-1 + Ut (3.40) 
where n is chosen so that the residual series, Vt and Ut, are empirical 
white noise. The test statistics are the ratio of 8, and)." to their 
calculated standard error (the Dickey Fuller (DF) statistic if a first 
order autoregressive model is appropriate - as judged by the whiteness 
of the residuals - or the Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) statistic if a 
higher order autoregression is required to achieve white noise). The 
null hypotheses are 
Ho: St-- 1(1) and Ho : Pt- I(1} 
They are rejected if 8 1 and A. 1 have large negative values and thus 
preclude a unit root. 
Unit root tests were also applied to the first differences of the 
exchange rate series (St) and the relative price series (Pt). This 
test takes the form of a canplement to the above test for stationarity. 
If a series is 1(1) in levels, this will be cancelled out on first 
differencing. The following regressions were therefore formed and 
tested for non-stationarity. 
n 
L\2st • a + B1L\St-1 + 1: 8 1 L\2St-l + Vt 
1-1 
n 
.1.~ • 'Y + A.1~Pt-1 + 1: 1.1.2 Pt-1 + Ut 
1-1 
(3.41) 
(3.42) 
where as before, n was selected to ensure empirical white noise and the 
null hypothesis constructed to test non-stationarity of the exchange 
rate series and price series for all the industries in the sample. 
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If the hypothesis that St and Pt are both 1(1) cannot be rejected, 
the cointegration regression is then formed: 
St • a + apt + £t (3.43) 
and the residuals £ t are tested to see if they appear to be I (0) • As 
discussed earlier in this section, economic theory will not always 
suggest an exact value for a in equation (3.43), it is therefore 
necessary to test whether cointegration (ie a long-run stable 
relationship) is satisfied for any value of a. stock (1984) has shown 
that when two series are cointegrated, a highly efficient estimator of 
the cointegrating factor, B, can be obtained from the cointegrating 
regression itself (equation (3.43». Stock shows that the om 
estimator in a regression of cointegrated variables will have a variance 
O(T-2), where T is the sample size, whereas in the usual case the om 
estimator gives an estimate of B with a variance O(T- 1 ). The estimate 
of a in equation (3.43) is therefore 'super consistent' if the series St 
and Pt are cointegrated. Therefore, as om minimizes the residual 
variance, for values of a other than the cointegrating factor the 
residuals in equation (3.43) will have asymptotic infinite variance. 
The next step in the procedure is to subject the residuals from the 
industries found to be integrated to the same order as the exchange rate 
to tests for stationarity. The hypothesis for non-cointegration is 
therefore: 
Ho : £t- 1(1) 
'The tests of the null hypothesis are based on two statistics. 
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Firstly, the following regression is formed 
n 
.1~ - a + 8 1 Rst - 1 + l: lh .1Rst - 1 + V t (3.44) 
1-1 
where R represents the fitted residuals from equation (3.43) and n is 
chosen to approximate white noise. The null hypothesis (ie the 
residuals in equation (3.43) containing a unit root) is rejected if 81 
in equation (3.44) has a large negative value. However testing for a 
uni t root in the residuals of the cointegrating regressions requires the 
critical values to be raised (Engle and Granger, 1987). Since OLS 
chooses 8 in equation (3.43) to minimize residual variance, it might be 
expected that we reject the null hypothesis of I(1) residuals rather 
more often than is suggested by the nominal test size. We therefore 
raise the critical values to correct the test bias. 
A further test for unit roots in the 015 residuals from (3.43) is 
to test the Durbin Watson (OW) statistic from equation (3.43) against 
the value of zero. Since DW • 2(1-P), and P is the first order 
autocorrelation coefficient, ow-O when P -1. Such a test provides a 
useful complement to the two step procedure outlined above. Engle and 
Granger (1987) report tables of critical values for the OW statistic 
from the cointegrating regression generated by Monte carlo methods. (3 ). 
Additionally, following the aJ:::ove procedure, Durbin Watson tests 
and tests of the residuals from the cointegrating regression normalized 
en the relative price series Pt were carried out. The following 
(3) Simulation experiments whereby the ec:onometrician conducts research 
on the propert ies of an est imate. 
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regressions were formed: 
(3.45) 
n 
6~ - "1 + A.1Rpt-1 + l: AtARpt-i + Vt (3.46) 
1-1 
and tested for unit roots. 
Finally as the regression equation (3.39) to (3.46) impose the 
p'" 
restriction St - -- , the above test procedure was also carried on on 
p 
each industry in the sample with the symmetry restriction relaxed 
therefore allowing for non-symmetric price responses. The auxiliary 
regressions took the form: 
OK OK n UK 
&Pt • 6 + .0,Pt-1 + E ~l.lPt-l + Ut (3.47a) 
i-1 
us us n us 
&Pt - 6 + .0,Pt-1 + E .01&Pt-l + Ut (3.47b) 
i-1 
and the cointegrat ing regression the form: 
f.JK us 
St - 6 + .0,Pt + .0Pt + _t (3.48) 
'!he residuals from equation (3.48) were then tested for unit roots by 
est imat irg 
n 
&RSt - 6 + .0RSt-1 + l: .016RSt-i + V t (3.49) i-1 
Engle and Yoo (1987) report tables of critical values for the 00, OF and 
ADF statistics from the cointegrating regression with symmetry relaxed. 
215 
3.5 Data 
The data used in this study is disaggregated data collected at 
industry level (Table 3.1). The decision to use disaggregated data 
arises fron the consideration of issues discussed in sections 3.2 and 
3.3 above. Essentially, it was argued that disaggregated data reflect 
product substitutability better than aggregate data, and as high product 
substitutability is a necessary condition if the law of one price is to 
hold, it is the most appropriate data to use when testing the null 
hypothesis that a special relationship does not exist between relative 
prices and the exchange rate. Such a conclusion arises fron the 
consideration that as disaggregated data is more likely to adhere to the 
law of one price (Kravis and Lipsey, 1978), the power of our test is 
increased by using data collected at the most disaggregated level 
possible. Additionally, given equation (3.7), ie 
n __ n 
s· ~ B1Pl - ~ alPl + 
n .. [ ~ (al - Bdp] (3.7) 
1-1 1-1 1-1 
then, fron equation (3.36), if the law of one price holds 
gt • (3.50) 
... 
and typically, as p _ l( 1), gt should also be l( 1}, even if a 'special 
relationship' exists between relative prices and the exchange rate. 
Hc::Mever at the industry level of aggregation, such weighting problems 
are less likely to occur, as typically, similar industries will have 
similar speeds of adjustment to external stimuli. Thus at the industry 
level of aggregation, we would expect 9t to be I (0) if the law of one 
price prevai led, such indices being more successful in canparing any 
long-run adjustments to parity. 
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We used the same data set as Webster (1987). This comprised of 
oonthly data on UK wholesale price indices and US producer price indices 
for the period fran January 1975 to Q:tol::er 1980, for a sample of 35 
industries (listed on Table 3.I). In 1977 these industr ies accounted 
for approximately 24 percent of the net output of all manufacturing 
industries in Great Britain. Sources were 'British Business' and US 
'Producer Price Indices' (US Department of Canmerce) respectively. 
Producer price indices were used in preference to retail prices as the 
former do not include price changes in imported corrunodities. Due to 
changes in industrial classification a longer time series was not 
available. Similarly the sample of industries considered was 
constrained by differences in the industrial classification between the 
UK and USA. Exchange rates were collected fran 'Economic Trends' 
(Central Statistical Office). 
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3.6 Empirical Results 
nte Auxiliary Regressions 
Table 3.II reports tests for a unit root in the logarithm of the 
nominal exchange rate. nte hypothesis that the logarithm of the 
naninal exchange rate is a I(1) series was unable to be rejected. nte 
auxiliary regressions of the form equation (3.39) contained a constant, 
the lagged level of the logarithm of the nominal exchange rate and one 
lagged first difference of the logarithm of the nominal exchange rate, 
this specification appearing to adequately capture the short-run 
dynamics as judged by the whiteness of the residuals. It also suggests 
that over the period under consideration, the nominal exchange rate 
between the US and the OK did not follow a pure random walk. 
Conversely, when unit root tests were applied to the first 
di fferences of the logar i thm of the naninal exchange rate in the form of 
equation (3.41), the results indicated the series was I(O). The 
logar i thIn of the naninal exchange rate appears therefore to contain a 
single unit root which cancels out on first differencing. 
For five of the thirty-five industries in the sample, the 
hypothesis that the logarithm of the relative price series was I(1) was 
rejected when the auxiliary regressions of the form, equation (3.40) 
were run (see industries marked • on Table 3.III). When unit root 
tests were applied to the first differences of the relative price 
series, (of the form, equation (3.42) in another four industries (marked 
•• on Table 3.II) the root of the series did not cancel out on first 
differencing, thereby indicating that the process generating the series 
was not I (1 ), but of a higher order. Thus for nine industries: 
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Tobacco, General Chemicals, Pumps, Construction Equipnent, Focd and 
Drink Machinery, Watches and Clocks, Furniture and Upholstery, Vacuum 
Cleaners, and Travel Goods, the null hypothesis that the series was I(1) 
was rejected at least at the 5 percent level of significance. Since 
this suggests that the nominal exchange rate and relative prices for 
these nine industries are not integrated to the same order, this in 
itself implies they are not cointegrated. 
Unit root tests were also applied to each of the thirty-five 
industries with the symmetry restrictions (as suggested by the 
purchasing power parity theorem) relaxed, ie estimating equations of the 
form (3.47a) and (3.47b). TWenty-three of the thirty-five industries 
were found to have a pr ice ser ies that were I (1) for both the US and the 
OK, thus may be cointegrated with the nominal exchange rate 
(Table 3.III). As with the results with symmetry imposed, the 
irdustries marked· in Table 3.III indicate price series which are 
stationary in levels and non stationary in first differences, while 
those marked •• indicate the series cannot be characterized by single 
unit root. 'Ihc.se rejected as being I(1) with symmetry relaxed match 
those rejected with syrrmetry imposed in five industries. It is 
interesting to note that many of the industries exhibit particularly 
unstable behaviour as reflected in positive ADF statistics. 
219 
The Cointegy:at ing Regressions 
The cointegrating regressions were normalized on the logarithm of 
the nominal exchange rate (Tables 3.IVA and 3.IVB) and on the logarithm 
of relative prices (Tables 3.VA and 3.VB) for each of the twenty-six 
industries where previous tests had indicated the possibility of 
cointegration between relative prices and the nominal exchange rate. 
The regression residuals were then tested for non-stationarity by unit 
root tests. The regression residuals from the regressions with the 
synunetry restrictions relaxed were also tested for unit roots in the 
twenty-three industries where the auxiliary regressions had not excluded 
the possibility of cointegration (Tables 3.VIA and 3.VIB). 
Standard errors are not reported in Tables 3.I1I-3.VI as no strong 
statistical inferences can be made with respect to these parameters 
since the estimated coefficient standard errors in regressions with 
I(1) variables may be misleading (eg see Granger and Newbold, 1974). 
Notice in the first instance that in only eight of the twenty-six 
industries tested with synunetry imposed (Tables 3.IVA and 3.IVB), were 
the slope coefficients even of the correct sign, ie positive, compared 
to all but three being of the correct sign with symmetry relaxed 
(Tables VIA and VIB), ie negative for pUK and positive for pus 
(remember that s is defined as dollars per pound). Note also that the 
R2 in each industry with symmetry imposed is very low, and in some 
cases negative, whereas (with the exception of the Television Receivers 
industry) the R2 improves when the unrestricted form of the equations 
are specified. 
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With symmetry restrictions imposed, none of the twenty-six 
industr ies that were integrated of the same order as the nominal 
exchange rate, ie I (1 ), were found to be cointegrated with the nominal 
exchange rate, as reflected by the DickeY-Fuller, Adjusted Dickey-Fuller 
and Durbin-Watson statistics. With symmetry restrictions relaxed, 
cointegration with the exchange rate was found for only three of the 
twenty-three industries tested: Bedding and Brushes and Brooms (at the 
10 percent level of significance) and Lubricating Oils and Greases (at 
the 1 percent level of significance). These results are confirmed by 
the Durbin-Watson statistic at 5 percent for Bedding and Brushes and 
Brooms and at 1 percent for Lubricatinq Oils and Greases. 
The resul ts of the tests for uni t roots in the residuals of the 
cointegrating regressions normalised on relative prices (Table 3.VA and 
3.VB) indicate that results are not wholly invariant to the choice of 
normalizing variable. Two industries, Hand Tools and Implements 
Synthetic Resins and Toys and Games were found to be cointegrated at the 
10 percent level of significance; Agricultural Machinery and Metal 
~rkinq Machine Tools at 5 percent level of significance, 
Pharmaceutical Chemicals at 1 percent level of significance. Therefore 
six industries in all have DF or ADF statistics that suggest 
cointegration. This was not however confirmed by the DW statistics in 
any of the aforesaid industries. The evidence in favour is therefore 
weak. 
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3.7 Conclusion 
The aim of this essay was to test the purchasing power parity 
hypothesis as a long-run theory of the 'Law of One Pr ice' • The study 
uses disaggregated data for thirty-five matched industries in the UK and 
USA during the period 1975 to 1980. We apply a recently developed 
econcmetric technique on the cointegration of economic time series, 
whereby one abstracts from the consideration of short-run deviations, in 
testing for long-run equilibria. 
Results were obtained that were generally unfavourable to the long-
run proportionality of prices in a common currency thus implying an 
unfavourable response to the purchasing power parity hypothesis. The 
nominal exchange rate and relative prices for all industries in the 
sample do not appear to be cointegrated when the normalizing variable is 
the nominal exchange rate although six industries indicate some evidence 
of stationary behaviour when the normalising variable is relative 
prices albeit weak. 
When ~ priori symmetry restrictions were relaxed, only in three 
industries did tests suggest evidence of stationary behaviour. While 
this implies a relationship between the exchange rate and prices in 
these three industries, the response is not in the manner suggested by 
the law of one price. 
Such evidence suggest that the hypothesis that the exchange rate 
between the UK and USA tends toward a stable purchasing power value can 
be rejected for a sul:stantial proportion of net manufacturing output in 
Great Britain. We can therefore amplify Websters' (1987) conclusion 
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that arbitrage in internationally traded goods does not follow the 
pattern that one would expect from the purchasing power parity theorem. 
This study implies there is no reason why purchasing power parity 
should tie the exchange rate system down to a stable value even in the 
long-run, as no 'special relationship' would seem to exist. The 
evidence suggests that monetarist type mcxiels of exchange rate 
determination are held together by a keystone which may not play the 
role intended. This in turn poses the question of what else there is 
to tie the system down in the long-run. 
Moreover, the results suggests that a persistent transfer of weal th 
between the UK and US may have occurred throughout this period, having 
an important influence on the decline of the UK manufacturing base. If 
we consider that from the last quarter of 1976 to the end of 1980, 
sterling persistantly appreciated against the dollar (see Figure 1 in 
the introduction to this thesis) and relative prices had no tendency to 
move in a complementary fashion, then UK goods wi 11 have become more 
expensive relative to US goods, resulting in the UK having a persistent 
trade deficit with the us. UK investors will associate a persistent 
deficit with an overvalued sterling, hence according to standard 
portfol io balance theory, wi 11 sell US assets as long as the expected 
return on such assets is less than the expected return from UK assets. 
Likewise US investors wi 11 buy UK assets as the expected return wi 11 be 
greater than the expected return on US assets. There will have arisen 
therefore a growing need to finance future interest payments to the OS, 
which in turn requires a larger trade surplus, thus a larger exchange 
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rate depreciation, than hitherto. The persistent unoompetitiveness of 
OK firms may have resulted in vulnerable firms shedding labour, allowing 
insider/outsider dynamics to be set in motion. Employment may have 
followed a process akin to a random walk, where after a shock which 
reduces employment, insiders set wages so as to maintain this lower 
level of employment. Employment and wages wi 11 show no tendency to 
return to their pre-shock values. The hysteresis effect will therefore 
continue, fundamental values being determined by the history of shocks. 
While our results reject the law of one price, and imply the 
existence of a wealth effect, it should be emphasized that our results 
suggests that the real exchange rate was non-stationary around a stable 
mean. During the 1970s, we experienced many supply side shocks: oil 
shocks, resource discovery, swings in fiscal stance and monetary policy, 
which also may have shifted long-run relationships. It may be that 
real exchange rates were stationary around continually shifting means or 
alternatively, prices may have been stationary around a slowly moving 
'quality' effect, both explanations being interpreted as non-stationary 
behaviour by our analysis. 'I1le question of what determines the long-
run equilibrium of exchange rates remains a contentious issue. 
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MI.H Number 
240 
263 
271 
272 
273 
274 
276 
331 
332 
333 
336 
339(1) 
339(7) 
352 
391 
392 
411 
414 
419 
441-449 
450 
462 
463 
472 
473 
483 
492 
493 
494(1) 
365(2) 
368(4) 
368(6) 
422 
432 
491(1) 
Descr ipt ic:n 
Tobacco Goods 
Lubricating Oils & Greases 
General Chemicals 
Pharmaceutical Chemicals & Preparations 
Toi let Preparatioos 
Paint 
Synthetic Resins, Plastics Materials & Synthetic 
Rul:ber 
Agricultural Machinery (excluding tractors) 
Metal Working Machine Tools 
Pumps, Valves & O::mpressors 
ConstI'\ICtioo & Earth Moving Equipment 
Mining Machinery 
Focxi & Drink Processing Machinery 
Watches & Clocks 
Hand Tools & Implements 
CUtlery, Spoons, Forks & plated Tableware etc. 
Prcx:iuctioo of Man-Made Fibres 
Woollen aM Worsted 
Carpets 
Clothing 
Footwear 
Pottery 
Glass 
Furniture & upholstery 
Beddirg 
Manufactured stationery 
Linoleum, Plastic Floor Coverings, Leathercloth etc. 
Brushes & Broars 
Toys & Games 
Television Receivers 
Vacuum Cleaners 
Refrigerators 
Made-up Text i I es 
Travel Goods 
Tyres 
In 1977 these industries accounted for about 24% of the net output of 
all manufacturing industry in Great Britain. 
- 'Ihe above table is taken from Webster (1986), Table I 
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A03MENI'ED DICKEY-FULLER TEST STATISTICS FOR lEE 
tDfINAL ~ RATE AND RELATIVE PRICES-
Dollar-ster ling 
Tobacco Goods 
Lubricating Oils & Greases 
General Chemicals 
Pharmaceut ical Chemicals 
Toilet Preparations 
Paint 
Synthetic Resins etc. 
Agricul tural Machinery 
Metal Working Machine Tools 
Pumps, Valves & Ccrnpressors 
Construction & Earth Moving Equi~t 
Mining Machinery 
Fcx:x:l & Or ink Processing Machinery 
Watches & Clocks 
Ham Tools & Implements 
Cutlery, S:POC1lS, Forks etc. 
Prcx1uct ioo of Man-Made Fibres 
Woollen and Worsted 
Carpets 
Clothing 
Footwear 
Pottery 
Glass 
Furniture & upholstery 
Bedding 
Manufactured Stationery 
Linoleum, Plastic Floor Coverings, etc. 
Brushes & BroctIS 
Toys & Games 
Television Receivers 
Vacuum Cleaners 
Refrigerators 
Made-up Text iles 
Trave 1 Gc:x:lds 
Tyres 
RELATIVE PRICES 
-1.325 
-3.497· 
-2.055 
-4.136· 
-2.180 
-2.831 
-1.095 
-2.494 
-2.364 
-2.636 
-4.639· 
-3.920· 
-2.216 
-3.090· 
-2.639" 
-2.616 
-1.217 
-1.980 
-1.546 
-0.614 
-1.380 
-1.310 
-2.095 
-1.751 
-1.799·· 
-2.027 
-2.262 
-1.300 
-0.980 
-1.602 
-2.644 
-1.666·· 
-2.385 
-1.325 
-1.600·· 
-1.946 
- '!he null hypothesis is that the series in question is I( 1) • '!he 
rejection region is (ADF < c) with c • -3.58, -2.93 or -2.60 at a 
significance level of 1\', 5\' or 10\' (Fuller 1976). The sample pericd 
is fran January 1975 through o=tober 1980. 
• indicate series which are stationary in levels and non-statiooary in 
first differences. 
•• indicate series which are noo-stationary in levels and first 
differences. 
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AOOMENI'ED DICKEY-~ TEST STATISTICS FOR 
RELATIVE PRICES WI'IH SYMMEI'RY RELAXED-
Tobacco Goods 
Lubricating oils & Greases 
General Chemicals 
Pharmaceutical Chemicals 
Toilet Preparations 
Paint 
Synthetic Resins etc. 
Agricul tural Machinery 
Metal Working Machine Tools 
Pl..Imps, Valves & Ccmpressors 
Construction & Earth Moving Equipnent 
Mining Machinery 
Focxi & Drink Processing Machinery 
Watches & Clocks 
Hand Tools & Implements 
CUtlery, Spc::ons, Forks etc. 
Prociuctioo of Man-Made Fibres 
vmllen and Worsted 
carpets 
Clothing 
Footwear 
Pottery 
Glass 
Furniture & Upholstery 
Bedding 
Manufactured Stationery 
Linoleum, plastic Floor Coverings, etc. 
Brushes & Broans 
Toys & Games 
Televisioo Receivers 
Vacuum Cleaners 
Refrigerators 
Made-up Textiles 
Trave I (;c:x)ds 
Tyres 
UK 
-2.329 
0.911 
-0.527 
-1.718 
0.385 
0.363 
-0.903 
-1.841 
-1.067 
-2.399 
-4.109· 
-1.119 
-1.900·· 
-1.287 
-0.695 
-0.302 
-1.347 
-2.213·· 
0.108 
-0.586 
0.517 
-0.814 
-2.919 
-0.908 
-0.482 
-0.616 
-1.152 
0.213 
-0.269 
-2.353 
-1.575·· 
-2.281 
-0.402 
-1.086" 
-0.763 
us 
-0.020 
3.818 
-0.110·· 
2.115·· 
1.280 
1.604 
1.897 
0.908 
3.679· 
2.824 
1.903 
-0.104 
0.913 
1.149 
4.060· 
2.280·· 
0.414 
-1.717 
0.818 
2.092 
0.691 
0.080 
0.672·· 
2.313 
1.077 
1.523 
-0.470·· 
0.204 
0.954 
-1.338 
-0.349 
-0.174 
-2.137 
2.356·· 
1.081 
- See note to Table 3.11 for definitions and rejection regions. 
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TABLE 3.IVA aJINIE:;RATIN:2 ~Ias AND TESTS Fm aJINI'EI'iRATICN-
St • a + Bp., + v" 
INrXETRY a:NSTANl' 
Lubricating Oils & Greases 0.592 
Pharmaceutical Chemicals 0.703 
Toilet Preparations 0.697 
Paint 0.786 
Synthetic Resins etc. 0.622 
Agricul tural Machinery 0.718 
Metal Working Machine Tools 0.724 
Mining Machinery 0.668 
Hand Tools & Implements 0.719 
cutlery, SpoCIls. Forks etc. 0.581 
Produc::t ioo of Man-Made 
Fibres 
Woollen an:! Worsted 
carpets 
0.723 
0.897 
0.700 
Pt 
0.276 
-0.052 
0.002 
-0.245 
-0.018 
-0.106 
-0.071 
-1.281 
-0.055 
-0.199 
0.174 
0.296 
-0.115 
R2 D>l 
0.05 0.049 
-0.00 0.042 
-0.14 0.041 
0.07 0.047 
-0.00 0.043 
0.00 0.043 
-0.01 0.042 
0.09 0.077 
0.00 0.042 
0.04 0.046 
0.00 0.042 
0.00 0.041 
OF 
-0.433 
ADF 0(24) 
-0.475 19.393 
(0.496) 
-1.578 23.340 
(0.326) 
-1.318 21.496 
(0.373) 
-1.981 22.483 
(0.372) 
-1.428 21.918 
(0.344) 
-1.583 21.507 
(0.367) 
-1.492 21.835 
(0.409) 
17.168 
(0.578) 
-1.397 21.522 
(0.367) 
-1.958 18.998 
(0.585) 
-1.110 19.198 
(0.572) 
-1.003 19.179 
(0.537) 
0.14 0.144 -1.703 23.578 
_ (0.261) 
.. Dependent variable is the naninal exchange rate. R2 is the adjusted coefficient of 
determinatioo. D>l is the Durbin-Watsoo statistic. Q(24) is the Ljung-Box portmanteau 
statistic with 24 degress of freedan. Figures in parenthesis below Ljung-Elox 
statistics are marginal significance levels. 'lbe rejectioo regicn for the Durbin-
watson statistic is (D>l>c) with c • 0.511. 0.386 and 0.322 at a significance level of 
tt. 5t or 10~ respectively (Enqle an:! Granger 1987). '!he rejecticn regicn for the 
Dicky-FUller statistic is (DF<c) with c • -4.07. -3.37 and -3.03 at a significance 
level of 1t, 5t or 10t respectively and for the augmented Dickey-Fuller statistic the 
rejectioo regioo is (AtF<c) with c • -3.77. 3.17 and -2.84 at a significance level of 
1t, 5t or 10% respectively (Engle and Granger 1987). In every case the null 
hypothesis is that the residuals are 1(1). Estimated coefficient standard errors are 
not reported since they may be misleading in this context (Granger and Newbold (1974». 
See note to Table 3.II for sample perio:ls. 
TABIE 3.IVB CDINI'EIiRATINJ ~ICN3 AND TESTS FOR CDI~TICN-
St - a + BPt + Vt 
lNOOSTRY cnEl'ANl' Pt R2 ~ OF ADF 0(24) 
Clothing 0.612 -0.024 0.46 0.05 -1.720 29.611 
( 0.128) 
Footwear 0.721 -0.086 -0.01 0.042 -1.342 21.125 
(0.389) 
Pottery 0.689 -0.038 -0.01 0.042 -1.413 21.943 
(0.402) 
Glass 0.698 0.028 -0.01 0.041 -1.117 20.858 
I,,) (0.405) I··) 
o..D Bed:iing 0.614 -0.123 0.16 0.040 -1.667 20.719 
(0.413) 
Manufactured Stationery 0.648 -0.055 -0.00 0.041 -1.526 22.001 
(0.399) 
Linoleum, Plastic 0.611 -0.249 0.03 0.045 -1.666 22.274 
Floor Coverings, etc (0.383) 
Brushes & Brocms 0.598 -0.199 0.03 0.043 -1.904 21.344 
(0.438) 
Toys & Games 0.647 -0.095 -0.00 0.042 -1.479 21.070 
(0.392) 
Television Receivers 0.710 0.044 -0.01 0.041 -1.232 21.547 
(0.425) 
Refrigerators 0.688 -0.239 -0.14 0.042 -1.245 21.635 
(0.360) 
Made-up Text i les 0.341 0.362 0.17 0.051 -2.035 20.765 
(0.473) 
Tyres 0.659 0.145 -0.00 0.041 -1.124 18.298 
(0.630) 
- See note to Table 3. lVA 
TABIE 3.VA CDINI'ffiRATlOO REJ:;RESSI<::H) AND TEST FUR CDINl'mRATICN-
Pt • 'Y + ASt + Ut 
lNOOSTRY a:::tEI'ANr St R2 I:M OF ADF Q(24) 
Lubricating Oils & Greases 0.217 0.230 0.05 0.083 -1.321 20.585 
(0.546) 
Pharmaceut ical Olemicals 0.258 -0.188 -0.00 0.011 -3.798 18.217 
(0.507) 
Toilet Preparations -0.060 0.002 -0.01 0.022 -2.802 17.975 
(0.707) 
Paint 0.613 -0.357 0.07 0.020 -2.715 18.925 
1-,,) (0.461) W· 
0 Synthetic Resins etc. -0.817 -0.110 -0.00 0.018 -2.974 17.767 
(0.663) 
Agricul tural Machinery 0.322 -0.177 0.00 0.011 -3.585 17.113 
(0.757) 
Metal Working Machine Tools 0.415 -0.054 -0.01 0.011 -3.401 21.446 
(0.493) 
Mining Machinery 0.052 -0.087 0.09 0.184 -2.360 8.587 
(0.979) 
Hand Tools & Implements 0.474 -0.106 -0.00 0.012 -2.921 15.146 
(0.713) 
CUtlery, Spoons, Forks etc. -0.371 -0.296 0.04 0.029 -2.274 15.961 
(0.817) 
Prcx:luction of Man-Made -0.232 0.114 0.00 0.024 -1.681 22.540 
Fibres (0.368) 
Woollen and Worsted -0.729 0.076 0.00 0.068 -1.598 23.377 
(0.176) 
carpets 0.199 -0.246 0.14 0.017 -1.649 13.908 
(0.904) 
• Dependent variable is relative prices. See note to Table 3.11 for other definitions 
and rejection regions. 
TAmE 3.VB OJINI'EnRATlOO REGRliSSlc:NS AND TESI' FOR OJINI'EnRATlOOab 
Pt· 'Y+ ASt + Ut 
lNOOSTRY CXN3TANI' St R2 J:lol OF ADF Q(24) 
Clothing -0.171 -0.241 0.04 0.062 -2.280 13.079 
(0.930) 
Footwear 0.317 -0.047 0.01 0.033 -1.389 23.049 
(0.286) 
Pottery -0.167 -0.042 -0.01 0.070 -1.977 14.817 
(0.869) 
Glass -0.040 0.015 -0.01 0.109 -1.641 17.976 
t·.,) (0.055) 
(.j Bedding -0.449 -0.250 0.16 0.015 -2.703 17.931 
.... (0.109) 
Manufactured statiooery -0.810 -0.091 0.00 0.015 -2.759 19.419 
(0.619) 
Linoleum, plastic -0.215 -0.185 0.03 0.041 -1.638 13.139 
Floor Coverings, etc (0.437) 
Brushes & BrOCAlS -0.309 -0.262 0.03 0.014 -2.478 20.246 
(0.567) 
Toys & Games· -0.426 -0.131 -0.00 0.142 -2.982 33.890 
(0.012) 
Television Receivers -0.352 0.666 -0.01 0.021 -1.432 22.444 
(0.262) 
Refrigerators -0.353 -0.289 -0.01 0.024 -2.779 23.575 
(0.369) 
Made-up Text iles -0.625 -0.510 0.17 0.023 -1.500 26.081 
(0.247) 
Tyres 0.197 0.084 -0.00 0.072 -1.802 13.222 
(0.926) 
• See note to Table 3.VA 
b In the Toys and Games industry, marked ., we had difficulty in specifying a 
regression equaticn where the residual series was empirical white noise. 
to·.) 
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TAmE 3. VIA (l)INI'EXiRATIN; ~ICN3 AND TESI'S FOR 
(l)INI'EXiRATlOO wrm SYMMETRY RELAXE:[)-
St. - 6 + ~1pOK + ~:zpUB + Et 
INIXlSTRY a:NS'I'ANl' 
Tobacx::o Goods -2.021 
Lubricating Oils & Greases -2.953 
Tbilet Preparations -5.126 
Paint -4.766 
Synthetic Resins etc. -6.958 
1fqr icul tural Machinery -8.560 
Pumps, Valves & Cmpressors -6.129 
Mining Machinery 
watches & Clocks 
Prcxiuc:t ioo of Man-Made 
Fibres 
Carpets 
-4.263 
5.629 
-4.934 
-10.683 
pUK 
-0.966 
-0.912 
-1.209 
-0.498 
-1.114 
-1.272 
-2.046 
-1.667 
-0.255 
-0.685 
-0.981 
pUS R2 DJ OF ADF Q(24) 
1.433 0.51 0.286 -2.164 16.207 
(0.805) 
1.531 0.83 0.614 -4.546 17.513 
(0.619) 
2.360 0.57 0.230 -2.181 19.001 
(0.645) 
1.505 0.20 0.066 -2.371 20.676 
(0.540) 
2.988 0.63 0.295 -2.319 28.426 
(0.161) 
3~005 0.36 0.127 . -1.711 26.579 
(0.221) 
3.381 0.72 0.228 -2.105 26.578 
(0.221) 
2.566 0.73 0.314 -3.370 15.593 
(0.684) 
1.511 0.81 0.027 2.700 17.115 
(0.541) 
1.920 0.49 0.144 -2.821 19.977 
(0.522) 
3.280 0.35 0.147 -2.095 20.133 
(0.574) 
.. Dependent variable is the naninal e.xchanqe rate. 'Ibe rejection regicn for the Durbin-
Watscn statistic is (DJ>C) with c - 0.51, 0.39 and 0.32 at a significance level of 1%, 5t or 
10% respectively for a canonical system and with c - 0.46, 0.28 and 0.21 for a higher order 
system. 'I'he rejecticn region for the Dickey-Fuller statistic is (DF<c) with c • 4.45, 3.93 
and 3.59 at a significance level of 1%, 5% an:i 10% respectively and for the Augmented Dickev-
Fuller statistic c -4.22, 3.62 and 3.32 at a significance level of 1%, 5t and 10% respectively 
(Eng"le and Yoo (1987). In every case the null hypothesis is that the residuals are 1(1). 
See note to Table 3.ll for sample periods. 
-_._- ______ • ____ • _____ ~ __ • _____ r_~ ________ ,,_ ___ __" __ _ 
Tl'BTE 3. VIB CDIm'IDRATIOO RmREESIOOS MID 'lE:;TS FCR 
OOINrmRATICN WI'IH SYt.t£ffiY RELAXEI>-
St - 6 + fi,pUK + fi2PUB + Et 
INIlE'IRY a::H)'l'1\Nl' pUK ptlB R2 IM OF ADF Q(24) 
Clothinq -7.685 -1.002 2.744 0.14 0.100 -1.824 19.335 
(0.624) 
Footwear -3.109 -0.982 1.661 0.34 0.111 -1.740 23.369 
(0.381) 
Pottery -2.703 -0.536 1.186 0.37 0.195 -2.474 11.774 
(0.961 
t-,) Furniture -10.712 -2.118 4.513 0.60 0.238 -2.848 25.970 w 
w (0.207) 
Beddinq -9.170 -0.983 3.096 0.41 0.290 -3.379 21.497 
(0.428) 
Manufactured stat icnery -7.045 -0.898 2.661 0.70 0.414 -2.690 23.591 
(0.369) 
Brushes & Broans -11.823 -1.793 4.429 0.39 0.328 -3.552 17.088 
(0.705) 
Toys & Games -7.484 -0.922 2.615 0.63 0.218 -2.242 23.602 
(0.368) 
Television Receivers -2.788 0.174 0.59 -0.01 0.047 -1.443 26.564 
(0.266) 
Refrigerators -7.756 -0.909 2.674 0.29 0.124 -1.698 23.948 
(0.349) 
Made-up Textiles 3.606 0.713 -1.494 0.38 0.094 -0.640 18.110 
(0.699) 
Tyres -2.380 -0.776 1.331 0.33 0.110 -2.030 16.038 
(0.811) 
• See rote to Table 3. VIA 
INI'ERNATIOOAL REAL INI'EREST RATE PARITY: 
'IHEDRY AND EVIDElCE 
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4.1 Introduction 
The nature of cross-country real (ie expected inflation adjusted) 
interest rate differentials is an important issue for open economy 
macroeconomics. Real interest differentials have been proposed as a 
crucial determinant of floating exchange rates, thus allooing a role in 
exchange rate determination for differences in secular rates of 
inflation (Frankel, 1979). As suggested in the introduction to this 
thesis such models have performed poorly to date, thus an empirical 
investigation of real interest parity is justified. Additionally, if 
an economy I s real interest rates are set in internat ional markets then 
domestic policy will be largely impotent with respect to the level and 
rate of domestic capital formation. If government liabilities are also 
substitutes for real capital in individual portfolio's, in a fully 
employed economy an increase in the steady state government budget 
deficit financed by issuing bonds with a constant real interest rate, 
will lead to a reduction in the level and rate of domestic capital 
formation. such a result arises from the consideration that the ex-
ante real return on bonds will be maintained while the ex-ante real 
return on capital will fall due to the inflationary consequences of the 
increased budget deficit (Feldstein, 1980). Thus if there is a short-
fall in fiscal take (eg say a Piper-Alpha disaster) and if the deficit 
is financed as described above, there may be substantial effects on the 
real economy. Therefore, in so far as the real interest rate is an 
important determinant of the domestic economy's saving-investment 
decisions, if it is set in international markets this will severely 
constrain macroeconomic pol icy. Moreover as it is often argued 
membership of a monetary system tends to make members nat ional 
currencies perfect substitutes for one another, it will also be of 
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interest to see whether members of the European Monetary System conform 
more closely to real interest parity than non-members, since this may 
have important impl icat ions for the credibi I i ty of the exchange rate 
union (Artis and Taylor, 1989). 
In this essay we derive and apply efficient tests of real interest 
parity by exploiting the vector time series properties of the data. 
This is achieved by noting that if agents are rational, in that they 
utilize all available information at time t, then the nominal interest 
rate differential should act as an optimal predictor of the relative 
future inflation rate. SUbject to a maintained hypothesis of rational 
expectations, real interest parity can then be tested as a set of non-
linear cross-equation restrictions on the vector autoregressive 
representation of the nominal interest rate and the relative inflation 
rate, ie on the bivariate vector autoregression (BVAR). 
The remainder of this essay is set out as follows : In section 4.2 
the theory and extant evidence on real interest parity is discussed, 
while section 4.3 sets out the econometric methodology used in the 
study. Section 4.4, explains the test statistic and testing procedure, 
section 4.5 describes the data and section 4.6 reports our empirical 
results. A final section concludes. 
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4.2 Real Interest Parity 1. Theory and Extant Evidence 
A theoretical argument as to why real interest rates should be 
equalised across countries can be expressed as follows. Consider the 
following Fisher closed conditions, ex-ante purchasing power parity and 
uncovered interest parity, equations (4.1) - (4.4). 
"" r t • it - ~Pt+1 (4.1) 
• • • • 
r t • it - L\Pt+1 (4.2) 
-
• 
.... 
L\ St+1 • L\Pt ... 1 - L\Pt+1 (4.3) 
• 
... 
L\St+1 . it-it (4.4) 
where rt denotes the real interest rate, it is the nominal interest 
rate, Pt is the logarithm of the price level, St is the logarithm of the 
nominal exchange rate (domestic price of foreign currency), L\- is the 
ex~tations operator and an asterisk denotes a foreign variable. 
Equations (4.1) - (4.4) are predicated on the assumption of rational 
• •• 
expectations (ie L\pt+1 • L\pt+1 + ut+1, L\pt+1 • .1pt+1 + ut+1, 
- .. 
.1st+1 • L\st+1 + ut+1 and .1st+1 • .1st+1 + ut+1. We al:::sorb the 
maintained hypothesis of rational expectations into our empirical work. 
Equations (4.1) and (4.2) define the real interest rate as equal to 
the nominal rate adjusted for the expected erosion in the purchasing 
power of money over the period to maturity. Therefore, 
'If the inflation rate is to some extent predictable, and if the 
one period equilibrium expected real return does not change in such 
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a way as to exactly offset changes in the expected rate of 
inflation, then in an efficient market there will be a relationship 
between the one per iod nomimal interest rate observed at a moment 
in time and the one period rate of inflation subsequently 
observed'. 
Fama, 1975, p 269. 
Equation (4.3) is the ex-ante version of purchasing power parity -
that the expected exchange rate depreciation over a period should be 
equal to the expected inflation differential over the period. Ex-ante 
purchasing power parity differs from the traditional purchasing power 
parity as formulated by Cassel (1918) in that deviations from purchasing 
pcMer parity or real exchange rates follow a martingale process (eg 
ESSAY III of this thesis). Equation (4.4) is the simple uncovered 
interest parity condition that the expected rate of depreciation should 
be just equal to the nominal interest rate differential. 
Combining equations (4.1) - (4.4) we obtain 
(4.5) 
- the real interest parity condition. 
'I1lis simple derivation of real interest parity should perhaps be 
taken only as a very basic motivation for the present exercise, since 
equations (4.3) and (4.4) may themselves be open to question (e.g. 
MacDonald and Taylor, 1989b and ESSAYS II and III of this thesis). 
What is beyond dispute, however, is that if real interest parity 
holds, (equation (4.5», then there is justification for using the real 
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interest parity condition as an axiom in models of exchange rate 
determination. FUrther, the scope for effective macroeconomic 
stabilisation policy at the domestic level is severely limited, since an 
important determinant of the savings-consumption decisions will have 
been set in internat ional markets. 
The extant empirical evidence on real interest parity is limited in 
quantity and, by and large, has not been favourable to the hypothesis 
that real interest rates will tend to equality. Mishkin (1981, 1984) 
for example, empirically investigates the equality of real interest 
rates from February 1967 to February 1979, for the united States and six 
other OED) countries, by the analysis of quarterly eurodeposit interest 
rates and both CPI and WPI price indices. The Mishkin methodology 
assumes rational expectations thus the forecast error of inflation is 
unforecastable. The Fisher open condition impl ies therefore that the 
expected differential between expost real interest rates is zero, given 
any information available at t-1. 
'Ihus : 
• (4.6) 
where r-r* is the real interest differential, Xt - 1 is any information in 
the information set at t-1 , Ut • €t-~t* , the white noise differential, 
and an asterisk denotes a foreign variable. 
Because of the martingale implication that in an efficient market 
any excess return would be arbitraged away between t-1 and t, a test of 
a • 0 is a test of the equal i ty of ex-ante real interest rates. There 
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should therefore be zero correlation between real interest rate 
differentials and the information set at t-1. Mishkin tests the null 
hypothesis of a • 0 by regressing the real interest differential on a 
constant and four 'TIME' variables, the TIME variables being a proxy for 
'smoothly moving low frequency components of economic variables 
that are related to real rates. 
Mishkin, 1984, p1348. 
The Mishkin evidence rejects convincingly the equality of real 
rates of interest with both CPI and WPI data. He suggests that 
differing risk premiums in forward exchange markets and in the markets 
for securities denominated in different currencies, as well as 
violat ion of purchasing power parity, may be reflected in real rates of 
interest in different countries having dissimilar movements. 
Friedman and Schwartz (1982) in their study of longer term 
movements of key economic magni tudes in the United States and United 
Kingdom between 1867 and 1975, also find deviations from real interest 
parity. They found that over the period studied a 1.74 percentage 
point differential between the two countries for short-term rates and a 
1.63 percentage point differential for the long term rate. An analysis 
of sub-periods, ranging from pre-World War I to post World War II also 
suggested persistent devi at ions from the real interest par i ty condi t ion. 
CUmby and Obstfeld (1984) in a study of the interplay amongst the 
price level, interest rates and exchange rates from January 1976 to 
September 1981, by analysing both one month and three month eurocurrency 
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rates and three month domestic money market rates for OK, Switzerland, 
Canada and Japan against the US dollar, using both CPI and WPI price 
indices, strongly reject ex-ante real interest parity for all countries 
except that of the US-OK combination. 
They estimate by OLS 
It 
~Pt+1 - ~Pt+1 - a + b( i-i·)t + Vt+1 (4.7) 
where ~Pt+1 is change in the logarithm of the price level over the 
period t to t+1, it is nominal interest rate at time t for maturity at 
t+1 , Vt+1 is the one step ahead forecasting error. An asterisk 
denotes a foreign variable. 
Under the assumption of rational expectations a test of a-O , b-1 , 
is a test of ex-ante real interest parity. Interestingly, the strength 
of rejection of real interest parity in euromarket rates compared to 
domestic market rates is similar. The authors conclude from this 
observation that it may not be institutional factors such as capital 
controls that impede international capital movements. 
lsard (1983) focuses on the long-run interest rates of the US 
Collar - German Mark country pair, choosing this particular combination 
as it is one of the few country pairs where data on long-term interest 
rates is available. The author used survey data to construct a series 
on five and ten-year US inflationary expectations which were then 
assumed to provide lower and upper bounds on the inflation rates that 
were expected in the US from the end of year two to the end of year 
five. Isard concludes that 
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'real interest differentials beyond a two year horizon were not 
time invariant, which rejects the assumption that real interest 
differentials were expected to vanish within a two year horizon'. 
Isard, 1983, p 28 
Thus the evidence of the above studies seem to suggest that in the 
1970s and early 1980s, the assumption that real interest rates will be 
equalized across countries is questionable. A powerful direct test of 
the real interest parity condition is therefore justified. 
In this essay, we report some new evidence of real interest parity 
which concentrates on Euro interest rates of six and twelve months 
maturity and which utilizes a powerful vector autoregressive methodology 
(due originally to Sargent, 1979) which has not previously been applied 
in this context. The methodology should provide a more efficient test 
of the parity condition by utilizing information implied by rational 
expectations thus enabling a direct test of real interest parity to be 
undertaken. 
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4.3 Econometric Methodology 
Under rational expectations, real interest parity implies: 
-it - E(~nPt.nl~) - it-E(~nPt.nIQt) 
which can be wr i tten as 
(4.8) 
(4.9) 
where gt is the information set available at time t, and n is defined 
as 
.~n - (1-Ln) 
where L, the lag operator is implicitly defined by 
and an asterisk. denotes a foreign variable. 
i.e. the nominal interest rate differential is in fact an optimal 
predictor of the future inflation rate. 
According to the rnultivariate form of Wold's decomposition (Hannan 
1970) we can assume that the current interest rate differential (i-i-)t 
and the one period (current) relative inflation differential ~1(P-P-)t 
together form a jointly determined, linear indeterministic, covariance 
stationary process, ie 
a) means are independent of t 
b) autocovariances depend only on differences between observations 
cl cross covariances depend only on differences between observations. 
This implies that the process has a unique, invertible infinite 
order moving average representation. Hence (i-i-)t and ~1(P-P-)t can 
be described by a bivariate stochastic process which can be approximated 
by a j-th order bivariate autoregression, ie modelled as past values of 
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themselves 
j j 
~1(P-P·)t· ~ Oia1(p-p·)t-l + ~ B1 (i-i·)t-l + n t (4.10a) 
j j 
(i-i·)t· ~ 'Y1~1(P-P·)t-i + ~ 5di-i-)t-i + £.t (4.10b) 
1-1 1-1 
where nt and _t are whi te noise 
'Ihe system (4.10) can be expressed in first order form as 
61 (p-p·)t 
a1 (p-P·)t-1 
.~1 (p-p·)t-:t+1 • 
(i-i ·)t 
(i-i-)t-1 
or, 
0102. • .amB1B2 • • .Bm 
10 .000 ••• 0 
00 •• 1000 ••• 0 
'Y"i2 ••• 'Ym6 1 62 ••• Bm 
00 .010 ••• 0 
o 0 0 0 0 000 0 0 1 0 
Using equat ion (4.11), we have 
~1 (p-P·)t-1 
~1 (p-P·)t-2 
61 (p-p·)t-j + 
(i-l-)t-1 
(i-i·)t-2 
where g' is a (1x2j) selection vector with unity in the (j+1) the 
element and zeros elsewhere. 
By recursive substition, it can be demonstrated that 
le 
~1(P-P-)t+le • e'~·1Zt_1 + e' ~ ~lVt+le_1 
1-0 
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o 
£t 
o 
o 
(4.11) 
(4.12) 
So that: 
n 
ll. n(P-P· )t ... n • e' ~ 
k-1 
n k 
~+1Zt_1 + e' ~ ~ ~1 Vt ... k-l 
k-11-0 
(4.13) 
where e' is a (1x2j) selection vector with unity in the first element 
and zero's elsewhere. 
Thus the 4j parameters of this bivariate vector autoregression 
(BVAR) system can be written as: 
where e' and g' (the 1x2j selection vectors) have unity in the first 
and second elements respectively, and zeros elsewhere, and vec(·) is the 
row stacking operator. 
If we assume agents to be 'weakly' efficient in that equations 
(4.10a) and (4.10b) contain only lagged values of (i-i·) and A,(p-p·) , 
defined A t - 1 , 
then taking expectations of the real interest parity condition, equation 
(4.9) with respect to At-1, and applying the law of iterated 
mathematical expectation where 
we have 
(4.14) 
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Now since by definition 
ie forecast errors are inherently unpredictable, if we take expectations 
of equations (4.12) and (4.13) with respect to l\ t-1 and set them equal 
to each other, as in equation (4.9), we have: 
n 
e' L ~.1Zt_1 • g'~Zt-1 
k-O 
so that the 2j non-linear rational expectations restrictions are : 
n 
e' L ~.1 - g'~ • 0 (4.15) 
Therefore equation (4.15) defines the restriction implied by rational 
expectations on the BVAR. Essentially the BVAR methodology focusses on 
the fact that if the predicted rate of inflation differential is to be 
equal to the process determining the interest rate differential, then 
the parameters a, a, 'Y , and 5 are not free, but constrained in a highly 
non-linear manner. 
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4.4 Test Statistics and Procedure 
The conjecture to be tested is the non-linear restrictions implied 
by real interest parity and rational expectations • 
... 
Ho: e' 1: ~.'-g'~ • 0 
Ie-O 
n 
H1 e' 1: ~+1_g't , 0 
k-O 
A convenient way of testing the null is to estimate the 
unrestr icted vector autoregression equat ion (4. 1 0) and to test the 
restrictions, equation (4.15), by means of a Wald test. Since the 
estimated coefficients in vector autoregressions, being projection 
coefficients, have no direct economic interpretation (Sims 1980) our 
chief interest in the unrestricted estimates is in being able to test 
the restrictions, equation (4.15), under H1 • If we assume that V t in 
equation {4.11} has a bivariate normal distribution, then an estimate 
of the parameter vector can be Obtained by OlS. If we denote the OlS 
estimator A then the asymptotic distribution of ').. is given by 
TV{).- A) _ N(O, r) 
where T is the sample size and 
If we wr i te the 2j real interest par i ty parameter constraints as a 
(2jx1) vector r{')..) , 
... 
r{A)' • e' 1: ~+1 - g'~ 
k-O 
247 
then the Wald statistic is seen to be of the form 
(4.16) 
and is a criterion for determining whether equation (4.15) is close 
enough to zero to be consistant with Ho. Using a matrix of 
differentiation result due to Schmidt (1974) it can be shown 
n k 
~ ~ (el~lle)~-1-1 
k-Ol-0 
D(A) - ------------------------
n k 
~ ~ (gl~lle)~-1-1-I 
k-Ol-0 
where I is a identity matrix of order 2j. 
Alternatively the null hypothesis can be thought of as reducing or 
restricting the set of possible values of the parameters a, 13, "t and 6 
(equations 4.10a and 4.10b), therefore restricting the maximum value 
that a 1 ikel ihood function can take. Hence a comparison of the 
unrestricted maximum likelihood estimat ion based on the observed sample 
and the maximum likelihood estimates defined by the null hypothesis, 
will yield a test on the validity of the null based on Ho and H,. If 
the values of the likelihood function are close then the two sets of 
estimates are close. Alternatively if the values of the likelihood 
function differ substantially (by 5 percent) the validity of the null, 
thus real interest parity, should be questioned. Thus the value of 
estimating the restricted coefficients lies in being able to construct 
alternative test statistics, in particular likelihood ratio statistics. 
A problem remains however in obtaining the restricted parameter 
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-estimates, A say. Bai llie and Schrnidt (1983), show that A can be 
obtained as a function of the unrestricted parameter estimates 
- - -- -- -
')... ').. - rD(A)[D(A) 'rn(A)]-1 r ( Al. 
'!his estimator has an asymptotic covariance matrix which can be 
consistently estimated as 
r • r - r D(~l[D(A.) 'rn(A)]-1D(~) 'I' 
Application of this result allows the restricted estimates to be 
obtained without the need to employ oomputationally burdensome non-
linear optimisation routines (e.g. Sargent 1979, Hakkio 1981). 
Thus a cross check of equation (4.15) is the Likelihood Ratio statistic 
given by 
LR • T(lnI91-1nI91) (4.17) 
where an upper tilde indicates that the contemporaneous covariance 
matrix of BVAR residuals has been estimated at the restricted parameter 
-
vector A. 
'!he likelihood ratio and Wald statistics have the same asymptotic 
distribution under the null hypothesis - central chi-square with degrees 
of freedom equal to the number of restrictions,2j. 
The intial task in the test procedure was to determine the order of 
the vector autoregression, ie the order of j. The approach in this 
essay was to follow Taylor (1987b) in the choice of an adequate 
bivariate model, whereby a model containing thirteen lags was tested 
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downwards, the mcxiel sought being that with the smallest 
parameterisation which yielded serially uncorrelated residuals and which 
could not be rejected by a likelihood ratio test against the next 
highest parameterisation. (1 ) 
'!he unrestricted vector estimates, equation (4.10), were then 
estmated, and the resul t ing vector residuals used to construct the Wald 
statistic, equation (4.16). The restricted vector parameter estimates, 
under the restriction given by equation (4.15), were estimated as a 
function of the unrestricted parameters and the vector residuals were 
checked to see if the restrictions were satisfied. The restrictions 
were calculated and the Likelihood Ratio statistic, equation (4.17), 
computed from the resulting restricted covariance matrix and previously 
computed unrestricted covariance matrix. 
C 1 ) The data was first put into mean deviat ion form as it was assumed 
the stochastic process had a zero deterministic part. Such a procedure 
has val idi ty as long as the determinist ic parts are assumed constant. 
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4.5 Data 
Monthy data were obtained on Eurodeposit interest rates of six and 
twel ve months matur i ty and consumer pr ice indices for the pericd 
July 1979 through to December 1986. All data are seasonally 
unadjusted, end of month values. The interest rate data were taken 
frem the Financial Times and the price index data from the IMF's 
International Financial statistics data tape. Data were obtained for 
seven major QED) countries - US, OK, Germany, Japan, France, Italy and 
the Netherlands. 
The decision to use Eurorates was motivated by the desire to ensure 
comparability of the underlying financial assets under consideration. 
Levich (1985) suggests that eurocurrency deposits can J:::e comparable in 
terms of issuer, credit risk, maturity and all other respects except 
currency of denomination. Moreover, the distinction J:::etween off-shore 
and on-shore interest rates has been considerably eroded in the period 
under consideration following the abolition of exchange controls, 
notably by the OK and Japan, in 1979. 
The data period was specifically chosen to coincide both with the 
abolition of Japanese exchange controls and with the period of operation 
of the European Monetary System. 
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4.6 Empirical Results and Discussion 
This essay has reported some new evidence on an important 
relationship in international macroeconomics - real interest parity. 
We examined real interest parity using a powerful, bivariate vector 
autoregressive methodology, and concentrated on Eurodeposit rates during 
the period July 1979 - October 1986. This investigation led to an 
overwhelming rejection of real interest parity (conditional on the 
maintained hypothesis of rational expectations) for real interest rate 
differentials between a number of major DECD countries against the US, 
the UK, West Germany and Japan. 
Our empirical results are reported in Tables 4.1 - 4.1V. Note in 
the first instance that in the case of country pairs : US - OK, Italy -
Germany, France - OK, Germany - OK, Netherlands - OK, Italy - Germany 
and France - Japan, a fairly high order autoregression was required to 
adequately characterise the time series properties of the data. The 
values of the Wald and Likelihood Ratio tests obtained for each country 
pair and maturity length are qualitatively identical - real interest 
parity is easily rejected in every case, with marginal significance 
levels of virtually zero. 
'!he results suggest that the imposition of real interest parity on 
models of exchange rate determination is questionable. Moreover, to 
some extent, these results may be welcomed by policy-makers as 
confirming the existence of an extra degree of freedom in their 
management of the danestic economy. Such evidence, in so far as it 
respresents the imperfect substitutability of bonds, suggests that 
national governments can drive a wedge between their international 
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pursuits and the domestic money supply by off-setting operations in 
danestic financial markets. For example, an official intervention in 
foreign exchange markets, say buying foreign exchange, can be steri lized 
by an open market sale of domestic securities. This leaves the 
domest ic money supply constant but al ters the supply of bonds to the 
public, increasing the ex-ante real interest rate and consequently real 
savings and investment decisions in the domestic economy. 
On the other hand, rejection of real interest parity raises some 
puzzles, particularly for one or two of the country pairs examined. 
Korajczyk (1985), for example shows that, at least under some stylised 
assumptions, foreign exchange risk premia should be a function of real 
interest rate differentials. Our real interest differentials between 
West Germany and other members of the EMS (France, Italy and the 
Netherlands) therefore run counter to the argument that the EMS makes 
the lira the franc or the guilder a perfect substitute for the mark and 
therefore protects mark cross-rates from movements out of or into the 
dollar. Canzoneri (1982) for example shows that if intervention is 
taking place within a custexrs union to smooth fluctuations in exchange 
rates, then a financial disturbance which shifts demand for one union 
members assets to a country outwith the union, results in the 
disturbances being reflected in the other union members labour market -
rather than being reflected in cross rates. To that extent the long-
run credibi I i ty of the European Monetary System may be threatened. 
Whi le the reported results from tests of real interest par i ty are 
decisive, one must remember that their validity rests on the legitimacy 
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of the maintained hypothesis of rational expectations. Rational 
expectations implies that all relevant information is acted on by the 
market. While this does not imply that all market participants 
formulate their expectations in a rational manner, it is a useful 
approximation in that it is widely accepted that agents in asset markets 
have immediate access to a vast continuously updated information set. 
There may of course be a number of feasible rational expectations 
equilibria other than the market fundamental solution. If, for 
example, the exchange rate is bid away from the fundamental solution in 
a speculative bubble, then agents will be required to evaluate the 
probability of the continuation of the bubble against a return to 
fundamentals. MacDonald and Taylor (1989a) note that the resulting 
assymetry in the bubble terms probability distribution will be imparted 
into the exchange rate innovation term, resulting in a skewed 
distribution of the rational expectation forecasting error. Our 
results therefore may reflect such a drift away from fundamentals. 
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TABLE 4.I 
Country 
Pairs 
UK-
os 
Germany-
lE 
Japan-
OS 
France-
lE 
Italy-
lE 
Nether lands-
lE 
WALD AND LIKELIHCXD RATIO TESl'S 
for the Real Interest Parity Restrictions: 
D:>llar Rates-
Chosen 
value of 
n R21 R22 01 02 L(n-1) L(n+1) Wald LR 
1.1 Twelve IOClIlths maturity 
9 
2 
3 
1 
3 
3 
0.256 I 0.844 I 24.547 12.076 6.446 
(0.053) (0.673) (0.168) 
0.359 I 0.734 I 23.580 22.079 10.390 
(0.369) (0.455) (0.034) 
0.162 I 0.886 I 31.298 25.264 17.840 
(0.068) (0.235) (0.001) 
0.299 I 0.657 I 21.426 23.123 
(0.550) (0.453) 
0.317 I 0.740 I 27.468 26.106 11.082 
(0.155) (0.202) (0.025) 
0.211 I 0.792 I 18.689 24.582 15.363 
(0.605 (0.265) (0.004) 
6.768 732.598 I 182.846 
(0.148) (0.000) (0.000) 
1.997 154.687 88.335 
(0.736) (0.000) (0.000) 
2.921 700.389 183.597 
(0.571) (0.000) (0.000) 
4.984 
(0.288) 
79.786 
(0.000) 
54.455 
(0.000) 
3.561 1138.805 81.484 
(0.468) (0.000) (0.000) 
1.356 I 320.420 133.500 
(0.851) (0.000) (0.000) 
- OI:servations begin July 1979 and end December 1986. R21 and R22 denote the coefficients of 
determinaticn adjusted for degrees of freedan for the inflation differential and interest differential 
regressions respectively. Q1 and 02 are the corresponding Ljunq-Eox statistics, and are asymptotically 
central chi-squared variates under the null hypothesis of white noise residuals, with (24-n) degrees of 
freedom; L(n-1) is a liklihood ratio statistic for a vector autoregressicn of order (n-1) (VAR(n-1) against 
the alternative VAR(n), while L(n+1) tests VAR(n) against VAR(n+1): each is an asymptotically central 
chi-squared variate with four degrees of freedom; the wald and Likelihood Ratio statistics for the rational 
expectations restrictions are each asymptotically central chi-squared under the null with 2n degrees of 
freecbn; Figures in parenthesis denote marginal significance levels in all cases. 
TABLE 4.IA WAID AND LlKELIlDD RATIO TESTS 
for the Real Interest Parity Restrictions: 
DJllar Rates-
Country Chosen 
Pairs value of 
n R21 R22 Q1 Q2 L(n-1) L(n+1) Wald IR 
1 .2 Six months matur i ty 
UK- 10 0.280 I 0.835 I 20.080 15.768 5.163 3.835 875.828 225.675 
US (0.127 ) (0.327) (0.270) (0.428) (0.000) (0.000) 
Germany- 2 0.355 0.696 22.218 28.169 13.325 2.950 81.934 57.580 
lE (0.446) (0.170) (0.009) (0.566) (0.000) (0.000) 
t··) (..I, Japan- 3 0.179 0.882 29.299 27.345 23.073 3.983 761.968 197.465 (to 
lE (0.106) (0.159 ) (0.000) (0.408) (0.000) (0.000) 
France- 1 0.288 I 0.657 121.429 23.123 5.292 79.786 54.455 
lE (0.555) (0.453) (0.258) (0.000) (0.000) 
1taly- 3 0.306 I 0.670 I 28.703 20.454 16.043 2.864 53.551 42.736 
lE (0.121 ) (0.492) (0.002) (0.580) (0.000) (0.000) 
Nether 1 ands- 4 0.212 I 0.800 I 17.1158 26.512 4.222 7.760 303.469 146.414 
lE (0.645) (0.149) (0.376) (0.100) (0.000) (0.000) 
- See note to Table 4.1 
TABLE 4.II WALD AND LIKEt.Umo RATIO TESTS 
for the Real Interest Parity Restrictions: 
Sterling Rates(&) 
Country Clxlsen 
Pairs value of 
n R2, R22 Q, 02 L(n-1) L(n+1) Wald IR 
2.1 Twelve months maturity 
Germany- 12 0.361 0.769 17.291 15.102 4.718 I 389.808 I 186.101 
OK (0.138) (0.235) (0.317) (0.000) (0.000) 
Japan- 6 0.134 0.701 27.109 14.864 7.956 4.288 224.131 116.764 
U<. (0.076) (0.724) (0.093) (0.368) (0.000) (0.000) 
France- 10 0.245 0.856 20.559 18.186 8.092 5.043 420.655 149.175 
OK (0.113) (0.198) (0.088) (0.282) (0.000) (0.000) 
Italy- 7 0.303 0.832 23.081 21.366 11.405 0.781 177.459 89.480 
U<. (0.146) (0.210) (0.022) (0.940) (0.000) (0.000) 1'.) (JI 
Nether 1 ams- 10 f -0.018 f 0.676 f 22.209 118.699 I 9.812 I 3.913 1(158.334) 92.262 ..J 
OK (0.074) (0.116) (0.437)· (0.417) (0.000) (0.000) 
2.2 Six months maturity 
Germany- 10 0.039 0.745 27.6351 15.921 9.710 4.755 138.207 92.312 
U<. (0.015) (0.317) (0.045) (0.313) (0.000) (0.000) 
Japan- 6 0.131 0.672 27.300 13.802 8.035 4.210 96.263 71.559 
OK (0.013) (0.141) (0.090) (0.318) (0.000) (0.000) 
France- 3 0.161 0.750 24.843 32.090 10.341 2.177 125.999 15.128 
OK (0.254) (0.573) (0.035) (0.703) (0.000) (0.000) 
Italy- 9 0.295 0.793 19.696 24.501 9.131 2.245 162.210 107.809 
OK (0.183 ) (0.057) (0.057) (0.690) (0.000) (0.000) 
Nether lands- 13 0.304 0.613 18.211 13.945 6.063 284.344 152.393 
OK (0.015) (0.236) (0.194) (0.000) (0.000) 
& See note to Table 4.I 
TABLE 4.III WArD AND LIKELIBXlD RATIO TESTS 
for the Real Interest Parity Restrictions: 
Mark Ratesc.) 
Cbuntry Chcsen 
Pairs value of 
n R21 R22 01 02 L(n-1) L(n+1) Wald I.R 
3.1 Twelve 1'OCIl'lths maturity 
Japan- S 0.227 0.904 21.595 16.516 10.554 1.731 663.379 181.547 Germany (0.304) (0.662) (0.032) (0.784) (0.000) (0.000) 
France- 1 0.248 0.818 21.853 16.038 4.783 270.152 115.228 Germany (0.529) (0.853) (0.309) (0.000) (0.000) 
Italy- 7 0.245 0.805 18.465 25.458 6.699 3.983 251.405 130.891 Germany (0.360) (0.848) ( 0.152) (0.408) (0.000) (0.000) 
to,) 
(..11 Nether lands- 3 0.358 I 0.577 I 29.623 I 16.123 I 18.451 5.988 , 185.359 , 107.421 w Gennany (0.099) (0.762) (0.001) (0.200) (0.000) (0.000) 
3.2 Six months maturity 
Japan- 5 0.222 0.897 23.700 15.277 13.314 13.135 415.215 155.311 Gennany (0.207) (0.704) (0.009) (0.535) (0.000) (0.000) 
France- 1 0.249 0.701 21.758 16.432 5.989 128.883 '15.370 Germany (0.534) (0.'193) (0.199) (0.000) (O.OOO) 
Italy-
'1 0.219 0.'131 20.130 29.373 8.784 6.596) 89.358 68.045 Gennany (0.267) (0.031) (0.066) (0.158) (0.000) (0.000) 
Nether lands- 3 0.367 0.600 31.426 20.089 22.329 6.588 141.620 96.274 Germany (O.06G) (0.515) (0.000) (0.159 ) (0.000) (0.000) 
.. See note to Table 4.I 
TABIE 4.IV WAID AND LIKELIHXlD RATIO TESTS 
for the Real Interest Parity Restrictions: 
Yen Rates-
Country Chcsen 
Pairs value of 
n R2, R22 Q, Q2 L(n-1) L(n+1) Wald IR 
4.1 Twelve months maturity 
France- 7 0.139 0.867 20.982 14.648 8.986 1.035 414.158 175.236 
Japan (0.227) (0.620) (0.061) (0.904) (0.000) (0.000) 
Italy- 2 0.136 0.813 28.166 26.417 10.041 0.224 170.596 91.396 
Japan (0.170) (0.234) (0.397) (0.994) (0.000) (0.000) 
t-.) Nether 1 ands- 3 0.258 0.888 24.603 22.054 17.894 3.146 280.631 120.962 
(I) Japan (0.264) (0.396) (0.001) (0.533) (0.000) (0.000) 
'..0 
4.2 Six months maturity 
France- 7 0.131 0.794 22.835 14.078 8.944 2.990 202.796 118.984 
Japan (0.154) (0.661) (0.062) (0.559) (0.000) (0.000) 
Italy- 4 0.113 0.799 26.535 17.464 17.983 1.118 72.244 57.951 
Japan (0.148) (0.622) (0.001) (0.891 ) (0.000) (0.000) 
Nether lands- 3 0.251 0.878 23.436 29.539 15.565 2.749 201.157 106.163 
Japan (0.321) (0.101) (0.003) (0.600) (0.000) (0.000) 
.. See note to Table 4.1 
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Summary and Concl usic:n 
'Ibis thesis brings together a collection of essays on parity 
condi t ions in internat ional economics: covered interest par i ty; 
uncovered interest parity; purchasing power parity and real interest 
parity. While each essay is an independent study of a particular 
problem area, there exists a common theme in that the set of parity 
condi tions chosen for analysis is thought to be important in determining 
the short and long-run behaviour of exchange rates. The justification 
for the study arises from two related issues. Firstly, as it is often 
assumed that exchange rates are determined in efficient markets, an 
analysis of international parity conditions provides important insights 
into the validity of the efficient markets hypothesis. Secondly, 
models of exchange rate determination, within which the above parity 
conditions play a fundamental role, have exhibited a poor empirical 
performance in the recent past. An examination of the foundations of 
such models may therefore be helpful in allocating 'blame'. In an 
attempt to match problem and methodology I each essay is concerned wi th a 
particular time period and employs an analytical technique specifically 
chosen to extract opt imal inforrnat ion from the data. 
Of the four problem areas analysed only covered interest parity was 
unconditionally accepted as a plausible assumption. From a possible 
6330 profitable arbitrage opportunities sampled around economic news 
releases during the months of August and September 1987, only eight 
would have been profitable. Agents were efficient in terms of ensuring 
the forward exchange premium equalled the relevant interest rate 
differentials, subject to transaction costs. Very short-run exchange 
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rates would seem to be determined in efficient markets, exchange rates 
responding quickly to nominal shocks particularly at the short end of 
the market. As suggested in ESSAY I, the deviations from covered 
interest parity at the long end of the market may be due to 
institutional factors. The evidence suggests that covered interest 
parity would be a plausible assumption to invoke when building models of 
exchange rate determination. 
Speculative efficiency, in the form of uncovered interest parity 
has been rejected in 1920s data. Some evidence however was found for 
the existence of a risk premium in the forward exchange rate during the 
1920s, but attempts to model the premia as both a function of past 
forecast errors and as a latent variable, using GARCH-in-MEAN and Kalman 
filtering techniques, met limited success. We suggest that the 
'correct' model may belong to the speculative bubble family, or that 
speculative behaviour does not conform to the rational expectation 
hypothesis. We also suggest that during this period the effect of the 
'peso problem' whereby market participants perceive a small probability 
in each period of an end to monetary instability, may have distorted 
results. Non-independence of the risk premium and skewed distributions 
would mean that standard t tests, which implicitly assume the risk 
premium to approximate a normal distribution, may be spurious. We were 
therefore unable to verify the existence of risk averse speculative 
agents in foreign exchange markets thus whether the market is efficient. 
This need not however invalidate the portfolio balance view of 
exchange rate behaviour. If, for exampl e, dev i at ions from uncovered 
interest parity are due to speculative bubbles, where the expectation of 
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capi tal gain from holding a currency is greater than the risk of the 
collapse of the currency (the bubble bursting and a return to 
fundamentals), this can be incorporated into a portfolio balance model, 
with deviations from parity representing the probability of a return to 
fundamentals. Any policy implications on the degree to which asset 
supplies and foreign exchange reserves can be manipulated ~uld depend 
en the successful modelling of such a deviation. 
Purchasing power parity, analysed in terms of a theory of gocds 
market arbitrage for 1975 to 1986, using a recently developed 
econometric teclmique - cointegration - was rejected. This ~uld imply 
that commodity arbitrage was inefficient. Persistent deficit with the 
us may have had feedback effects on the exchange rate via wealth and 
also may have damaged the relative competitiveness of the UK industrial 
base by generating insider/outsider dynamics, thus affecting the real 
economy. The analysis however was conducted in terms of price 
adjustment and it may be that adjustment was taking place qualatively 
rather than quantitively - a prcx::ess which our particular analysis did 
not pick up, but is arguably accounted for in unit value indices.(1) 
On the existing evidence however it would seem that purchasing power 
parity is not an axiom upon which models of exchange rate determinaticn 
should rest easi 1 y • It can be argued however that the foundat ion of 
the portfolio balance model is perhaps less damned. The implication 
that there may have been a hysteresis effect operating in the real 
(1) Recent ~rk has suggested that unit values are dominated by price 
effects rather than by qualitative and non-price effects, eg see Fraser, 
Taylor and webster (1989). 
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economy throughout this pericd, would seem to support a model which 
allows for feedback effects. As the period under consideration (1975-
1980) was dominated by supply shocks, it can be argued that they were 
real rather than nominal shocks, and our failure to find any mean 
revert ing tendency in the real exchange rate may have been because the 
variable was converging toward a continually shifting mean. Such a 
consideration implies that after an initial shock, market forces may set 
in motion a series of events which will permanently affect international 
competi tiveness. Such an argument suggests economic theorists should 
consider carefully supply side effects when building models of exchange 
rate determination. 
A direct test of real interest parity using the powerful bivariate 
vector autoregression approach, was also decisively rejected for the 
period 1979 to 1986. During this period there were no capital controls 
between the major western economies and the existence of the European 
t-bnetary System impl ies members currencies should be perfect 
substitutes. The period is therefore ideally suited to the analysis of 
the real interest parity condition. It would seem that real interest 
rates diverge internationally, the evidence suggesting that monetary 
models of exchange rate determination which invoke such an assumption 
may be misspecified. The ol:servation that real interest rate 
differentials do not optimally predict inflation differentials suggests 
that government can influence national investment/saving decisions by 
intervention in danestic financial markets. 
Research activity in the direction of modelling risk premia would 
therefore seem to have considerable credence if we consider our 
264 
empirical evidence on real interest parity. OUr evidence suggests that 
changes in relative supplies of different assets wi 11 have an effect on 
real interest differentials, hence measuring the extent to which we can 
alter interest rates without affecting the future path of exchange rates 
becomes an important issue. 
This thesis has attempted to increase our knowledge on how exchange 
rates are determined by an analysis of four of the bui lding blocks of 
currently dominant asset-type models of exchange rate determination. 
With the exception of very short-run movements in exchange rates, our 
results suggest that short and long-run equilibrium values of the 
exchange rate and convergence towards those values, may be far more 
complex than parity conditions and the efficient markets hypothesis 
imply. We suggest that the impl ied complexity may be the reason why 
empirical models of exchange rate determination have performed so poorly 
during the recent experience of floating exchange rates. The evidence 
which will allow us to understand such puzzling behaviour more fully 
must come from further empirical work as only then can economic 
theorists conceptually reassemble formal models. 
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